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APPENDIX ONE
Commentaries on Delphi Panel
responses



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REPORT ON QUESTIONNAIRE 1 (Q1) FROM THE CARDIFF UNIVERSITY TEAM TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCE (ESC) DELPHI PANEL

COMMENTARY ON RESPONSES TO QUESTION ONE OF QUESTIONNAIRE ONE

1. What can 'managing urban security' mean?

Most panellists responded to this question by distinguishing between:

- i.) problems of (or threats to) urban security,
- ii.) different approaches to managing these problems, and
- iii.) the diversity of contexts across Europe in which these problems and approaches pertain.

Some responses also queried the very concept of 'urban security management' both for its lack of familiarity in the particular national contexts they were reporting on and/or for the presumption that problems of security ought to be 'managed' as opposed to transformed or fundamentally altered.

A number of responses also distinguished between security as an objective condition and as a subjective perception. Each of these key findings can be elaborated further.

Problems of urban security:

Notwithstanding differences of emphasis, the responses to this question revealed a high degree of consensus around street crime and incivility, particularly amongst young, socially excluded populations, as a pressing problem of urban security.

Many emphasised violence against the person particularly that related to alcohol consumption and to family life, especially the abuse of women and children by adult males in the home. Many responses identified illicit drugs markets as a major problem of urban security and their relationship to other problems, in particular vice, property crimes, firearms-related crimes and the escalation of conflict amongst criminal gangs.

A number of responses also identified immigration as a problem for urban security in terms of its impact both as a driver of social conflict with more settled inhabitants of cities and as something eroding social cohesion and, therefore, the capacity for informal social control. A minority of responses identified state crimes as major threats to urban security, in particular police corruption and violence and, more broadly, the corruption of public officials. Only a minority of responses identified organised crime, human trafficking and terrorism as major problems of urban security, notwithstanding the priority accorded to these problems by the European Union's Directorate General for Home Affairs.

Even fewer identified corporate and white-collar crimes, including fraud and tax evasion, as problems of urban security notwithstanding the pressures these problems place on the resources for governing cities, particularly in an age of austerity. There was also negligible



mention of 'safety crimes', such as transgressions of regulations concerning health and safety in the work place or crimes against the environment such as industrial pollution or waste dumping, notwithstanding the significance of this broader conception of threats to the security of urban populations.

Approaches to the management of urban security:

The responses to this question also revealed a high degree of consensus around the growing significance of preventive approaches to problems of urban security undertaken by 'partnerships' of statutory, commercial and non-governmental organisations. Such partnerships or 'security networks' reflect a recognition of the limits to punitive and criminal justice-oriented responses to complex problems of security. They also reflect an interest in mobilising other kinds of resources and expertise, whilst recognising that appropriately modernised policing and criminal justice will continue to play an important role in protecting and reassuring urban populations.

Many responses also emphasised the importance of social justice approaches to problems of urban security, specifically those targeting social inequalities and social segregation as major causes of insecurity, especially the exclusion of young people from formal labour markets. A number of responses also identified the growing significance of risk management approaches that target interventions on the management of prolific and serious offenders, the protection of the repeatedly and multiply victimised and on early interventions with social groups 'at risk' of offending or becoming victimised. A few responses note the significance of approaches aimed at reducing the opportunities for security threats to be realised, for example through improved surveillance, environmental design and other manipulations of the situational circumstances of insecurity. Notable for its absence from all but one of the responses to this question, was the restorative justice approach of diverting conflict resolution from criminal justice processes and into conferences that negotiate direct reparations and forgiveness between victims, offenders and their close relations.

The diverse contexts of urban security management:

The principal disagreement amongst panellists revealed by responses to this question was over the very language of 'urban security management'. This term simply is not used in the Anglophone countries (the British Isles and Eire) where communitarian ideas have gained greater purchase and where notions of 'community safety' or 'safer and cohesive communities' would be more familiar descriptions of the range of problems of crime and disorder discussed in response to this question.

A number of respondents also noted the marginality of urban security as a focus for public policy and debate in largely rural countries, such as Eire and Norway and in countries which may have large urban populations but which have also noted increasing problems of rural crime such as Scotland and Wales. In this regard, 'community safety' is also preferred as a concept that can recognise the diversity of local contexts for security threats. A number of respondents also identified the mobility of criminal organisations both within and across countries.

As such, it is argued that the appropriate context for interventions against security problems is not so much self-contained cities but networks of criminal relations (for example the cross-



national trafficking of drugs and humans). It was partly in response to this perceived mobility that the UK police National Intelligence Model (NIM) identified the interrelationship between 'Level One' problems (street crime and disorder), 'Level Two' problems (inter-regional trafficking in drugs and other illicit goods and services) and 'Level Three' problems (the transnational trade in narcotics, other illicit goods and services and organisation of terrorist attacks). Another area of dissent, or at least ambiguity, was over the relationship of national authorities downwards to local authorities, upwards to the European Union and outwards to security actors in the commercial and NGO (non-governmental organisation) sectors. Some respondents referred to 'public safety' or 'public security' as a concept used to describe the continued normative, as well as empirical, importance of national sovereignty in setting the policy agenda for responding to problems of internal security. Finally there was some implied criticism of the idea that these security problems ought to be 'managed' rather than being transformed or fundamentally altered. The concept of 'management' has connotations of accepting a social condition and its allied problems but administering them more effectively, economically and efficiently. Insofar as respondents emphasised the failure of austerity and free market economics as a context for internal security, the implications are policy responses that are more fundamental and transformative.

The objective and subjective dimensions of urban security:

Another key distinction made by a number of respondents was between security as an objective condition (for example the exclusion of entire cohorts of the young population of European cities from formal employment opportunities) and as a matter of subjective perception (in particular fears and anxieties about crime, predation, incivility, infirmity, ethnic diversity that often get conflated). To this end, security can be as much about public reassurance about the probabilities of victimisation as about the response to the actual realisation of security threats, such as crime waves, terrorist incidents, corruption scandals etc.



COMMENTARY ON RESPONSES TO QUESTION TWO OF QUESTIONNAIRE ONE

2. What are the current challenges for managing urban security in your region?

Having discussed the broad range of problems, responses and contexts which 'urban security management' can be understood as referring to, panellists were asked to identify what, in their opinion, were the current challenges that dominated the particular social context they were working in. The principal finding from responses to this question was that experience was quite uneven, reflecting the variety of contexts for security across Europe. In this regard a useful distinction was made by one respondent between 'endogenous' challenges (referring to the nature of urban security itself) and 'exogenous' challenges (referring to the wider environment in which urban security is practiced).

Endogenous challenges: Respondents consistently noted a current challenge was to premise security strategies on problem-solving expertise, specifically what existing research tells us about the onset and desistance of various problems of crime and victimisation and about the evaluation of preventive responses. There is a tension here, however, between research as a driver of security and political and normative concerns. Respondents noted different models, for example the leadership of urban security strategies in Belgium and in France by elected municipal mayors as contrasted with leadership by appointed civil servants (for example in the Netherlands and, until November 2011 and the election of Police and Crime Commissioners, in England and Wales). There is ambiguity here between the role of elected or appointed officials in leading urban security, defining policy agendas and allocating necessary resources, the appropriate democratic oversight and scrutiny which such leadership (whether elected or bureaucratic) ought to be subject to and, finally, the role of research in informing the formulation, implementation and evaluation of these agendas.

Exogenous challenges: There was, predictably, consensus about the significance of the financial crisis of 2008, the subsequent sovereign debt crises experienced by a number of European countries and the impact of these on economic growth across Europe for urban security. Most respondents identified a double effect of the economic crisis in generating problems of crime and civil unrest in many European cities, particularly in those Southern European countries experiencing the most acute sovereign debt problems, whilst simultaneously degrading the governing capacity to respond to these problems. This double impact isn't limited to Southern European countries, however, as even in the relatively affluent North, there are major 'austerity' programmes of retrenchment in public expenditure including, for example, cuts of between 20-30% in policing in England and Wales and up to 60% reductions in resources for crime prevention and community safety work. A number of respondents also identified the broader geopolitical context of Europe, in particular the



involvement of many European countries in foreign policy conflicts in the Middle East and Northern Africa which are likely to continue to render European cities vulnerable as targets for revenge attacks, such as those witnessed in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 and as destinations for further inward migration from populations fleeing civil wars in the Arabic world.



COMMENTARY ON RESPONSES TO QUESTION THREE OF QUESTIONNAIRE ONE

3. What are the potential challenges for managing urban security in your region in the coming decade?

Whilst there was a broad consensus amongst respondents about the depth of the current economic crisis affecting European countries and the likelihood of the longevity of its impact on urban security over the coming decade, they noted how these impacts would be uneven. The impact on cities in Southern European countries is likely to be the most severe in terms of long-term high unemployment rates for young urban populations in Spain, Greece, Eire, Portugal and Southern Italy. In turn this is likely to generate enormous pressures for migration of these young populations to other cities in the European Union, particularly in the relatively wealthier countries of the North West. These migratory pressures – along with migratory processes emanating from outside of Europe- are likely to further exacerbate competition for limited public resources (housing, education, healthcare etc.) and employment opportunities in the cities of the North and with the low-skilled, socially excluded populations already resident in these cities. Some respondents identified a likely backlash against new arrivals and the growth of a more intolerant, exclusionary and embittered politics of entitlement altering, for example, the social model associated with post-war Nordic societies of which the Utoya and Oslo atrocities of 2011 are but a foretaste.

Some respondents identified even more profound challenges for urban security in the coming decade that are likely to interact with, and be exacerbated by, these economic problems. They identified the ageing population in Europe as likely to alter the demography of crime and victimisation. An ageing population may generate greater vulnerabilities to predatory crime, including fraud. Ageing populations also tend to be more anxious, refracting fears about their general infirmity through fears about crime and incivility particularly amongst the young. This, it was suggested, is likely to worsen inter-generational conflicts between a fearful elderly population and a younger population resentful of being materially poorer than previous generations. One respondent argued, however, that a future trend is likely to be toward forms of 'wrinkly crime' in which populations retiring into more impoverished conditions resort to forms of property crime to enhance their standards of living. Some respondents noted the subtle complexities of this changing demography of crime and victimisation as an ageing population also implies more employment opportunities for those of working age and this might act to offset some of the structural unemployment confronting younger cohorts of the urban population in Europe. This, however, will be determined by the kind of employment opportunities open to highly skilled graduates in knowledge-economy labour markets contrasted with their semi-skilled and unskilled peers thereby worsening processes of social segregation along lines of class as well as ethnicity.



Another longer term trend is toward the continued expansion of urban populations and related concerns over the sustainability of the energy, transport, food and water systems supporting these populations. In addition the 'critical infrastructure' of European cities was thought be some respondents to be vulnerable to breakdown as a consequence of climate change and related extreme weather conditions. This is particularly the case for infrastructures premised on digital communications which may be 'smart' but are also 'brittle' given the vulnerability of their complex engineering to breakdown in extreme conditions.

A final long-term challenge identified by respondents was the likelihood that, in conditions of greater social segregation, social inequality and reduced upward mobility of populations, criminality will become more organised, more severe and more frequent amongst populations excluded from licit labour markets.

In turn these future-oriented scenarios about urban security have major implications for the forward-planning and anticipation of the kinds of authorities that will need to be responsible for responding to problems of urban security and the kinds of skills and expertise they will need to have.



COMMENTARY ON RESPONSES TO QUESTION FOUR OF QUESTIONNAIRE ONE

4. Who is currently responsible for managing urban security?

Responsibility for managing urban security can be found at varying levels and amongst several agencies and actors in each of the sampled countries. Respondents differed over the emphasis they placed on the responsibility assumed by actors at different 'tiers' (national, regional and municipal) and 'spheres' (state, commercial and NGO/not-for-profit) of governance. However, all respondents limited their discussion to responsible authorities within nation states with negligible recognition of the responsibility of actors at the supra-national level (such as Europol, Eurojust and Frontex). In other words, there was no mention of those EU bodies with responsibility for policing and judicial cooperation over matters of 'internal security' within the EU (for example, within the Schengen zone). Also not discussed were the roles of other supra-national actors (such as the strategic partnerships the EU has with Russia and the US), the influence of the UN (and other intergovernmental organisations) on matters of internal security (e.g. through conventions on transnational organised crime etc.) or any pressures brought to bear on problems of urban security (such as corruption) from NGO's (such as Transparency International) or from commercial security actors.

A consensus of opinion emerged from respondents about the concentration of responsibility in the state 'sphere' as contrasted with the commercial, community or NGO 'spheres' with this state responsibility evident at different 'tiers'. For example, centralised Ministries and agencies at the national 'tier', county/state administrations (governing over several localities) at the regional 'tier', and local councils within municipalities including small, medium and large cities and towns at the local 'tier' were noted by respondents. In most jurisdictions state responsibility for urban security management is organised across these three levels reflecting the extent to which urban security may be managed more centrally and/or more locally. However, respondents also reported key differences in relation to the extent to which power is devolved to municipalities or centralised in national ministries or in which the mandate for leadership is not clear with elements of local discretion but also national government steering. For example, the use of performance management, targets, budgetary allocations, public service agreements and so on to steer local community safety partnerships in a particular direction was noted in one jurisdiction. Within the state 'sphere' of governance, respondents also reported another key difference between leadership from elected politicians or from appointed civil servants. In these frameworks it is therefore important to understand how 'strategic' and 'operational' responsibilities are distributed given tensions between competing mandates and relations of power. In other words, who creates the 'strategic' agenda in terms of resource allocation and prioritisation of security problems for how urban security is managed and subsequently which actors have 'operational' responsibility for carrying out urban security management. For



example, in some jurisdictions frameworks are created by central government agencies but implemented and operationalised at the local and regional 'tiers' whereas other jurisdictions present evidence of co-management and co-production between (elected or appointed) civil servants, local authorities (e.g. local councils, social and housing services), police and state agencies at different 'tiers', commercial enterprises (e.g. local businesses), schools, social services, etc. Many respondents questioned how these structures of responsibility are evaluated, how they function and thus their transparency.

Whether leadership is concentrated at the national or municipal level or taken by elected politicians or appointed civil servants, scientific and research-based expertise about urban security problems was consistently reported as marginal to this leadership. In some jurisdictions new security professions have also been created such as risk managers, security managers and community safety managers but greater empirical understanding of these professions throughout Europe is required. This mixed economy of responsibility for urban security management exists, albeit unevenly, throughout Europe given recent trends towards growth in privatisation and de-professionalisation as well as austerity measures aiming to reduce state spending.



COMMENTARY ON RESPONSES TO QUESTION FIVE OF QUESTIONNAIRE ONE

5. Who ought to be responsible for managing urban security?

The question of who 'ought' to be responsible for managing urban security elicited a number of common responses. Most respondents advocated dual responsibility or co-responsibility between local authorities/municipalities and the central government. As one response suggested, giving emphasis to local government and the public police seems an appropriate division of labour as it formally removes the monopoly over security from the police: this complements local strategies of public safety and wellbeing as opposed to crime control that are evident throughout the sampled jurisdictions. Thus, as another response indicated, there should be locally developed crime-prevention programmes with a national support structure. For some jurisdictions, the role of the police within this framework should remain pivotal given the high level of trust they receive and their status as the central authority for responding to internal problems. However, even in those jurisdictions advocating a strong police role, myriad state and non-state actors and agencies emanating from different 'spheres' located across different 'tiers' would remain involved in urban security management. For example, some responses acknowledged how the increasing importance of commercial security and the decreasing ability of the state and municipalities to provide security can lead to new forms of security being developed: this in turn potentially widens those responsible and accountable. However, it was suggested that these non-state developments should be managed and regulated by the state but operationalised at the local 'tier' by local authorities within the state 'sphere'. In other words, there should be a distinction here between actors with 'strategic' and 'operational' responsibilities.

In some jurisdictions, responses indicated stronger support for responsibility to be located primarily at the local 'tier' (municipalities, cities) where the police, Mayors and/or other responsible agents (but primarily those within the state 'sphere') can be directly accountable to those areas and citizens that they serve: centralised law enforcement bodies often have no formal accountability to local authorities, as suggested in one response, while similarly another respondent indicated a need to shift away from the centralised police being solely responsible. Thus, urban security management should be carried out in accordance with local authorities at the local 'tier'.

At this local 'tier', responses indicated the need for local authorities to develop multi-agency partnerships, and inter-agency and inter-locality responses to security management. However, certain caveats to responses at the local 'tier' exist. For example, one respondent spoke of how partnerships at the local 'tier' are reliant on trust-based coordination and require negotiation and compromise rather than hierarchical 'command and control', have more opaque accountability relationships and are susceptible to non-statutory partners exiting if negotiations



do not meet their remits. Additionally, in the backdrop of declining voting turnouts during elections, the 'democratic' credibility of local government and the extent to which elected members represent community members was also questioned. Other respondents wrote of the potential of an 'urban security manager' located at the local 'tier but with both this concept and those of 'partnerships' and other complex arrangements, the 'strategic' and 'operational' decision-making powers are not clear. There is ambiguity in the discourse and practice of such concepts in relation to where the locus of power actually resides and where it ought to reside: within which 'sphere' and at which 'tier'. Important questions remain to be answered: (1) where and by whom should the urban security management 'strategy' be formulated, (2) how should prioritisation of certain problems over others for intervention given modest resources occur and therefore the allocation of resources be determined, and (3) where and with whom should 'operational' responsibility to carry out the practices of urban security management be located? In other words, which actors (e.g. police, elected/appointed civil servants, commercial enterprises) at which 'tiers' (supranational, national, regional, local) ought to on the one hand have final authority should competing authorities not be able to reach agreement and on the other hand be tasked with carrying out these strategies?



COMMENTARY ON RESPONSES TO QUESTION SIX OF QUESTIONNAIRE ONE

6. What expertise and training currently equips these authorities to respond to these problems?

The final part of the questionnaire (questions 6-8) shifted focus to questions of expertise, both current and potential, and in particular how such expertise could be institutionalised in training and educational programmes. On the basis of the responses of the panellists it is possible to identify three substantively different kinds of expertise, namely:

- The expertise of administrators and public office holders ('administration as a vocation')
- The expertise of politicians and elected representatives ('politics as a vocation')
- The expertise of scientists and researchers ('science as a vocation').

Such different modes of expertise also need to be understood in terms of the different types of training, education and occupational socialisation which may be associated with the three types of career. This is not to suggest that these three 'vocations' are entirely separate nor to deny that there is vital interaction between such actors. At the same time the different logics underpinning these vocations should not be collapsed into an ill-defined call for joint or multi-disciplinary partnership working across the different authorities and their forms of expertise. From the responses received from panellists, it is possible to elaborate further the key differences between the administrative, political and scientific kinds of expertise thought to be relevant to urban security management.

The current expertise of administrators and public office holders:

It was widely noted that the key actors requiring greater expertise and training were those holding appointed public office. There was thus a broad consensus that the generally limited expertise and training in urban security which did exist across some European countries was associated with public administrators, both generalist and specialist, and often remained specifically located in the traditional branch of law enforcement and crime control, the public police. In turn these actors were located at both the national and municipal levels. In terms of the current expertise equipping authorities to respond to problems of urban security, at one extreme we find an emphasis on both strategic and operational expertise being defined currently in traditional repressive and reactive public policing terms. This was particularly characteristic of countries of Southern and Eastern Europe. In such contexts both the strategic agenda-setting and resource allocation powers and operational responses to specific problems of urban security appear to remain with the repressive arm of the state, locally and nationally. In other countries it is suggested that a criminal justice or legal discourse remains dominant but tempered by evidence of the growth of local, municipal preventive strategies also being emergent especially in cities (see France, Germany). In the two afore-mentioned countries



responsibility for training and developing expertise remains with centralised state programmes and governed by legal rules and bureaucratic regulations regarding certification in which competence in knowledge of public law is essential. Across the Scandinavian countries, distinct and well developed professional systems of training for public servants appear to be evident, in which police colleges and academies are key institutional players alongside specialist institutes of crisis management. Panellists agreed that the Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian police appear to continue to be held in high regard and trusted by the public at large and thus have legitimacy to play the leadership role, both strategic and operational it would appear, in urban security management. Whereas panellists reporting on the experience of the UK and Ireland in particular identified a distinct emphasis on 'on the job' training and skills acquisition alongside generic performance management skills for public administrators with responsibility for urban security. Furthermore, nation-wide networks of these administrators also play a role in sharing operational good practice along with dedicated central government units.

The current expertise of politicians and elected representatives:

The role of elected politicians, local and national, was not discussed in any great depth by the majority of our respondents. This reflected a consensus that strategic and operational expertise in urban security management was primarily understood as residing in the office of non-elected executive officers and teams. Elected politicians at both national and local municipal tiers of government were also viewed as being influenced by populist sentiments and moral judgment rather than on the basis of rational, evidential and technical expertise. They were viewed in turn as generally lacking in the type of long-term strategic vision needed to deal proactively, rather than reactively, with the kinds of problems of managing urban security identified in q.1 – 3, above. This was vividly depicted by one of our respondents as involving a 'void' in terms of any political and policy understanding of the complex, multi-dimensional, qualities of urban security issues and their management. Interestingly, there was no mention, in responses to Q1, of the capacity of elected politicians to exercise adequate democratic oversight and scrutiny of administrators given their limited technical expertise about problems of urban security. In summary, the suggestion from the responses of panellists to this question is that exercise of authority for urban security management is either premised on the party political and ideological inclinations of elected actors or it is left to unaccountable public administrators but in either case the influence of social scientific expertise is marginal. In turn, this provokes an important question about the pre-dominance of political, administrative and scientific expertise in urban security management and how these different kinds of expertise can relate to one another.

The current expertise of scientists and researchers:

The expertise of university-based researchers and scientific advisors was almost universally viewed as being marginal to both the strategic and operational work of public authorities tasked with managing urban security. Perhaps not unsurprisingly, given the institutional location of members of this particular Delphi panel, the relative marginality of social scientific research skills in gathering data and social trend analysis, evaluation of policy interventions and evidence-based problem-solving etc. was widely perceived as a major deficit in expertise and training for urban security management. As noted above, all panellists supported the emerging



role for university-based undergraduate and, more especially, Masters level courses in, variously, 'urban safety', 'crime prevention' and 'community safety' and to a lesser extent 'crisis management', 'urban policy' and 'public management'. However, at present it would appear that very few, if any, of these university-based and primarily criminology-based and multi-disciplinary social science courses are considered compulsory for candidates for urban security management posts. In turn across European countries there is little evidence of any general, coordinated training although developments associated with the European Forum for Urban Security (EFUS)-based Masters programme in urban security were cited by a number of respondents as a potential starting point for the European-wide development of such training and education.

Other issues:

Some respondents also reported the significance of different social contexts for the kinds of expertise implied by urban security management. Respondents viewed the larger cities as having greater analytical capacity compared with smaller cities, towns and rural areas (see Belgium, Norway, Finland, Ireland, UK). In common with earlier responses in the questionnaire, little reference was made to either the international level of governmental expertise (especially EU-level, for example the significance of the European Union's annual Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) or its annual Terrorism Situation and Trend reports (TE-SAT) for urban security management) or to expertise in the commercial and voluntary spheres (for example, the reports issues by NGO's such as Transparency International).



COMMENTARY ON RESPONSES TO QUESTION SEVEN OF QUESTIONNAIRE ONE

7. What expertise ought to be entailed in this response in the context of your country?

Given the wide-ranging definition of the problems of urban security management noted in the responses to questions 1-3 above, it is not surprising to find often broad-brush and ill-defined discussion of the skills, knowledge and values which ought to be entailed in the responses of relevant authorities and actors. The distinction between operational and strategic knowledge and skills and their relationship to those holding office at different tiers and in different spheres of governance was mentioned by a number of our experts but not discussed in detail. Rather, 'feel-good', but ill-defined, rhetoric about co-ordinated management, joint working, partnerships, collaboration and networking predominated over more precise accounts of the substantive expertise required of administrators, elected politicians and social scientists in evidence-based approaches to problems of urban security management.

There was, however, a consensus with regard to the current deficit, within urban security management, in the kinds of scientific expertise and analytical capacity needed to identify patterns and trends in urban security threats, to infer their causes, identify opportunities for their commission and to formulate, implement and evaluate responses based on this kind of expertise. In a number of countries an absence of reliable scientific evidence and independent data sets and scientific evaluation of interventions was acknowledged. Arising out of this perceived deficit, the 'solution' was viewed as requiring the wider development and dissemination of a critical, proactive problem-solving, evidence-based and rational understanding of urban security problems. In relation to this, a useful example is the attempt by the British Home Office to promote a 'problem-oriented approach' to policing and crime reduction, drawing upon North American action-research approaches to crime prevention, which identify the need for a logical process of 'Scanning' for current and prospective problems (drawing upon quantitative and qualitative sources of intelligence), 'Analysing' this intelligence to identify the concentration of these problems in particular places at certain times and amongst particular social groups, 'Responding' to these problems in ways that target resources on where, when and amongst whom they exist according to the evidence and finally 'Assessing' the impact of these responses (the 'SARA' process).

There was also a consensus amongst panellists about the need for a closer connection and interaction between the worlds of the research academy (science as a vocation) and of practice and policy (politics and administration as vocations). This was seen as an important area for more enlightened and rational policy making in what is recognised as a volatile and emotive arena of politics and public moral debate. In discussing the key forms of expertise which ought to be required of those undertaking urban security management, the overwhelming focus was on developing a **new cadre of municipal-level public managers (and teams)**: in other words



those pursuing administration as a vocation. There is also a strong sense that these public sector managers would need to facilitate communication between those with social scientific expertise about problems of urban security and those with political responsibility for addressing these problems. The core knowledge and skills base of any future graduate level profession for municipal-level civil servants was both widely and positively associated with multi-disciplinary skills and competencies established at Masters level university training. However, with a few notable exceptions, the proposed content of university curricula and training programmes remained perhaps understandably vague. Indeed it is clear that very few specialist courses and training programmes in urban security management exist currently.

The exact mix of such an academic and professional knowledge and skills base ranged from a combination of the disciplines of law, public policy and sociology, to predominantly criminology-based and more widely, critical interdisciplinary social science degrees which would enable the grasp of the inherent complexity of the problem to be managed or more ambitiously 'transformed' through new modes of governance. There was a consensus among respondents that both knowledge of the nature of the problem of urban security ('content') and of the 'process' of governing and managing the response to the problem was seen as crucial to any training and professional development of this expertise.

The challenge of communicating with and empowering local 'hard to reach' communities and citizens was also a key issue among several respondents and in turn the importance of a sensitivity to the politics, ethics and human rights consequences of urban security strategies and interventions was suggestive of a wish to move beyond generic management training and expertise. Three potentially key areas of 'content' knowledge and skills acquisition for future urban security management may be discerned from the panel to date. First there is the claim that this expertise needs to prioritise knowledge and skills in crime and disorder prevention; second, that this expertise needs to prioritise knowledge and skills with regard to broader trends and concerns over social cohesion and community capacity building; and third, that this expertise in needs to prioritise knowledge and skills with regard to deep and long-term trends with regard to human security and the environment, urban planning and the smart but brittle infrastructure of cities and modern governance.

In some of the accounts the overarching authority of central government ministries and the police was viewed as a crucial means of maintaining the rule of law and equitable outcomes (see, for example, Germany, Finland and Norway). In others the dominance of the state and its traditionally 'repressive' ministries was viewed as constituting a threat to any future enlightened preventive policy and practice (see Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, for example). In the case of the latter, an argument was made for fundamental reforms including a new evidence-based, strategic and anticipatory policy making expertise at the central state sphere.



COMMENTARY ON RESPONSES TO QUESTION EIGHT OF QUESTIONNAIRE ONE

8. How might this expertise be best developed in educational and training programmes?

The development of a new knowledge, skills and values base in urban security management for non-elected public administrators was almost universally viewed as needing to reside in innovative, institutional processes associated with educational and training programmes involving the long-term collaboration of universities and researchers and national and local policy officer and practitioner agencies. It was, however, much rarer to see any explicit discussion of educational and training programmes for elected politicians (not to mention non-state actors in the commercial sector or citizens and local communities). That said we note again the concerns expressed over the lack of specialist expertise among mayors (e.g. Belgium) and the emphasis on the need for joint training of 'social actors', including politicians, citizens, social workers and police in the Spanish context. The general lack of discussion among most respondents of the educational and training needs of those pursuing politics (rather than administration or science) as a vocation is probably again indicative of urban security management being viewed as a function primarily for public administrators rather than for elected politicians or indeed actors in the commercial and voluntary sectors.

A consensus existed among respondents that urban security management ought to be professionalised through postgraduate instruction in the social sciences, focused on the acquisition of knowledge of the complex nature of the problem itself (urban security) and social scientific ways of explaining and responding to the problem alongside knowledge of governance and managing the policy process. It was also acknowledged by respondents that such instruction would need to be underpinned by vocational experience and 'placements' or 'internships.' However the fine detail of the curriculum for this postgraduate instruction and the priority to be accorded to different social sciences was less clear. The European Forum for Urban Security's (EFUS) Masters programme in Urban Security was noted by several respondents as a potential basis for furthering the development of a European-wide but locally-sensitive educational and training programme. It was also recognized by some respondents that the professionalization of this field of practice would necessitate several levels of educational and training qualifications, courses and programmes, depending on the work and tasks associated with 'teams' and 'offices'.

The possibility of advanced and specialist training for members of urban security management teams linked to particular in-service skills development was viewed as an important additional source of expert training above and beyond the widely supported, more generic Masters-level degree programme. The possibility of advanced scientific training to (professional) doctoral level for urban security managers was not identified by our respondents. Nonetheless such advanced training may facilitate better understanding of the relationship between scientific,



political and administrative expertise. It would also appear important to have be-spoke training and educational courses for elected representatives. Finally and exceptionally there was a call for international, pan-European networks and forums to facilitate comparative understanding of urban security management.



REPORT ON QUESTIONNAIRE 1 (Q1) FROM THE CARDIFF UNIVERSITY TEAM TO THE EUCPN DELPHI PANEL

Introduction

In this report on the first of three questionnaires, we present the key points of both consensus and dissent among our EUCPN Delphi panellists, structured in terms of the 8 questions in Questionnaire 1 (Q1). Please note that we have made the report available here as a word document as some of you may wish to read it as one complete document before answering the questionnaire which is available electronically. We have also included our question by question commentary available at the beginning of each of our eight sections on the electronic Questionnaire 2 (Q2), again for ease of reference. We wish to thank the members of EUCPN who were able to respond to this first round of our exercise in knowledge exchange. In particular we thank the following government representatives for their participation: Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Rumania.

We are keen for those country representatives who were unable to participate in round 1 of the Delphi panel and complete Q1 to comment on this initial report and contribute hopefully to the Questionnaire 2 (Q2). Indeed some of the missing countries are characterised by a long history of urban security and crime prevention strategies and it would be productive to draw on these respondents' experiences and reflections in Q2 and Q3 if at all possible.

Once participants have read this report, we will ask you to respond to Q2 which draws on the key points of interest emergent from the first round of our dialogue. Unlike the deliberately very open-ended nature of Q1, we have designed a highly structured, closed questionnaire for the second stage of the Delphi panel process. We are confident that this questionnaire will be both provocative and productive for your reflections on policy and practice in this fast developing field of expertise. Q2 is now available electronically at the following site:
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Given some delays in receiving responses to Q1 the timetable for the return of Q2 is now set at **27 July 2012**. In turn we aim to distribute Q3 to you by **1 September 2012** and for return from you by **30 September 2012** (this time-scale takes account of the summer leave requirements of EUCPN members). Finally we will provide the final report on the Delphi panel by the end of October 2012. Many thanks once again for taking time out of your busy working lives to support this research which we are confident will make a significant contribution to new policy thinking and practice on urban security and prevention strategies across Europe.



COMMENTARY ON RESPONSES TO QUESTION ONE OF QUESTIONNAIRE ONE

1. What can 'managing urban security' mean?

All panellists responded to this question by highlighting:

- i.) different approaches to *managing* these problems.

A minority of respondents also highlighted;

- ii.) problems of, or threats to, urban security
- iii.) the distinction between security as an objective condition and as a subjective perception.

Each of these key findings can be elaborated further.

Approaches to the management of urban security:

The responses to this question revealed a high degree of consensus around the growing significance of preventive and 'integral' approaches to problems of urban security undertaken by 'partnerships' of statutory organisations. There was in turn a widespread recognition of both the need for and difficulties in realising effective co-ordination of local policy that deploys available means efficiently and methodically. The need for greater attention to co-operation between diverse actors at different policy levels was also acknowledged widely. The support for partnerships or 'security networks' among the majority of our respondents appears to reflect a recognition of the limits to punitive and criminal justice-oriented responses to complex problems of security. Such views also reflect an interest in mobilising other kinds of resources and expertise, whilst recognising that appropriately modernised policing and criminal justice will continue to play an important role in both repressing criminality and protecting and reassuring urban populations.

In the majority of responses, the problem of managing urban security was viewed through the prism of crime prevention strategies, both long-term and short-term, which in turn were located in territorially defined contexts (of the neighbourhood or the city). Most responses noted the significance of approaches aimed at reducing the opportunities for security threats to be realised, for example, through improved surveillance, environmental design and other manipulations of the situational circumstances of insecurity. A smaller number of responses also identified the growing significance of risk management approaches that target interventions on the management of prolific and serious offenders, the protection of the repeatedly and multiply victimised and on early interventions with social groups 'at risk' of offending or becoming victimised. Alongside both situational and risk management approaches, the majority of responses also saw a key role for social crime prevention strategies aimed at increasing the capacity of individuals and promoting social cohesion and a greater sense of security in neighbourhoods. A minority of responses also emphasised the importance of social justice approaches to problems of urban security, specifically those targeting underlying social



inequalities and social segregation as major causes of insecurity. Exceptionally one response highlighted the need for an 'all hazards' approach to managing urban security covering any damage inflicted on people, property and the environment by all types of accidents and disasters. Finally it was evident that some of the newer EU countries were characterised and constrained by limited legislative frameworks and institutional resources required for managing problems of urban security.

Problems of urban security:

Notwithstanding differences of emphasis, the responses to this question revealed a high degree of consensus around street crime, urban disorder and incivility, particularly amongst young, socially excluded populations, as a pressing problem of urban security. Some respondents also emphasised violence against the person particularly that related to alcohol consumption and to family life. Some responses identified illicit drugs markets as a major problem of urban security and their relationship to other problems, in particular vice, property crimes, and the escalation of conflict amongst criminal gangs. A number of responses also identified immigration as a problem for urban security in terms of its impact both as a driver of social conflict with more settled inhabitants of cities and as something eroding social cohesion and, therefore, the capacity for informal social control. A minority of responses identified organised crime, human trafficking and terrorism as major problems of urban security, reflecting perhaps the priority accorded to these problems by the European Union's Directorate General for Home Affairs.

Unsurprisingly perhaps no respondents identified state crimes as major threats to urban security, in particular police corruption and violence and, more broadly, the corruption of public officials. Nor did any respondents identify corporate and white-collar crimes, including fraud and tax evasion, as problems of urban security notwithstanding the pressures these problems place on the resources for governing cities, particularly in an age of austerity. There was, however, the identification by two respondents of 'safety crimes', such as crimes against the environment including industrial pollution, waste dumping and water pollution. Exceptionally a very broad notion of public security was developed by one respondent highlighting the dangers of climate change, environmental disasters and pandemics alongside the traditional problems of crimes.

The objective and subjective dimensions of urban security:

Another key distinction made by a number of respondents was between security as an objective condition (for example the exclusion of entire cohorts of the young population of European cities from formal employment opportunities) and as a matter of subjective perception (in particular fears and anxieties about crime, predation, incivility, ethnic diversity that often get conflated). To this end, security can be as much about public reassurance about the probabilities of victimisation as about the response to the actual realisation of security threats, such as crime waves, terrorist incidents, corruption scandals etc.



COMMENTARY ON RESPONSES TO QUESTION TWO OF QUESTIONNAIRE ONE

2. What are the current challenges for managing urban security in your region?

Having discussed the broad range of responses and problems which 'urban security management' can be understood as referring to, panellists were asked to identify what, in their opinion, were the current challenges that dominated the particular social context they were working in. The principal finding from all responses to this question was that the major challenges were both organisational and financial and thus largely about governmental capacity to manage the problem. However, a minority also identified external challenges in the wider environment such as globalisation, changing forms of crime and such like. In this regard a useful distinction may be made between 'endogenous' challenges (referring to the nature of urban security management itself) and 'exogenous' challenges (referring to the wider environment in which urban security management is practiced).

Endogenous challenges: Most respondents consistently noted a current challenge was to premise security strategies on clear co-ordination and transparent co-operation between the different partners alongside greater engagement and education of the citizenry. Problem-solving expertise was recognised as a scarce resource. It was also widely recognised that urban security management spans different policy levels (national, regional and local) and spheres (public, private, voluntary) and that this complex institutional landscape made harmonisation of effort difficult to achieve. In a minority of respondents, mention was made of the challenges associated with the respective roles of national and local elected (mayoral) political leadership. Only one respondent emphasised the challenge of, and need for, strengthening the role of research and scientific evaluation in informing and assessing the formulation, implementation and evaluation of policy agendas.

Exogenous challenges: As noted previously, there was quite limited discussion of exogenous challenges among our respondents. However, four respondents did refer to ongoing problems of 'street' crime and disorder and cross-border crimes associated with illegal immigration and human trafficking. In turn two commentators pointed to the challenge raised by both the changing nature of public space generally and the changing character of vulnerable neighbourhoods specifically. There was, perhaps surprisingly, very limited explicit discussion of the significance of the financial crisis of 2008, the subsequent sovereign debt crises experienced by a number of European countries, and the impact of these on economic growth across Europe for urban security. One respondent, however, did note that financial uncertainty would impede the long-term development of strategies for urban security. No respondent identified explicitly the broader geo-political context of Europe, in particular the involvement of many European countries in foreign policy conflicts in the Middle East and Northern Africa



which are likely to continue to render European cities vulnerable as targets for revenge attacks, such as those witnessed in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 and as destinations for further inward migration from populations fleeing civil wars in the Arabic world. However, one respondent did raise the challenge of the increasing complexity and interlocking of societies, organisations and systems for the environment in which policy makers and practitioners have to work. Such forces of 'globalisation' were recognised as offering both new opportunities for innovation and increased unpredictability and uncertainty with the likelihood of crises spreading faster.



COMMENTARY ON RESPONSES TO QUESTION THREE OF QUESTIONNAIRE ONE

3. What are the potential challenges for managing urban security in your region in the coming decade?

There was a broad consensus amongst respondents about the depth of the current economic crisis affecting European countries and the likelihood of the longevity of its impact on urban security generally and reduced investment in public services and preventive measures more specifically over the coming decade. The impact on cities in Southern European countries is likely to be the most severe in terms of long-term high unemployment rates for young urban populations. In turn this is likely to generate enormous pressures for migration of these young populations to other cities in the European Union, particularly in the relatively wealthier countries of the North West. These migratory pressures – along with migratory processes emanating from outside of Europe- are likely to further exacerbate competition for limited public resources (housing, education, healthcare etc.) and employment opportunities in the cities of the North and with the low-skilled, socially excluded populations already resident in these cities.

Another longer term trend identified by a small number of respondents was the continued expansion of urban populations and related concerns over the sustainability of the energy, transport, food and water systems supporting these populations. In addition the 'critical infrastructure' of European cities was thought by one respondent to be vulnerable to breakdown as a consequence of climate change and related extreme weather conditions. This is particularly the case for infrastructures premised on digital communications which may be 'smart' but are also 'brittle' given the vulnerability of their complex engineering to breakdown in extreme conditions.

A final long-term challenge identified by respondents was the likelihood that, in conditions of greater social segregation, social inequality and reduced upward mobility of populations, criminality will become more organised, more severe and more frequent amongst 'ghettoised' populations excluded from licit labour markets.

No respondents explicitly identified the ageing population in Europe as likely to alter the demography of crime and victimisation. An ageing population may generate greater vulnerabilities to predatory crime, including fraud. Ageing populations also tend to be more anxious, refracting fears about their general infirmity through fears about crime and incivility particularly amongst the young. This, it may be suggested, is likely to worsen inter-generational conflicts between a fearful elderly population and a younger population resentful of being materially poorer than previous generations.

In turn these future-oriented scenarios about urban security have major implications for the forward-planning and anticipation of the kinds of authorities that will need to be responsible for responding to problems of urban security and the kinds of skills and expertise they will need to have.



COMMENTARY ON RESPONSES TO QUESTION FOUR OF QUESTIONNAIRE ONE

4. Who is currently responsible for managing urban security?

Responsibility for managing urban security can be found at varying levels and amongst several agencies and actors in each of the sampled countries. A minority of respondents discussed the differential responsibility assumed by actors at different 'tiers' (national, regional and municipal) and 'spheres' (state, commercial and NGO/not-for-profit) of governance. However, all respondents limited their discussion to responsible authorities within nation states with negligible recognition of the responsibility of actors at the supra-national level (such as Europol, Eurojust and Frontex). In other words, there was no mention of those EU bodies with responsibility for policing and judicial cooperation over matters of 'internal security' within the EU (for example, within the Schengen zone). Also not discussed were the roles of other supra-national actors (such as the strategic partnerships the EU has with Russia and the US), the influence of the UN (and other intergovernmental organisations) on matters of internal security (e.g. through conventions on transnational organised crime etc.) or any pressures brought to bear on problems of urban security (such as corruption) from NGO's (such as Transparency International) or from commercial security actors.

A clear consensus of opinion emerged from respondents about the concentration of responsibility in the state 'sphere' as contrasted with the commercial, community or NGO 'spheres' with this state responsibility evident at different 'tiers'. For example, centralised Ministries and agencies at the national 'tier', state administrations (governing over several localities) at the regional 'tier', and local councils within municipalities including small, medium and large cities and towns at the local 'tier' were noted by respondents. In most jurisdictions state responsibility for urban security management is organised across these three levels reflecting the extent to which urban security may be managed more centrally and/or more locally. However, respondents also reported key differences in relation to the extent to which power is devolved to municipalities or centralised in national ministries or in which the mandate for leadership is not clear with elements of local discretion but also national government steering. Within the state 'sphere' of governance, a small number of respondents also reported another key difference between leadership from elected politicians or from appointed public servants.

In these frameworks it is therefore important to understand how 'strategic' and 'operational' responsibilities are distributed given tensions between competing mandates and relations of power. In other words, who creates the 'strategic' agenda in terms of resource allocation and prioritisation of security problems for how urban security is managed and subsequently which actors have 'operational' responsibility for carrying out urban security management. For example, in some jurisdictions frameworks are created by central government agencies but



implemented and operationalised at the local and regional 'tiers' whereas other jurisdictions present evidence of co-management and co-production between civil servants, local authorities (e.g. local councils, social and housing services), police and state agencies at different 'tiers', commercial enterprises (e.g. local businesses), schools, social services, etc.

Whether leadership is concentrated at the national or municipal level or taken by elected politicians or appointed civil servants, scientific and research-based expertise about urban security problems was not reported as having a key supporting role currently to this leadership. In a small number of jurisdictions it was reported that new security professions have also been created such as risk managers, security managers and community safety coordinators. This mixed economy of responsibility for urban security management exists, albeit unevenly, throughout Europe given recent trends towards growth in privatisation and de-professionalisation as well as austerity measures aiming to reduce state spending.



COMMENTARY ON RESPONSES TO QUESTION FIVE OF QUESTIONNAIRE ONE

5. Who ought to be responsible for managing urban security?

The question of who 'ought' to be responsible for managing urban security elicited a number of common responses. Most respondents advocated dual responsibility or co-responsibility between local authorities/municipalities and the central government.

As one response suggested, giving emphasis to local government and the public police seems an appropriate division of labour as it formally removes the monopoly over security from the police: this complements local strategies of public safety and well-being as opposed to crime control. As other responses indicated, there should be locally developed crime-prevention programmes with a national support structure.

For some jurisdictions, however, the role of the police within this framework was viewed as remaining pivotal given their status as the central authority for responding to internal problems and in some of the more recently joined EU jurisdictions being the only designated body with any resources for dealing with issues of urban security. In contrast, for other respondents, particularly those with a longer history of integral preventive strategies, non-state actors such as business, communities and local minority groups were identified as needing to be more greatly involved in and responsible for urban security management. However, it was commonly suggested that these non-state developments should be managed and regulated by the state and operationalised at the local 'tier' by local authorities within the state 'sphere'. In other words, there should be a distinction here between actors with 'strategic' and 'operational' responsibilities.

In some jurisdictions, responses indicated stronger support for responsibility to be located primarily at the local 'tier' (municipalities, cities) where the police, mayors and/or other responsible agents (but primarily those within the state 'sphere') can be directly accountable to those areas and citizens that they serve. Exceptionally one respondent discussed briefly the potential of an urban security co-ordinator/manager located at the local 'tier' to deal with what was termed 'cross-cutting solutions for cross-cutting problems'. However, with both this concept of urban security co-ordinator/manager and those of 'partnerships' and other complex multi-agency arrangements, the 'strategic' and 'operational' decision-making powers are not clear.

There is ambiguity in the use of such concepts in relation to where the locus of power actually resides and where it ought to reside. Important questions remain to be answered: (1) where and by whom should the urban security management 'strategy' be formulated, (2) how should prioritisation of certain problems over others for intervention given modest resources occur and therefore the allocation of resources be determined, and (3) where and with whom should 'operational' responsibility to carry out the practices of urban security management be located?



In other words, which actors (e.g. police, elected politicians, appointed civil servants, commercial enterprises) at which 'tiers' (supranational, national, regional, local) ought to on the one hand have final authority should competing authorities not be able to reach agreement, and on the other hand be tasked with carrying out these strategies?



COMMENTARY ON RESPONSES TO QUESTION SIX OF QUESTIONNAIRE ONE

6. What expertise and training currently equips these authorities to respond to these problems?

The final part of the questionnaire (questions 6-8) shifted focus to questions of expertise, both current and potential, and in particular how such expertise could be institutionalised in training and educational programmes. This was the section of the questionnaire which was answered least fully by a number of respondents.

On the basis of the responses of the panellists it is possible to identify three substantively different kinds of expertise, namely:

- The expertise of administrators and public office holders ('administration as a vocation')
- The expertise of politicians and elected representatives ('politics as a vocation')
- The expertise of scientists and researchers ('science as a vocation').

Such different modes of expertise also need to be understood in terms of the different types of training, education and occupational socialisation which may be associated with the three types of career. However, this is not to suggest that these three 'vocations' are entirely separate nor to deny that there is vital interaction between such actors. At the same time the different logics underpinning these vocations should not be collapsed into an ill-defined call for joint or multi-disciplinary partnership working across the different careers and their forms of expertise. From the responses received from panellists, it is possible to elaborate further the key differences between the administrative, political and scientific kinds of expertise thought to be relevant to urban security management.

The current expertise of administrators and public office holders:

It was widely noted that the key actors requiring greater expertise and training were those holding appointed public office and for a significant number of respondents this effectively equates *currently* with the public police. There was thus a broad consensus that the generally limited expertise and training in urban security which did exist across some European countries was associated with public servants and often remained specifically located in the traditional branch of law enforcement and crime control, the public police.

In turn these actors were located at both the national and municipal levels. In terms of the current expertise equipping authorities to respond to problems of urban security, at one extreme we find an emphasis on both strategic and operational expertise being defined currently in a mix of traditional repressive and reactive public policing terms alongside technological innovations in surveillance and some recognition of the need to develop more preventive, community-oriented police work. This was particularly characteristic of countries of Southern and former Eastern Europe. In such contexts both the strategic agenda-setting and resource allocation powers and operational responses to specific problems of urban security appear to remain with



the law enforcement arm of the state, locally and nationally. In other countries it is suggested that a criminal justice or legal discourse remains dominant but tempered by evidence of the growth of local, municipal preventive strategies also being emergent especially in cities. The current training provision varied from those suggesting a mixture of university based training and education at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels (in law, social sciences and public administration) with 'on-the-job' training to those viewing training still as the preserve of police academies.

The current expertise of politicians and elected representatives:

The role of elected politicians, local and national, was not discussed in any great depth by any of our respondents. This reflected perhaps a consensus that strategic and operational expertise in urban security management was primarily understood as residing in the office of non-elected executive officers and teams.

According to the one exceptional respondent who commented explicitly on the role of local elected mayors, these actors were viewed as generally lacking in the type of long-term strategic vision needed to deal proactively, rather than reactively, with the kinds of problems of managing urban security identified in q.1 – 3, above. In turn it was argued that the national 'security and prevention' service was able to provide 'objective and quality' support for municipalities with regard to its problems. Interestingly, there was no mention, in responses to Q1, of the capacity of elected politicians to exercise adequate democratic oversight and scrutiny of administrators given their limited technical expertise about problems of urban security.

The current expertise of scientists and researchers:

There was very little discussion in Q1 responses of the role of the academic community of scientists and researchers in supporting public authorities currently. However, the role of universities in the provision of training and education was noted explicitly by four respondents but with very limited specification of the content of such courses and programmes (apart from the mention of disciplines such as criminology, sociology, urban planning to architecture, law and public administration).

Exceptionally one respondent did specify the existence of a specialised educational programme for students wishing to work in the field of security. This same respondent was also able to specify, again exceptionally, a number of dedicated centres and institutes involved in policy knowledge exchange and training. (Such comments were associated with a Northern European country with a long tradition of promoting 'integral' safety strategies).

Given the absence of commentary across the majority of the panel regarding the contributory expertise of university-based researchers and scientific advisors to policy problem-solving, it is possible to conclude that such expertise is somewhat marginal to the current strategic and operational work of public authorities tasked with managing urban security.

It remains a moot point and an issue for the next stage of this Delphi panel process to explore whether our respondents support the emerging role for university-based undergraduate and, more especially, Masters level courses in, variously, 'urban safety', 'crime prevention', 'community safety', 'crisis management', 'urban policy' and 'public management'. However, at



present it would appear that none of these university-based and primarily criminology-oriented and multi-disciplinary social science courses are considered compulsory for candidates for urban security management posts. In turn across European countries there is little evidence of any general, co-ordinated training across the potentially responsible authorities.

COMMENTARY ON RESPONSES TO QUESTION SEVEN OF QUESTIONNAIRE ONE

7. What expertise ought to be entailed in this response in the context of your country?

Question 7 elicited the briefest comments among the majority of respondents (and in two cases no comments at all). That noted, given the wide-ranging definition of the problems of urban security management noted in the responses to questions 1-3 above, it is not surprising to find often broad-brush discussion of the skills, knowledge and values which ought to be entailed in the responses of relevant authorities and actors. Potentially important, but ill-defined, rhetoric about co-ordinated management, holistic approaches, joint working, mutual learning, partnerships, collaboration and networking (both locally and internationally) predominated over more precise accounts of the substantive expertise required in evidence-based approaches to problems of urban security management. It is however salutary to note that in the case of two respondents there was no discussion of multi-agency and partnerships approaches at all and instead urban security management expertise remained associated exclusively with the police. Such differences of perspective appear indicative of the uneven state of development of urban security management across Europe but may also be in part the consequence of the respondents' occupational background.

In sharp contrast to the above-mentioned traditional police-centred and law enforcement approaches, two respondents from countries with a relatively long tradition of crime prevention policy noted the current deficit, within urban security management, in the kinds of scientific expertise and analytical capacity needed to identify patterns and trends in urban security threats, to infer their causes, identify opportunities for their commission and to formulate, implement and evaluate responses based on this kind of expertise. Arising out of this perceived deficit, the 'solution' by these two respondents was viewed as requiring the wider development and dissemination of a critical, pro-active problem-solving, evidence-based and rational understanding of underlying urban security problems.

The majority of respondents argued that expertise needed to be based on a blend of knowledge of what one respondent termed the 'social map' and deeper understanding of underlying societal relations alongside 'on the job' learning of experienced practitioners and support via in-service training (including web-based learning and national and international networking for knowledge exchange).

In the great majority of respondents it was issues of crime and disorder prevention which were viewed as the key problem upon which the afore-mentioned deeper sociological insights could be brought to bear. However, again exceptionally, one respondent argued that the problem of 'general resilience' and the management of often exceptional but high impact crises were likely to be an additional future priority in urban security management.



A minority of respondents noted the need for a closer connection and interaction between the worlds of the research academy and of practice and policy. However, it was not clear that our respondents believed that the core knowledge and skills base of any future graduate level profession needed to be established primarily at Masters level university training programmes. It will be interesting to explore further whether our respondents would wish to prioritise both knowledge of the nature of the problem of urban security ('content') and of the 'process' of governing and managing the response to the problem to any foundational training and professional development of this expertise. Alternatively it may be that generic management training and expertise alongside 'on the job' experience would be viewed as a higher priority.



COMMENTARY ON RESPONSES TO QUESTION EIGHT OF QUESTIONNAIRE ONE

8. How might this expertise be best developed in educational and training programmes?

Whilst four of our respondents gave very full reflections on this question, the majority of responses were quite brief although still instructive. Two failed to answer the question. The discussion of this question may be differentiated according to issues of delivery and process and those of intellectual content.

Let us begin with questions of delivery. We may note again that a minority of respondents focused exclusively on police professional development including reference to the European Police College (CEPOL). However, most respondents viewed the development of a new knowledge, skills and values base in urban security management for public administrators as needing to reside in multi-agency, institutional processes and the sharing locally, nationally and internationally of 'good practice'. For some respondents such programmes should be associated with 'tailor-made' modules and ongoing professional development. For others, there was a desire for educational and training programmes involving the long-term collaboration of universities and researchers and national and local policy officer and practitioner agencies. It was, however, much rarer to see any explicit discussion of educational and training programmes for elected politicians and non-state actors in the commercial sector or citizens and local communities. Two respondents specified the need to include local communities and businesses in such programmes. The general lack of discussion among most respondents of the educational and training needs of those pursuing politics (rather than administration or science) as a vocation is probably again indicative of urban security management being viewed as a function primarily for public administrators rather than for elected politicians or indeed actors in the commercial and voluntary sectors.

Let us now turn to issues of intellectual content. Of the minority of respondents who discussed questions of intellectual content, several focussed on urban security management expertise being developed initially through higher educational instruction in the social sciences, focused on the acquisition of inter-disciplinary knowledge of the complex nature of the problem itself (urban security) and social scientific ways of explaining and responding to the problem alongside knowledge of governance and managing the policy process. We may speculate that such instruction would need to be underpinned by vocational experience and 'placements' or 'internships.' However the fine detail of the curriculum for this instruction and the priority to be accorded to different social sciences was less clear. It was noticeable that no specific university-based postgraduate Masters programmes were mentioned by our respondents. It was, however, recognized by some respondents that the professionalization of this field of practice would necessitate several levels of educational and training qualifications, types of modules, courses and programmes, depending on the work and tasks associated with 'teams' and 'offices'.



REPORT ON QUESTIONNAIRE 1 (Q1) FROM THE CARDIFF UNIVERSITY TEAM TO THE EFUS DELPHI PANEL

Introduction

In this report on the first of three questionnaires, we present the key points of both consensus and dissent among our EFUS Delphi panellists, structured in terms of the 8 questions in Questionnaire 1 (Q1). Please note that we have made the report available here as a word document as some of you may wish to read it as one complete document before answering Questionnaire 2 which is available electronically. We have also included our question by question commentary available at the beginning of each of our eight sections on the electronic Questionnaire 2 (Q2), again for ease of reference. We wish to thank the members of EFUS who were able to respond to this first round of our exercise in knowledge exchange. In particular we thank the following EFUS representatives for their participation: Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and UK (Northern Ireland).

We are keen for the few EFUS representatives who were unable to participate in round 1 of the Delphi panel and complete Q1 to comment on this report and contribute hopefully to the Questionnaire 2 (Q2). Once participants have read this report, we will ask you to respond to Q2 which draws on the key points of interest emergent from the first round of our dialogue. Unlike the deliberately very open-ended nature of Q1, we have designed a highly structured, closed questionnaire for the second stage of the Delphi panel process. We are confident that this questionnaire will be both provocative and productive for your reflections on policy and practice in this fast developing field of expertise. Q2 is now available electronically at the following site: https://socsi.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_cMzybAK6xgUbRIq

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Given some delays in receiving responses to Q1 the timetable for the return of Q2 is now set at **10 September 2012**. In turn we aim to distribute Q3 to you by **21 September 2012** and for return from you by **15 October 2012** (this time-scale takes account of the summer leave requirements of EFUS members). Finally we will provide the final report on the Delphi panels by the end of October 2012. Many thanks once again for taking time out of your busy working lives to support this research which we are confident will make a significant contribution to new and improved policy thinking and practice on urban security and prevention strategies across Europe.

Professor Gordon Hughes
Urbis Project Team leader, Cardiff University, Wales



Lifelong Learning Programme



COMMENTARY ON RESPONSES TO QUESTION ONE OF QUESTIONNAIRE ONE

1. What can 'managing urban security' mean?

All panellists responded to this question by highlighting:

iv.) both different and preferred approaches to *managing* these problems.

A minority of respondents also highlighted:

v.) problems of, or threats to, urban security

vi.) the distinction between security as an objective condition and as a subjective perception.

Each of these key findings can be elaborated further.

Approaches to the management of urban security:

The responses to this question revealed a high degree of consensus around the growing significance of preventive, multi-agency and multi-sectoral approaches to problems of urban security undertaken by responsible authorities (alongside more traditional 'repressive' approaches). There was in turn a widespread recognition of both the need for, and difficulties in, realising effective co-ordination of local policy that deploys available means democratically and efficiently. The need for greater attention to co-operation between diverse actors at different policy levels (local, regional, national) was also acknowledged widely.

The support for partnerships or 'security networks' among the majority of our respondents appears to reflect a recognition of the limits to traditional 'sovereign state' responses and in particular punitive and criminal justice-oriented responses to complex problems of security. Such views also reflect an interest in mobilising other kinds of resources and expertise (such as the 'third sector' and in particular the citizenry), whilst recognising that appropriately modernised policing and criminal justice will continue to play an important role in both repressing criminality and protecting and reassuring urban populations.

In the majority of responses, the problem of managing urban security was viewed through the prism of crime prevention strategies which in turn were located in territorially defined contexts (of the neighbourhood or the city). The majority of responses saw a key role for social crime prevention strategies aimed at increasing the capacity of individuals and promoting social cohesion and a greater sense of security and quality of life in neighbourhoods.

It was evident that those with less experience of, and less well-developed systems for, managing urban security ('now talking their first steps in this direction') noted the importance of learning from others in policy and practice networks across Europe.

Finally, and exceptionally, one respondent raised a number of key misgivings over the very terminology of 'managing' urban security which it was suggested ran the danger of obscuring the need for more fundamental reflection over the deeper causes of social insecurity and the politics surrounding 'public tranquillity'. Such critical comments on the 'management of urban



security' challenge the presumption that problems of security ought to be merely technically 'managed' as opposed to transformed or fundamentally altered through political debate.

Problems of urban security:

Whilst recognising that most respondents did not focus on the nature of urban security problems per se but rather on the management of such problems, the minority of respondents who did specify concrete examples of sources of insecurity revealed a high degree of consensus around street crime, public disorder, incivility and violence as the pressing problems of urban security.

Exceptionally one respondent identified state crime such as bribery of public officials as a major threat to urban security.

No respondents identified corporate and white-collar crimes, including fraud and tax evasion, as problems of urban security notwithstanding the pressures these problems place on the resources for governing cities, particularly in an age of austerity.

The objective and subjective dimensions of urban security:

Another key distinction made by several respondents was between security as an objective condition (for example the rise of specific examples of 'new' criminal activities) and as a matter of subjective perception (in particular fears and anxieties about crime, predation, incivility, ethnic diversity that often get conflated). As one respondent noted, 'collective insecurity' needed to be recognised as a phenomenon in its own right, separate from that of criminality. To this end, security can be as much about public reassurance about the probabilities of victimisation as about the response to the actual realisation of security threats, such as crime waves, terrorist incidents, corruption scandals etc. To quote one respondent, 'we are working on a safe city where people feel good'.

COMMENTARY ON RESPONSES TO QUESTION TWO OF QUESTIONNAIRE ONE

2. What are the current challenges for managing urban security in your region?

Having discussed the broad range of responses and problems which 'urban security management' can be understood as referring to, panellists were asked to identify what, in their opinion, were the current challenges that dominated the particular social context they were working in. Our sample of responses was divided quite clearly between those who focused on the current *organisational and governmental challenges* to the problem and those who focussed on the nature of the *crimes and harms* currently threatening urban security.

In this regard a useful distinction may be made between 'endogenous' challenges (referring to the issues of governmental capacity and the nature of urban security management itself) and 'exogenous' challenges (referring to the wider environment in which urban security management is practiced and the harms to be found in this wider environment).

The principal finding from four responses to this question was that the major challenges were organisational and thus largely about governmental capacity to manage and analyse the problem. However, six responses identified external challenges in the wider environment such as immigration trends and growing insecurity among 'resident' populations, changing forms of crime and such like. In two cases both aspects of the distinction were noted together albeit with greater emphasis placed on either the exogenous or endogenous aspect.

Endogenous challenges: Most respondents consistently noted a current challenge was to premise security strategies on clear co-ordination and transparent lines of responsibility and co-operation between the different partners. Analytical problem-solving expertise was recognised as a scarce resource among two respondents.

The same respondents emphasised the challenge of, and need for, strengthening the role of empirical research and scientific evaluation in informing and assessing the formulation, implementation and evaluation of policy agendas. It was also recognised that urban security management spans different policy levels (national, regional and local) and spheres (public, private, voluntary) and that this complex institutional landscape made harmonisation of effort difficult to achieve. One respondent noted the problems of both buy-in from organisations for whom partnership working was viewed as peripheral to their core business and lack of engagement with local communities in much urban security management or 'community safety' in Anglophone terms.

Exogenous challenges: As noted previously, there was quite detailed discussion of exogenous challenges among a number of our respondents. Respondents referred to ongoing problems of immigration (legal and illegal), 'street' crimes, incivilities and public disorder, alongside new cross-border and cyber crimes.



There was also explicit discussion of the significance of the financial crisis and recession, and the impact of this across Europe for urban security generally and vulnerable young people in particular. Three respondents noted explicitly that financial uncertainty and the EU crisis would impede the long-term development of strategies for urban security.



COMMENTARY ON RESPONSES TO QUESTION THREE OF QUESTIONNAIRE ONE

3. What are the potential challenges for managing urban security in your region in the coming decade?

There was a broad consensus amongst respondents about the depth of the economic crisis affecting European countries and the likelihood of the longevity of its impact on urban security generally and reduced investment in public services and preventive measures more specifically over the coming decade. A related longer term trend identified by a small number of respondents was the continued expansion, changing character and greater diversity of urban populations and related concerns over social integration and harmony. A minority of respondents also explicitly noted the danger of the growth of more authoritarian, nationalist and ethnocentric political responses in the coming decade. Finally one respondent with a long history of state-centred approaches to policing of urban security noted that a major future challenge was to involve 'the association of citizens' themselves in their own strategies for safety and security and in particular to overcome the widespread subjective fears about urban living.



COMMENTARY ON RESPONSES TO QUESTION FOUR OF QUESTIONNAIRE ONE

4. Who is currently responsible for managing urban security?

Responsibility for managing urban security can be found at varying levels and amongst several agencies and actors in each of the sampled countries. Most respondents discussed in brief the differential responsibility assumed by actors at different 'tiers' (national, regional and municipal) and in a small minority of cases the different 'spheres' (state, communal, commercial and not-for-profit) of governance.

However, all respondents limited their discussion to responsible authorities within nation states with negligible recognition of the responsibility of actors at the supra-national level (such as Europol, Eurojust and Frontex). In other words, there was no mention of those EU bodies with responsibility for policing and judicial cooperation over matters of 'internal security' within the EU (for example, within the Schengen zone).

A clear consensus emerged from respondents about the concentration of responsibility in the state 'sphere' (as contrasted with the commercial, community or NGO 'spheres'). For example, the role of (1) centralised Ministries and agencies at the national 'tier', (2) state administrations (governing over several localities) at the regional 'tier', and (3) local councils within municipalities including small, medium and large cities and towns at the local 'tier' were noted by several respondents. In most jurisdictions state responsibility for urban security management is organised across these three levels reflecting the extent to which urban security may be managed more centrally and/or more locally. However, respondents also reported key differences in relation to the extent to which power is devolved to municipalities or centralised in national ministries or in which the mandate for leadership is not clear with elements of local discretion but also national government steering.

Within the state 'sphere' of governance, most respondents also reported another key difference between leadership from elected politicians or from appointed public servants. It was widely acknowledged that responsibility for urban security was no longer the exclusive preserve of the police with 'more and more diverse actors' mobilised in this policy field. Exceptionally one Northern European respondent noted the existence of over 100 organisations, across state and non-state spheres, in the 'security network' of the city in which the respondent worked. In contrast one respondent from a Southern European country with little experience of coordinated urban crime prevention and safety strategies identified the current responsibility for urban security as residing with the national and municipal police exclusively and as being associated with poor levels of competence among these services, whilst another respondent with well-established history of crime prevention at the municipal level argued that despite the formal and rhetorical role of the mayor and other municipal actors, a 'policing perspective' remained dominant. In these frameworks it is important to understand how 'strategic' and 'operational' responsibilities are distributed given tensions between competing mandates and relations of



power. (Note such issues were but vaguely addressed by our respondents). In other words, who creates the 'strategic' agenda in terms of resource allocation and prioritisation of security problems for how urban security is managed and subsequently which actors have 'operational' responsibility for carrying out urban security management. For example, in some jurisdictions frameworks are created by central government agencies but implemented and operationalised at the local and regional 'tiers' whereas other jurisdictions present evidence of co-management and co-production between civil servants, local municipalities (e.g. local councils, social and housing services), police and state agencies at different 'tiers', commercial enterprises (e.g. local businesses), schools, social services, etc.

COMMENTARY ON RESPONSES TO QUESTION FIVE OF QUESTIONNAIRE ONE

5. Who ought to be responsible for managing urban security?

Most respondents advocated dual responsibility or co-responsibility between local authorities/municipalities and the central government although not unexpectedly given the role of our respondents as local players themselves, most attention was given to ways of improving the local governance of urban security.

Three responses (from localities with what appeared to be well-developed systems for managing urban security as reflected in responses to question 4) were very brief, merely noting that they were happy with the existing arrangements and that no structural changes were necessary.

There was a clear consensus among those respondents that commented specifically on how responsibility for urban security *ought* to be managed. Namely that it should be led by local government authorities through the office of the mayor and further that the multi-agency dimension of such management should be enhanced further through the inclusion of what one respondent termed 'associative partners', operating 'beyond the conventional control system'. Responses indicated strong support for responsibility to be located primarily at the local 'tier' (municipalities, cities) where the mayors, police and/or other responsible agents (but primarily those within the state 'sphere') can be directly accountable to those areas and citizens that they serve.

Two respondents from Southern Europe specified that there should be a designated 'safety officer' or 'urban security manager' (located in the 'cabinet' of the mayor), tasked with coordinating and leading partnership work and also reaching out to the wider community. However, with both this concept of urban security manager and those of 'partnerships' and other complex multi-agency arrangements, the 'strategic' and 'operational' decision-making powers were not made clear in the responses. It would appear that there is ambiguity in the use of such concepts in relation to where the locus of power actually resides and where it ought to reside. Important questions remain to be answered: (1) where and by whom should the urban security management 'strategy' be formulated, (2) how should prioritisation of certain problems over others for intervention (given modest resources) occur and therefore the allocation of resources be determined, and (3) where and with whom should 'operational' responsibility to carry out the practices of urban security management be located? In other words, which actors (e.g. police, elected politicians, appointed civil servants, commercial enterprises) at which 'tiers' (supranational, national, regional, local) ought to on the one hand have final authority should competing authorities not be able to reach agreement, and on the other hand be tasked with carrying out these strategies?



COMMENTARY ON RESPONSES TO QUESTION SIX OF QUESTIONNAIRE ONE

6. What expertise and training currently equips these authorities to respond to these problems?

The final part of the questionnaire (questions 6-8) shifted focus to questions of expertise, both current and potential, and in particular how such expertise could be institutionalised in training and educational programmes.

On the basis of the responses of the panellists it is possible to identify three substantively different kinds of expertise, namely:

- The expertise of administrators and public office holders ('administration as a vocation')
- The expertise of politicians and elected representatives ('politics as a vocation')
- The expertise of scientists and researchers ('science as a vocation').

Perhaps unsurprisingly given the nature of our panel drawn from EFUS representatives, the focus of attention was largely on the expertise of administrators and public office holders.

These different modes of expertise (administrative, political, and scientific) need to be understood in terms of the different types of training, education and vocational socialisation which may be associated with the three types of career. However, this is not to suggest that these three vocations are entirely separate nor to deny that there is vital interaction between such actors (as identified by some of our respondents). At the same time the different logics underpinning these careers should not be collapsed into an ill-defined call for joint or multi-disciplinary partnership working across the different vocations and their forms of expertise. From the responses received from EFUS panellists, it is possible to elaborate further the key differences between the administrative, and to a lesser extent, political and scientific kinds of expertise thought to be relevant to urban security management.

The current expertise of administrators and public office holders:

There was a wide variation regarding the nature of the current expertise of administrators and public office holders across our respondents. At one extreme, two Northern European respondents and one Central European respondent highlighted the breadth and depth of officer expertise in the realm of urban security management. At the other extreme three Southern European respondents noted the current absence of any specific training in urban security management other than that associated with basic traditional police training. Other respondents fell between these extremes and suggested that developments were under way in terms of developing officer expertise through both formal higher educational programmes and 'on the job' training and experience. Overall, then, the cross-national picture in Europe is decidedly uneven in terms of the expertise and training currently equipping authorities to respond to problems of urban security management.



Exceptionally, one respondent from Northern Europe emphasised that there was a wide range of higher education-based expertise on safety issues and further that departments of public safety in big cities in this country were staffed by 'mostly academically trained people'. This academic training was associated with criminology, public policy and law degrees. In turn practical skills were developed also by 'on the job' and bespoke training organised by municipal authorities. Another Northern European respondent emphasised the importance of regular shared congresses and workshops organised locally, regionally and nationally, including events organised by the national forum of EFUS, and learning from recent research findings. In sharp contrast, most respondents did not elaborate in any depth on the 'healthy' state of expertise and training but instead focused on deficits in such capacity and called for investment in training, both 'on the job' and through higher education programmes.

The current expertise of politicians and elected representatives:

The role of elected politicians, local and national, was not discussed in any great depth by the great majority of our respondents. This reflected perhaps a consensus that strategic and operational expertise in urban security management was primarily understood as residing in the office of non-elected executive officers and teams. Interestingly, there was no mention, in responses to Q1, of the capacity of elected politicians to exercise adequate democratic oversight and scrutiny of administrators given their limited technical expertise about problems of urban security. However, one respondent did emphasise that local elected representatives were insufficiently trained and knowledgeable whilst another respondent did contend that the issue of urban security management was profoundly and complexly politicised. Furthermore, both these respondents argued that the police had a 'disproportionate role' politically, not least because of the insufficient experience of local elected representatives.

The current expertise of scientists and researchers:

There was very little discussion in Q1 responses of the role of the academic community of scientists and researchers in supporting public authorities currently. However, the role of universities in the provision of training and education was noted explicitly by six respondents but with very limited specification of the content of such courses and programmes (apart from the mention of disciplines such as criminology, sociology, urban studies, security studies, law and public policy). Exceptionally one respondent from a Northern European country with a long tradition of technocratic expertise in 'integral' safety strategies did specify the existence of a specialised educational programme for students wishing to work in the field of security. Given the absence of commentary across the majority of the panel regarding the expertise of university-based researchers and scientific advisors to policy problem-solving, it is possible to conclude that such expertise is somewhat marginal to the current strategic and operational work of public authorities tasked with managing urban security.



COMMENTARY ON RESPONSES TO QUESTION SEVEN OF QUESTIONNAIRE ONE

7. What expertise ought to be entailed in this response in the context of your country?

With the exception of one respondent who did not respond to this question, all respondents supported the development of local, inclusive, multi-faceted and multi-disciplinary expertise in the municipality. Given the wide-ranging definition of the problems of urban security management noted in the responses to questions 1-3 above, it is not surprising to find often broad-brush discussion of the skills, knowledge and values which *ought* to be entailed in the responses of relevant authorities and actors.

Four respondents from countries with contrasting traditions and depth of experience of crime prevention policy noted explicitly the current deficit, within urban security management, in the kinds of scientific expertise and analytical capacity needed to identify patterns and trends in urban security threats and to formulate, implement and evaluate responses based on this kind of expertise. Such respondents noted the need for a closer connection and interaction between the worlds of the research academy and of practice and policy. However, it was not clear that most of our respondents believed that the core knowledge and skills base of any future graduate level profession needed to be established primarily at Masters level university training programmes. That noted, one respondent with a depth of knowledge about postgraduate level training (from Italy) did elaborate on both the 'content' knowledge and skills (about the problem of urban security and its causes) and 'process' knowledge and skills (with regard to managing and possible solution of the problem). It will be interesting to explore further whether our respondents would wish to prioritise both knowledge of the nature of the problem of urban security ('content') and of the 'process' of governing and managing the response to the problem to any foundational training and professional development of this expertise. Alternatively it may be that generic management training and expertise alongside 'on the job' experience would be viewed as a higher priority.

Finally, and exceptionally, one respondent from Northern Europe focused primarily on the need to develop local knowledge based on contacts from the local community. It was also noted that the development of agencies with a proactive approach to problem-solving was as a pressing requirement in partnership expertise but that ultimately 'community safety' should be owned and led by local communities themselves.



COMMENTARY ON RESPONSES TO QUESTION EIGHT OF QUESTIONNAIRE ONE

8. How might this expertise be best developed in educational and training programmes?

Whilst four of our respondents gave very full reflections on this question, the majority of responses were quite brief although still instructive. One respondent failed to answer the question. The discussion of this question may be differentiated according to issues of delivery and process and those of intellectual content.

Let us begin with questions of delivery. Most respondents viewed the development of a new knowledge, skills and values base in urban security management for public administrators as needing to reside in multi-agency, institutional processes and the sharing locally, nationally and internationally of 'good practice'. In the case of two Southern European respondents, explicit reference was made to needing to 'fine-tune' and adapt attempts at implementing best practice learnt from elsewhere to the specific local contexts of the municipality in question.

For most respondents training programmes should be associated with 'tailor-made' modules and ongoing professional development in which existing practices whose effectiveness was proven could be discussed. For others, there was a desire for educational and training programmes involving the long-term collaboration of universities and national and local policy officer and practitioner agencies. It was, however, much rarer to see any explicit discussion of educational and training programmes for elected politicians and non-state actors in the commercial sector or citizens and local communities.

The general lack of discussion among most respondents of the educational and training needs of those pursuing politics (rather than administration or science) as a vocation is probably again indicative of urban security management being viewed as a function de facto primarily for public administrators rather than for elected politicians or the citizenry. However, two respondents did explicitly refer to the need to involve elected representatives alongside security coordinators, police and judges in multi-disciplinary training.

Let us now turn to issues of intellectual content. Of the minority of respondents who discussed questions of intellectual content, several focussed on urban security management expertise being developed initially through higher educational instruction in the social sciences, focused on the acquisition of inter-disciplinary knowledge of the complex nature of the problem itself (urban security) and social scientific ways of explaining and responding to the problem alongside knowledge of governance and managing the policy process. We may speculate that such instruction would need to be underpinned by vocational experience and 'placements' or 'internships.' However the fine detail of the curriculum for this instruction and the priority to be accorded to different social sciences was less clear.

It was noticeable that university-based postgraduate Masters programmes were mentioned by a minority of respondents as important vehicles for developing expertise in this field, with three



respondents referring specifically to the proposed EFUS-sponsored Executive Masters in urban security management (EEMUS). These three respondents also supported the development of a 'profession' of prevention/urban security manager underpinned by postgraduate study and specialist diploma. It was, however, recognized by other respondents that the professionalization of this field of practice would necessitate several levels of educational and training qualifications, different types of modules, practical as well as theoretical courses and training programmes, depending on the work and tasks associated with 'teams' and 'offices'.

COMMENTARY ON QUESTIONNAIRE 2 (Q2) FROM THE CARDIFF UNIVERSITY TEAM TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCE (ESC) DELPHI PANEL

Introduction

In this report on the second of three questionnaires (Q2), we present the key findings on areas of consensus and disagreement about:

- the problems, approaches and contexts of urban security management;
- responsibility for undertaking this work; and
- allied areas of expertise.

It will be recalled from the guidance notes accompanying the first questionnaire (Q1), that the methodological justification for conducting a policy Delphi is not to elicit responses that are representative of an entire population of interest (e.g. social scientists with an interest in urban security in Europe). Rather, it is to facilitate structured dialogue amongst those with informed judgement about a subject matter that is characterised by lack of agreement in order to establish if it is possible to reach a consensus of opinion or else to clarify and corroborate areas of disagreement about subjects that are 'essentially contested'. The subjective judgements of those recruited to a Delphi Panel are transformed into a more objective account through a particular form of iterative group communication in which Delphi Panel co-ordinators collect and interpret responses from each panellist and communicate them back out to all panellists along with further questions.

This iterative communication provides panellists with an opportunity to defend or revise initial judgements in the light of feedback from the whole panel. Subsequent iterations in this group communication act as forms of both respondent and construct validation of the research problem in question and therefore of the objectivity of the informed judgement reached by the panel as a whole. Turoff and Hiltz (1996: 70) argue that this transformation of subjective judgements into the collective informed opinion of a Delphi panel has a number of objectives:

- improving the understanding of the participants through analysis of subjective judgements to produce a clear presentation of the range of views and considerations;
- detecting hidden disagreements and judgemental biases that should be exposed for further clarification;
- detecting missing information or cases of ambiguity in interpretation by different participants;
- allowing the examination of very complex situations that can be summarised only by analysis procedures;
- detecting patterns of information and of sub-group positions;
- detecting critical items that need to be focussed upon.



The following commentary addresses these objectives by summarising areas of consensus and disagreement revealed by analysis of the responses to Q2. For a detailed discussion of the methodological and analytical procedures used to derive these areas of consensus and disagreement, please see the **Appendix**. After a brief discussion of the logic of the Urbis policy Delphi and the particular contribution of Q2, this commentary will be limited to providing a summary of what the co-ordinators of the panel at Cardiff University consider to be the main findings on consensus and disagreement about urban security management. However, the co-ordinators' interpretation can be related to the detailed statistical report of responses to Q2 ('Q2SOCSI' Report), which was an on-line survey questionnaire completed by all of the 15 panellists participating in the Social Science ('SOCSI') panel of the Urbis policy Delphi, and which is attached to this commentary. The detailed analysis of consensus and disagreement provided in the Appendix to this commentary was derived from data in the Q2SOCSI Report and panellists are encouraged if possible to read these documents in conjunction with this commentary.

Whereas Q1 posed a series of deliberately open-ended questions as a means of capturing the **scope** of the problems, approaches and contexts of urban security, the responsibility of different actors for undertaking this work and the expertise these actors ought to possess, Q2 explored areas of consensus and disagreement by asking respondents to **prioritise** the kinds of problems, responsibilities and expertise that had been identified in Q1. The third and final questionnaire (Q3) seeks to **validate** these areas of consensus and disagreement, offering panellists an opportunity to reflect on the priorities indicated by other respondents to Q2 and to corroborate or revise their own opinions accordingly. Q3 will also provide panellists with open text boxes which they can use to offer any final comments on the Urbis policy Delphi. In addition to clarifying the uncertain and contested qualities of 'urban security management', this validation is important for the core objective of Work Package 3 of the Urbis project, which is to recognise the 'state of the art' in urban security management as a basis for curriculum development in postgraduate level education and training in this area of work.

In validating the priorities of this work and, therefore, any putative 'core curriculum' of education and training in urban security management we are particularly interested in arguments for and against a standardised educational programme; whether, for example, it is possible and desirable to pursue **policy convergence** around a standard set of problems, responsibilities and expertise and to what extent policy responses ought to be tailored to the particular contexts of urban security in different European localities. If not, we are interested in panellists' arguments against policy convergence and what this implies for policy transfer across these contexts; what, if anything, can Europeans learn from one another about managing urban security?

In support of these aims, the following commentary is organised in terms of the three core themes of Urbis policy Delphi:

I. 'Problematisation'



- The main problems, approaches, contexts and futures of urban security management.
- II. 'Responsibilisation'
- The actors responsible for urban security management.
- III. 'Expertise'
- The education and training required to meet these responsibilities.
- Under each of these headings, areas of high, moderate, low, questionable and negligible consensus are discussed as a precursor to provoking a dialogue amongst panellists in Q3 about any core set of problems, responsibilities and expertise.



I. THE MAIN PROBLEMS, APPROACHES, CONTEXTS AND FUTURES OF URBAN SECURITY MANAGEMENT

I.i. PROBLEMS

Responses to Q2.1a revealed a high consensus around the problem of **'violence against the person, including domestic violence'** as the principal priority for urban security management, with 80% of the panellists identifying this as one of their five most important problems and none of the panel identifying this as one of the least important problems. There was a moderate consensus around **'social exclusion and youth unemployment'** as a priority problem, with 60% of panellists identifying this as one of the most important challenges for urban security. Again, no respondent rated this problem as one of the least important problems. 60% of panellists also identified **'property crime'** and **'incivilities and anti-social behaviour'** as top priorities, although a small minority of respondents also ranked these two problems as amongst the least important. Even so, it is a fair interpretation to regard these four problems as constituting the very core of priorities for urban security management.

Were a lower threshold of consensus to be employed, however, the core policy agenda for urban security management would encompass the problem of **'immigration and social cohesion'**, which a substantial minority of 40% of panellists identified as a priority problem, albeit with 13% of respondents identifying this as one of the least important problems. There was also a low consensus about the priority to be given to **'criminal gangs and organised crime'**, with a fifth of respondents identifying this as an important problem for urban security management. Finally, just over a quarter of panellists identified **'alcohol and drug misuse'** as a priority problem.

Of course, these are matters of interpretation and not an exact measurement but we would argue that a questionable consensus exists around any problem identified by less than a quarter of panellists as a priority for urban security management. In turn this would exclude, from the policy agenda such issues as drug trafficking, corporate crime, human trafficking, terrorism and civil unrest, notwithstanding the high profile of these problems in public discourse on security in many European countries, certainly since the bombing of public transport systems in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 and in the impact of the post-2008 financial and sovereign debt crises of urban governance in many European cities. There is also a significant contrast between these priorities and those identified in the European Union's multi-annual programmes for creating an 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice' amongst member states.

A further, significant, finding is the low consensus (≥ 25 - $< 50\%$) of respondents ranking such problems as health and safety in the workplace, tax evasion, civil unrest and terrorism amongst the five least important problems for urban security management, again notwithstanding the prominence of these issues in public discourse about security. The questionable and negligible priority accorded to problems of tax evasion and corruption, especially of public administration, is a particularly interesting finding given the pressures these problems place on the governing capacity for urban security.



It should be noted, however, that a majority of respondents (11/15) took advantage of the open text box option to discuss the rationale behind their prioritisation of urban security problems. Amongst this rich qualitative feedback, it is possible to identify three important types of qualification to the prioritisation of problems offered by respondents:

I.i.1. Scope

A number of respondents argued that issues such as organised crime and corruption are clearly serious problems but ones that are better regarded as 'supra-local' and that are, 'to be addressed by bodies that operate beyond the urban security domain.' These insights provoke an important discussion about the appropriate scope of urban security management, as one respondent remarked, 'It also depends upon what one considers to lie within the proper capacity and competence of urban security – it cannot be "all things to all people"'. As such, the consensus of opinion amongst respondents is that urban security management ought to be restricted to problems which are locally bounded in their origin and context-specific (see I.i.2., below) and which, 'are both objectively and subjectively recognized by citizens as such ... and linked to the local space'. The implication of this is that an important distinction exists between problems that are locally bounded and context-specific or, to use current public policy terminology, those that are 'downstream' and those which may be expressed in particular localities, such as the Madrid and London bombings, but whose origins and key points of intervention are 'upstream', in other localities, regions and countries requiring, in turn, national or transnational security responses.

I.i.2. Context

Another important qualification and one that reflects an ongoing theme of the Urbis policy Delphi is the need to recognise the diverse contexts of urban security across Europe as noted by one of the respondents, 'It's context specific – so problems & issues vary between and within nation states'. To illustrate this point some respondents discussed the problem of 'knife crime', which less than a quarter of respondents ranked as a top priority for urban security but which is of significant concern in particular contexts, such as some French cities and the Strathclyde region of Scotland including the city of Glasgow which has a long-standing reputation for knife-related violence. It will be recalled from the commentary on responses to Q1 of the Urbis policy Delphi that context-specificity was also borne out by the identification of problems that have a particular prominence in particular regions, such as the issue of organised criminality and motorcycle gangs in Scandinavia or concerns over state police violence in the Balkans.

I.i.3. Categorisation

Finally, a number of respondents qualified their prioritisation by identifying those categories that, in the particular national context they had been asked to discuss, would be considered together. For example, a number of respondents observed that 'criminal damage' would be considered as an 'incivility' rather than as a separate problem and so issues of vandalism and graffiti would be included in the category of 'incivilities and anti-social behaviour' which, it will be recalled, over 60% of the panel rated as a priority for urban security management. Issues of conceptual translation were also identified as significant such that terms like 'anti-social behaviour' ought to



be regarded as an ethnocentric (Anglophone) administrative category rather than a commonly used analytical category such as 'incivility' that is recognisable and meaningful in other European contexts. Other respondents emphasised the interaction between problems of urban security and a need to avoid treating problems as self-contained. One respondent remarked, 'social exclusion (not necessarily just youth unemployment but [the] wider phenomenon) is one of the main factors behind the others', whilst another observed that, 'I would always begin with "structural conditions" that can generate the sorts of problems listed, and then I would move on to consider problems that are of greatest magnitude, whether in terms of their frequency/commonality or in terms of their impact upon collective safety and security.'

Summary and implications for Questionnaire Three (Q3)

These responses suggest an important criterion for prioritisation which is to identify those problems which are regarded as primary and generative and to distinguish these from problems which are thought to be secondary and 'epiphenomenal'. The implication of this is that, especially in austere conditions that compel greater prioritisation, the identification of generative problems provides some grounds for the definition of policy agendas, the allocation of governing resources, the co-operation of responsible actors and the kinds of expertise required for urban security management. This criterion provokes an important debate over the generative or epiphenomenal qualities of the other problems prioritised by a clear majority of panellists in Q2 of the Urbis policy Delphi. In addition to social exclusion and youth unemployment, are incivilities and property crime to be regarded as generative of urban security or as epiphenomena of other causal factors and vulnerabilities? In what sense, might violence against the person be regarded as a consequence of 'structural conditions'?

Reference to the 'greatest magnitude', the 'frequency' and the 'impact' of the sorts of problems ranked by panellists implies a consideration of **harm** as a possible criterion for defining the scope, contexts and categories of urban security management. Recent work in the area of organised and serious crime (which is another broad, ambiguous, concept) has used the notion of a 'risk assessment matrix' distinguishing policy priorities in terms of the harms of particular problems, ranked according to their 'severity' (on a scale from negligible to catastrophic) and their 'probability' (from unlikely to frequent). This matrix is, of course, subject to some interpretative flexibility but at least it provides an organising framework for arguments about prioritising certain problems relative to others, from one extreme (frequent and catastrophic) to another (unlikely and negligible) (see Greenfield and Paoli, 2010).

In addition to validating the priority problems identified by panellists in Q2, a purpose of Q3 will be to seek panellists' informed opinion about the utility of this matrix in assessing the severity and probability of these problems and whether this alters the level of consensus and disagreement about the definition of urban security management.

I.ii. APPROACHES

Responses to Q2.1b revealed a high consensus about the priority that should be given to '**reducing social segregation and promoting social cohesion**', with 93% of the panellists ranking this as one the most important approaches to urban security management and no



respondent ranking this as one of the least important approaches. The other priority approach attracting a high consensus from the panel was that of **'reducing social inequalities in household income, access to education, employment, healthcare and housing'**, with 80% of panellists ranking this as one of the most important approaches, albeit with a minority of 13% ranking this as one of the least important approaches. A clear majority of panellists, 73%, also ranked **'reassuring citizens about their security and about their fear of crime'** as a priority approach and two thirds of panellists ranked **'preventing the onset of offending behaviour and incivility'** as a priority. In both cases a minority of panellists, 13%, ranked these approaches as the least important.

This suggests the consensus of opinion of panellists is that scarce resources ought to be allocated to economic and social policy interventions that target social segregation and social inequality combined with measures aimed at reassuring citizens, countering moral panics and unrealistic anxieties about security whilst investing in programmes aimed at preventing offending behaviour. There is a strong affinity between these judgements and the 'spirit level thesis' (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009) which uses comparative social research to demonstrate a relationship between social inequality and various social ills, including elevated levels of violent crime and punishment.

Were a lower threshold of consensus to be used the policy agenda for urban security management would also include **'enhancing the democratic scrutiny and oversight of security strategies'** and **'reducing the opportunities for criminal victimization'**, both of which were ranked as important approaches by 40% of the panel with no respondent ranking either as least important. A third of the panel also ranked **'restorative justice interventions with perpetrators and victims of criminal offences'** as a priority approach, again with no panellist ranking this as least important. These are interesting findings in that they run somewhat counter to the international promotion of situational crime prevention measures and allied risk management approaches, for example by the European Union's Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN) and, to a lesser extent, to restorative alternatives to criminal justice approaches. In terms of the latter there was a questionable consensus about **'enforcing the criminal law'**, with only 13% ranking this as an important approach and a third of panellists ranking this as one of the least important approaches. Significantly, and in dramatic contrast to much popular discourse, the use of **surveillance** and **imprisonment** were not ranked as important by any panellist with two thirds regarding surveillance as a low priority approach and 93% ranking imprisonment as a low priority.

Another significant finding is the disagreement amongst panellists over **'requiring citizens to take responsibility for their own security and equipping them with the capacity and resources to meet this responsibility'**, with just over a quarter of the panel ranking this as a priority approach but 40% ranking it as one of the least important approaches. Attempts to shift responsibility for security from the state onto private citizens has been an influential theme in contemporary criminology and one that has been regarded as a defining characteristic of the current 'culture of control' in Britain and the United States (Garland, 2001; O'Malley, 1992) and



its transfer across Europe (Wacquant, 2001). By contrast, findings from the Urbis policy Delphi suggest there is greater resistance to this approach and a continued commitment to state-centred social democratic responses (see, also, Section II, below).

Again, respondents made ample use of the open text facility to qualify the rationale behind their prioritisation of approaches and these responses provide some very rich and important insights into areas of consensus and disagreement about urban security management. One respondent remarked that, 'Penal and criminal policy does not lead to an increase in social justice. Also the responsabilisation of citizens can be dangerous, while it can lead to a policy of blaming the victim.' Another observed that, 'Requiring citizens to take responsibility is, in abstract terms, a good idea, but its application in the French context would be quite difficult (because of the cultural difficulty to accept it).' In addition to disagreement over the possibility and desirability of citizens assuming direct responsibility for urban security management, respondents also noted the continued strength of state-centred social policy approaches. As one respondent remarked, 'We don't have restorative justice (concept, practice) in Finland, but in a way similar approaches. There is still quite well functioning social security system and welfare society in the country, although there is a trend to "replace" social welfare by security management or community safety initiatives. However, there is no significant move or shift in resources from social sector to security.' Another respondent remarked, 'The rationale of this prioritisation was focussed on social integration and social cohesion ... In what concerns the prevention of offending behaviour and incivilities we highlight the strategies of so called primary prevention and developmental prevention, which avoid the stigmatization effects and are focussed on the promotion of life condition, well being, and opportunity equality.' The strong consensus opposing criminal justice and risk management approaches, including surveillance, was also backed up by qualitative comments from panellists. As one respondent remarked, 'Priorities are to be sought to a large extent outside the criminal justice system. Repression is not a good tool for creating social justice'. Another remarked, 'On the one hand we need more primary prevention which focuses on the causes of deviance and also strengthens social cohesion and social control. On the other hand we need secondary prevention which reduces opportunities of crime. These approaches seem more sustainable than the intensivation (sic) of surveillance and increased punishment.'

Summary and implications for Q3

The clear finding from responses to the prioritisation of urban security management approaches is that law enforcement, surveillance and imprisonment are unsustainable as responses to the kinds of problems the panel have prioritised and are counter-productive for accomplishing policy agendas concerned with the promotion of social justice. An equally strong consensus exists over the promotion of social policy responses to problems of urban security, particularly those that can tackle social inequalities and cultivate greater social cohesion. An important insight was provided by one respondent who noted in the Irish context how research had revealed the general public, 'as being reasonably tolerant in spite of the politicisation of crime and the heightened media interest in it. When asked how they would spend additional monies in the budget, respondents chose more preventative options as opposed to punitive ones. It ...



appears on this basis that the public are more compassionate than media or political discourses credit them with; and they prefer prevention to punishment.'

There remains a greater ambiguity, however, over the panel's opinion about the prioritisation of those forms of risk management that are often described in terms of 'situational crime prevention'. In particular, those measures that are aimed at reducing the immediate opportunities for criminal victimization and which switch the focus of policy responses away from offending behaviour and toward the vulnerabilities of victims. Despite the significant promotion of situational crime prevention in international criminology over the past three decades and, in Europe, by the EUCPN over the past decade, there was at best a low consensus in support of this approach and a significant minority of panellists ranking it as of least importance.

In addition to validating this weight of opinion, Q3 will seek panellists' views on the arguments between advocates of situational crime prevention and proponents of social crime prevention in addition to the relative weighting that ought to be given to primary forms of prevention (that target whole populations), secondary prevention (that targets 'at risk' groups) and tertiary prevention (that targets 'prolific and priority' offenders and repeat victims). It will also seek panellists' opinions about the basic relationship between social policy and urban security management given the priority the panel has accorded to social policy responses but also the suggestion, in one of the qualitative responses, that security management is separate from, and may even be used to 'replace', the social welfare state.

I.iii. CONTEXTS

Responses to Q2.1c revealed an unsurprisingly high consensus about large cities and all cities being a relevant context for urban security management. This was the first Likert Scale question of Q2, which enabled analysis of consensus, disagreement and uncertainty in terms of the 'inter-quartile range' (IQR) of responses (see Appendix). All respondents ranked large cities as a priority context with no panellist disagreeing and no uncertainty. Only one respondent disagreed that all cities were a relevant context. Beyond this there is ambiguity given the increasing mobility of populations and problems, epitomised in the notion of 'globalisation' and hence the importance of the cross-regional and cross-national dimensions to urban security, particularly challenges posed by drug trafficking and criminal gangs. In the qualitative feedback, one respondent argued the concept of urban security management is too vague to distinguish between relevant contexts, 'The security must be increasingly linked to the concept of space and less to the person or persons, but if the idea of space is essential at all levels, not all space is an urban space, and not every social or living together problem is a security problem (we need to distinguish between the concepts and the management of words like security, safety, welfare, well-being, social rights and so on ...)'. As noted in the previous section, Q3 will be used to consider the basic relationship of urban security management to social policy given the consensus that has emerged about the particular problems and approaches that can define this policy area. Another respondent argued that, 'Urban security management is a good notion



(even if management is a bit ambiguous). According to me, it may in general terms be applied everywhere. The difficulty is that localities vary.'

Given this ambiguity, the significance of the consensus around the problems of urban security identified in responses to Q2.1a becomes important. For example, it could be argued that the most relevant context for managing problems of violence against the person including domestic violence (the overwhelming top priority problem ranked by the panel) is arguably the neighbourhood, given the identification of a 'Lorenz curve' distribution of inter-personal violence and its concentration in particular residential neighbourhoods characterised by other indices of multiple deprivation (Hope, 1996) along with those commercial and entertainment districts of cities that generate high levels of alcohol-related violence (Hobbs et al, 2004). The other problems ranked as a priority by a majority of the panel (social exclusion and youth unemployment, property crime and incivilities and anti-social behaviour) are similarly concentrated in particular neighbourhoods. This is corroborated in the moderate consensus amongst the panel about particular neighbourhoods as relevant contexts, with 13 panellists agreeing, one uncertain and one disagreeing.

The appropriate context for managing the problems identified in responses to Q2.1b will also depend on arguments about the appropriate approach to urban security analysis. For example, those arguing for 'upstream' responses to illicit drug use (law enforcement strategies aimed at reducing the supply of illicit drugs from producers and wholesalers) ought to prioritise cross-national, cross-regional and (in Europe) EU-wide contexts as the most relevant. Those privileging investment in 'downstream' responses aimed at reducing opportunities for consumption of illicit drugs, the rehabilitation of drug users and preventive work with groups 'at risk' of consuming illicit drugs ought to prioritise those neighbourhoods where consumption is concentrated and the large cities that act as the main distribution points for class-A narcotics. Given the particular problems and approaches prioritised by the panel, however, it is unsurprising there is a low consensus amongst panellists over the relevance of cross-national territories (for example the Shengen area of cross-border policing in Europe) and of the European Union's 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice'. Respondents from non-EU countries, such as Norway and Turkey, may object to the AFSJ as a relevant context for urban security management, however there are arguments in the research literature to suggest that the EU applies considerable influence over the internal security agendas of states on its borders and, especially, to applicants for EU membership (Edwards and Gill, 2003; Sheptycki, 1999; Monar et al, 2003).

Another significant finding of responses to this question was the low level of disagreement about rural areas as a relevant context for urban security. A significant minority of panellists (40%) agreed that rural areas were relevant whilst 60% disagreed and none were uncertain. As discussed in the commentary on Q1, a number of respondents preferred the concept of locality to that of the 'urban', both to recognise important variations amongst cities (and



neighbourhoods) and to acknowledge the importance of security problems in predominantly rural countries, such as Norway or Eire.

Summary and implications for Q3

The ambivalence of the panel as a whole toward 'supra-local' and to rural security 'spaces' accords with the stronger consensus about urban security management as a policy field defined by social policy-oriented approaches to high volume personal and property crimes and to incivilities and social inequalities that are concentrated in large cities and, within these, in particular neighbourhoods. In addition to validating this prioritisation, Q3 will seek panellists' opinions about the retention of 'urban security management' as a concept used to recognise the distinctive and common problems of security associated with cities or its replacement with a concept of 'local' security that can also accommodate rural places and problems. Q3 will also seek panellists' opinions about the distinction that has emerged out of responses to Q2 between local and 'supra-local' contexts of security. In the opinion of some panellists, urban security can be clearly distinguished from problems of national or supra-national security. Others argue that processes of globalisation compel a focus on the interrelationships between the global and local, hence the EU's interest in the internal security of member states. As one panellist remarked, 'Ireland is a highly globalised society and in 2004 was ranked as the most globalised on the AT Kearney Scale. In this context, there is a need for a strong cross-regional and cross-national dimension to urban security challenges; especially drug trafficking and criminal gangs.'

I.iv FUTURES

The Delphi method has also been used to facilitate forecasting given the predictive limitations of social science. This is a particular challenge for social research into security given that anticipation of problems in order to prevent them is central to the logic of security management, as contrasted with after-the-fact prosecution of events in criminal justice approaches. As noted in section I.ii and in commentary on responses to Q1, the panel has prioritised preventive approaches and this implies some debate over the current and prospective challenges for urban security management. In seeking panellists' informed opinion about these challenges, Q2 drew upon a distinction made by one panellist in response to Questionnaire One between the 'endogenous' and 'exogenous' qualities of urban security management and on the need to adopt a more medium-to-long-term anticipation of these challenges over the coming decade. Responses to Q2.2a about **endogenous** challenges, revealed a high consensus of agreement amongst panellists about the need to premise security management on research expertise about the causes of security problems and on evaluative evidence about what preventive interventions work. Only one respondent disagreed with the use of evaluative research to drive policy and no panellists were uncertain about these challenges. Beyond clarity on these points, responses revealed an interesting admixture of disagreement. Whilst two thirds of the panel, a clear majority, agreed that security strategies ought to be led by democratically elected politicians, just over a quarter disagreed reflecting some of the responses to Q1 which expressed concern about the tensions between research-driven policy agendas and the



authoritarian populism resulting from party political competition over crime prevention and other issues of security. One respondent also remarked that, 'Local development partnerships under the EU cohesion funds during the 1990s deliberately disallowed elected politicians so as social inclusion strategies would be depoliticised and that any risk of political favouritism, patronage or the promotion of pet projects would be minimised. A problem encountered given this scenario was that the partnerships were more politically fragile as a result.' This tension is also implied by the even split amongst panellists over the leadership of appointed civil servants, with one uncertain response, 7 for and 7 against this proposition. As another respondent remarked, 'the political level (policy makers) must be clearly separated of the expert level (expert systems). In this sense it is not good that these actors exchange their roles. Again at this point, the separation should not obscure their needed and essential relationship.' Of course this provokes a further discussion about who ultimately has power to set urban security agendas when there are competing mandates (for example between politicians elected on authoritarian populist manifestos and executives adopting the kind of research driven and evidence-based approaches that an overwhelming majority of the panel agree with).

The panel was also divided over the leadership of national governments with 7 for and 8 against. In turn, this reflects broader disputes over 'localism' or the extent to which the formulation and implementation of security strategies ought to be devolved to local actors. A counter argument is that, for certain problems, for example organised criminality and the corruption of public administration, such devolution is too high a risk as local actors are vulnerable to intimidation and 'capture' and may even be implicated in the problem. These are often cited as grounds for national and supra-national security agencies. Again, however, the kinds of problems of volume personal and property crime, incivilities and social exclusion that have been prioritised by a clear majority of the panel suggest devolution of power to local actors. As one respondent remarked, 'Urban security issues are local, not central. The security strategies should not be "co-ordinated" by the EU. They should be supported. EU may favour benchmarking, exchange of good practices, initiate networks, but not co-ordinate.'

Responses to Q2.2b, about the **exogenous** challenges confronting urban security strategies revealed a much greater degree of consensus than about the endogenous challenges of the political leadership of this management. There was a high consensus of agreement that the austerity programmes being pursued by many European governments in response to sovereign debt crises, and identified in Q1 as the dominant factor in the policy environment, will degrade the capacity to govern problems of urban security (87% agreement and 13% disagreement with no uncertainty) and that these will act as a catalyst for the rapid growth in private security for affluent neighbourhoods (80% agreement with 13% uncertain and one respondent in disagreement). There was also moderate agreement that these programmes will drive down health and safety standards in the workplace (although this was ranked by 47% of the panel as a low priority for urban security management), mobilise greater involvement of commercial enterprises and non-governmental organisations in public safety, fuel the growth of mass civil unrest and protest (although, again, this was also ranked by 40% of the panel as a low priority for urban security management) and fuel the growth of organised criminality and an expansion



of illicit labour markets in narcotics, vice and gambling (although a fifth of the panel disagreed with this latter scenario and just over a quarter were uncertain). Just under three quarters of the panel disagreed with the proposition that austerity programmes will produce smarter, more effective, efficient and economical security strategies, although a quarter of the panel were uncertain about this). Two thirds of the panel also agreed that greater cross-national migratory flows will threaten the cohesion and stability of European cities.

Responses to this question also revealed some interesting areas of disagreement with two thirds of the panel agreeing that austerity programmes will result in the abandonment of socially excluded populations to criminal victimisation but a third disagreeing. There was also disagreement about whether austerity programmes will generate greater corruption amongst public officials, with just under a half disagreeing with this scenario but a quarter agreeing and a further quarter of panellists uncertain. Responses to this question also produced one of the few majority uncertain verdicts, with 40% uncertain that the foreign policy programmes of some European countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa will make European cities more vulnerable to terrorism, whilst a third agreed with this proposition and just over a quarter disagreed. This is a very significant finding as it illustrates a strategic dilemma for the management of urban security, which is, in a condition of high uncertainty about the probability of infrequent but potentially catastrophic problems (such as terrorist attacks), what investment ought to go into preventing such problems? What are the opportunity costs of switching investment from more frequent but less severe problems towards infrequent but potentially catastrophic problems? In these terms, it is also worth noting that 53% of the panel ranked 'protection of the critical infrastructure' of cities as one of the least important problems for urban security. However, if, as discussed above, one criterion for defining the policy agenda for urban security is to prioritise 'generative' rather than 'epiphenomenal' problems, might not the vulnerabilities of cities with smart but brittle infrastructures be a priority for anticipating the volume of personal and property crime that would accompany failures of water and food supplies to expanding urban populations?

Responses to Q2.3, about the challenges for urban security over the **next decade**, revealed a high degree of consensus amongst the panellists. 100% of panellists agreed that offending and victimisation will remain concentrated on young cohorts of urban populations for both personal and property crimes notwithstanding the ageing demography of European populations. There was also strong agreement (93%) with the proposition that the impact of continuing austere economic conditions on urban populations will be highly uneven, with social exclusion concentrated on young, low-income, populations in multiply deprived neighbourhoods within which criminal predation and victimisation will increase. A further 93% of the panel agreed that urban populations in Europe will be characterised by increasing ethnic and cultural diversity and that this will result in worsening problems of social segregation and integration. 87% of the panel also agreed that the ageing demography of the European population will result in elderly cohorts accounting for a greater proportion of known victims for personal and property offences. The same percentage of the panel agreed that urban populations will be characterised by increasing social inequalities resulting in greater conflict between the generations over limited



public services. This percentage of the panel also agreed that in a context of austere public expenditure, governing capacity for delivering public safety will be degraded and that combined with trends toward greater social inequality and recession in the formal economy, there will be an expansion of the illicit economy (of drugs, vice and gambling) which will also become more organised and more harmful in terms of its consequences. These are significant findings which suggest that organised criminality is liable to become a higher priority for urban security across a broader range of European cities over the next decade. In turn, this provokes further reflection on the kinds of approaches and expertise that urban security managers ought to be learning now in anticipation of these trends.

Whether urban populations in Europe will become unsustainable given pressures on critical infrastructure (transport, and energy systems, water and food supplies) was a significant area of disagreement amongst panellists, with 47% agreeing but a third uncertain and a fifth disagreeing. Similar to the disagreement over the vulnerability of European cities to future terrorist attacks, dispute over the significance of the critical infrastructure of these cities implies an important strategic dilemma over the investment in infrequent but catastrophic problems. In addition to this, however, the issue of critical infrastructure provokes further discussion of the priority to be accorded to 'slow-burning' issues that may not register with urban populations (and electorates) in the here-and-now but which may reach a tipping-point after which their harmful impact becomes very severe, very quickly. Another key area of dispute was over the impact of these social and economic trends on public administration, with 60% agreeing there is likely to be increasing problems of corruption and tax evasion but a quarter disagreeing and two respondents uncertain. This is also a very significant finding suggesting that action against corruption and tax evasion ought to be a part of the training and education of urban security managers now, in anticipation of this likely trend.

Summary and implications for Q3

In addition to validating consensus about the futures of urban security, Q3 will seek the informed opinion of panellists about the key areas of disagreement emerging out of responses to Q2.2a, b and Q2.3. Specifically, it will consider the endogenous tensions between political, scientific and administrative leadership of urban security management and whether it is possible for these kinds of leadership to complement one another. It will consider whether a risk assessment matrix of severity and probability can support the anticipation of urban security problems and clarify how those with managerial responsibility for tackling these problems can cultivate anticipatory intelligence.



II. THE ACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR URBAN SECURITY MANAGEMENT

It will be recalled from responses to Q1 that panellists made a distinction between the strategic management of urban security problems (establishing the policy agenda and allocating resources for its implementation) and operational management (the routine processes and practices of urban security). A further distinction was made between actors organised in different state, commercial and non-governmental 'spheres' and at different supra-national, national and sub-national 'tiers' of governing. Panellists were asked to respond to a series of likert scale questions about the actors who are currently responsible for the strategic and operational management of urban security problems in the national context they were reporting on and which actors they think ought to be responsible.

II.i ACTORS WITH CURRENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT

Responses to Q2.4a revealed a high consensus about the **core responsibility of state actors** at national and sub-national tiers for the strategic management of urban security, with 80% agreeing and a fifth disagreeing and with no panellists uncertain. There was also a moderate consensus that **scientific expertise was marginal to strategic management**, with just under three quarters of the panel agreeing, a fifth disagreeing and one uncertain response.

However, two thirds of the panel agreed with the statement that it is not clear who, specifically, has strategic responsibility and that this is accompanied by a general lack of evaluation and regulation of responsible authorities, whilst the other third of the panel disagreed with this statement. There was also an interesting spread of responses about the responsibility of elected officials for strategic management, with 60% agreeing but a third disagreeing and one uncertain response. The same low consensus existed about the primary role of state actors in allocating resources for urban security. There was a lower consensus of agreement about the responsibility of commercial actors and NGOs, working in partnership with state actors, for strategic management, with 47% agreeing non-state actors have an influence on strategy but 40% disagreeing, whilst two respondents were uncertain.

There was also a low consensus about the location of responsibility for strategic management at the sub-national tier of governing, with a third of the panel agreeing but 60% disagreeing. Just over half of the panel disagreed that 'partnerships' of state, market and civil society actors work effectively and democratically to determine strategic management however a third agreed with this proposition whilst two panellists were uncertain. Again, just over half of the panel disagreed that EU bodies such as Europol and Frontex are able to determine strategies for urban security, however just over a quarter agreed and a fifth were uncertain about the impact of such supra-national actors.

There was even further disagreement about the strategic responsibility of appointed civil servants and their ability to operate independently of political leadership, with an even split between 47% agreeing, 47% disagreeing and one panellist uncertain. Two thirds of the panel



disagree that non-state actors determine the policy agenda for urban security but two panellists were uncertain about this whilst a fifth of the panel agreed. An interesting split of opinion also emerged over the influence of international conventions and legal frameworks on the policy agenda for urban security, with 60% disagreeing but 40% agreeing. There was also an important area of disagreement about the transparency of who has responsibility for strategic management and how decision-making powers are distributed amongst actors organised at different tiers and in different spheres of authority, with 60% disagreeing that this distribution was clear, whilst a third of the panel agreed.

By contrast with the ambiguity over responsibility for strategic management, responses to Q2.4b revealed a much higher consensus about responsibility for the operational management of urban security. All panellists agreed that the state police are the primary agents of urban security management and only one panellist disagreed with the proposition that operational duties are primarily the responsibility of state actors, particularly the police and local government. The overwhelming majority of the panel, 93%, also agreed that responsibility for operational management is located at the local, municipal, level in order to address the needs of local people. Significantly 87% the panel agreed that appointed civil servants have direct operational responsibility, with only 2 panellists disagreeing, and 80% of the panel agreed that this responsibility is jointly shared between civil servants from different departments of state, including justice, health and housing. There was also a consensus that whilst the police play a significant role, other state actors, such as social workers, housing officers and those in the emergency services are involved in the operational side of urban security management. This is a significant finding as it corroborates informed opinion that across different European contexts urban security is not the sole responsibility of the state police and so urban security managers concerned with operational matters have to work in conjunction with civil servants from a broad range of occupations. In these terms the 'brokerage' skills that operational managers require in order to enrol such a broad range of actors into preventive strategies are a core competence. In turn, this implies an ability to understand and engage with the various occupational concerns of these other actors.

There was less of a consensus about the role of non-state actors in carrying out key urban security tasks. Whilst nearly three quarters agreed that commercial enterprises and volunteering groups now have an operational responsibility, just over a quarter disagreed. This is a significant finding which alerts us to the continued dominance of state actors in some contexts for urban security. This may not remain the case given the pressures on state capacity for urban security over the next decade (identified in Q2.3, above).

Finally, there was a significant division of opinion about the 'unofficial' role that local criminal networks and organised crime groups play in managing problems of urban security. Here the panel was evenly divided with 47% agreeing, 47% disagreeing and one respondent uncertain. This reflects findings in the research literature which suggest that criminal organisations can adopt state functions (such as arbitrating private disputes and providing forms of welfare and employment) particularly in the context of weak and failing state power. Again, this finding is significant for anticipating the kinds of security management that might evolve in those



European contexts where the capacity of legitimate state intervention is eroded by austerity programmes and allied reductions in state governing capacities.

Summary and implications for Q3

Beyond consensus about the core responsibility of state actors for urban security, the lack of agreement amongst panellists about the political or executive leadership of state actors organised at different tiers of governing is a significant finding. It reflects a long-standing observation in the research literature over the locus of power for setting policy agendas and allocating resources for urban security. In turn, this reflects arguments over the 'limits of the sovereign state' (Garland, 1997) to command and control problems of urban security including the extent to which national governments are dependent on sub-national, even 'street-level', actors to deliver their policy agendas given the 'implementation gap' between policy formulation and outputs (Rhodes, 1997; Wildavsky, 1973). Ambivalence over who, if anyone, is in control of strategy in this policy area has intensified as a consequence of experiments in public-private 'partnerships' which formally involve commercial and not-for-profit organisations in urban security (Crawford, 2002). This is an especially important issue for the prevention of the kinds of problems that have been prioritised by panellists given that it is commonly acknowledged in the research literature that state police organisations lack the resources to govern 'alone' and must, therefore, enter into partnerships with other statutory, commercial and voluntary organisations (Hebberecht and Duprez, 2002; Hebberecht and Baillergeau).

As one panellist remarked in qualitative feedback on this question, 'I think that managing urban security affords the collaboration of different professions and approaches. So it is a task of a bunch of stakeholders, often working collaboratively in partnerships. This includes state actors (which are in an outstanding position) but also needs the activities of others. In a sense of subsidiarity the local level is most responsible but had to act in the framework of law and has to be supervised by elected politicians. The state or even the EU can enhance the local activities, but they won't be able to plan and devise the needed programmes.' Q3 will seek other panellists' views on how the notoriously vague concept of 'partnership' relates to strategic management, particularly in the light of the perceived future challenges for this management in the coming decade (see I.iv). It will explore whether, for the purposes of strategy (as contrasted with operations) partnership might be rejected in favour of a more unambiguous leadership of state actors and, amongst these, elected politicians rather than civil servants or their scientific advisors. In turn, this relates to the priorities that panellists accord to political, administrative and scientific leadership (as discussed in sections I and III).

II.ii ACTORS WHICH OUGHT TO HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT

Responses to Q2.5a revealed a high level of consensus in favour of matching responsibility for strategic management to the particular kinds of security problem in question and to the particular local contexts in which they occur. This reflects the consensus of the panel around restricting urban security management to locally-bound and context-specific problems. However, there is an interesting tension here, with the panel's identification of organised crime



and corruption in public office as problems that are likely to become more pressing in the coming decade. Whether local actors have the capacity to counter the organisation of more serious crimes and, if not, how responsibility for the strategic response to these ought to be shared with supra-local authorities is significant point for consideration in Q3. There was also a high consensus in favour of granting responsibility for strategic management to elected officials in order to ensure that the prioritisation of urban problems reflects the concerns of local people. There was also a high consensus against granting strategic responsibility to national policy-makers and against a standardised approach to security management in all cities and regions. Again, however, this might make more sense for strategic responses to volume personal and property crimes than to problems of organised criminality and corrupt public administration. There was nonetheless an interesting division of opinion amongst the panel over the relevance of supra-national organisations, such as the EU, with just over a half of panellists agreeing that strategic responsibility ought to remain within nation states given that external actors do not have sufficient understanding of the nature of urban problems in different national contexts. By contrast 40% of panellists disagreed with this, reflecting qualitative comments by some panellists in response to Q2.4a, that the EU can enhance local activities but cannot devise and plan such activities. The balance of opinion on the panel in favour of 'localism' and 'subsidiarity' is also reflected by the 53% arguing against the role of supra-national organisations, such as the UN, in setting urban security agendas and against the proposition that transnational problems, such as organised crime cannot be managed within nation states alone. Conversely, just over a quarter of the panel agreed that supra-national organisations ought to be key players in setting the policy agenda, whilst a fifth of the panel were uncertain.

Another significant finding is the low consensus about the hierarchical organisation of decision-making powers to ensure that disputes between authorities with competing mandates for urban security can be arbitrated. Just over a half of the panel agreed that one authority ought to be in a position to make a final decision, whilst just over a quarter of the panel disagreed and fifth of the panel were uncertain. This is a major issue for urban security management as research suggests that without an ultimate arbitrator, partnerships can drift into indecision and paralysis becoming 'mere talking shops'. Again, and counter to the more comfortable language of partnership, this raises the more challenging judgement about which actors, amongst those with competing political, administrative and scientific mandates, ought to have power to set policy agendas and allocate resources. Disagreement about this core issue of responsibility is further borne out by the low consensus in favour of distributing the power to govern urban security across several state and non-state actors at different tiers of governance, with just over a half of the panel in favour of this but a third against and two panellists uncertain. The same spread of opinion emerged in response to the idea of shifting agenda-setting powers away from the police and criminal justice agencies towards local actors with a broader public safety remit. Responses to Q2.5b revealed a stronger consensus about which actors ought to have operational responsibility for security management. All panellists agreed that local and national authorities ought to share responsibility. Only one panellist disagreed with the proposition that partnerships vested with operational responsibility ought to be constituted through formally binding contracts (as contrasted with the vague and informal qualities of much partnership



work) that ensure a clear and transparent allocation of decision-making powers. Significantly, 80% of the panel agreed that urban security managers ought to be given formal powers to negotiate and compel both state and non-state agencies to comply with their operational leadership, with no panellist disagreeing but a fifth of the panellists uncertain. This is an important but controversial finding, certainly in those European contexts where state police guard their right to 'operational independence'. The panel's collective opinion is that operational responsibility ought to be vested in state actors, with only one panellist agreeing that responsibility ought to lie with non-state actors and only two panellists agreeing that state and non-state actors ought to be jointly responsible for operational security management. Beyond this basic agreement in favour of state-centred management of urban security problems, however, panellists reported a very interesting, contradictory, set of judgements about operational responsibility. All panellists were in favour of multi-agency partnerships as the most appropriate way of managing urban security (the 'moderate consensus' here reflects the breadth of opinion amongst panellists about the strength of their agreement). However, whilst 80% of the panel thought elected local authorities ought to be responsible, a third also thought the police must be the primary agent for managing urban security, whilst 40% also felt that an elected mayor ought to be responsible.

Summary and implications for Q3

Given the ambivalence of the panel about the appropriate distribution of powers for strategic and operational management, Q3 will seek panellists informed opinion about which actors ought to have powers in relation to the specific problems of personal and property crime, incivilities and social exclusion which they prioritised on the current agenda for urban security management. It will also question whether this opinion alters in relation to managerial responsibility for the problem of organised criminality which panellists anticipate will become a greater priority in the coming decade.



III. THE EDUCATION AND TRAINING REQUIRED FOR URBAN SECURITY MANAGEMENT

Q2 sought the informed opinion of panellists about the three basic kinds of expertise for urban security management which they had discussed in Q1: the expertise of administrators, elected representatives and members of the research community. Following the format of other sections in the questionnaire, respondents were asked their opinion about current expertise and the expertise they thought these kinds of actors ought to have. The questionnaire concluded by asking panellists for their opinions about the appropriate use of educational and training programmes for developing this expertise.

III.i THE CURRENT EXPERTISE OF ADMINISTRATORS, ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES AND RESEARCHERS

Responses to Q2.6a revealed a high degree of consensus that those responsible for administering urban security programmes currently have expertise in traditional law enforcement and reactive policing strategies (100% agreement). 87% of the panel agreed that professional groups involved in urban security management have their own distinct and separate systems of training. This is a significant finding reflecting a long-term concern in the research literature that 'partnerships' have been hampered by conflicts between professions with competing occupational cultures and priorities for crime prevention, such as state police, social workers and other welfare professionals (Blagg et al, 1988; Hughes, 2007: 54-81). 87% of the panel also agreed that administrative expertise is currently premised on these practical occupational cultures and work experience rather than formal qualifications. 80% of the panel also agreed that currently, there is a confusing and uncoordinated field of educational and training provision and university-based programmes. There was also a consensus amongst panellists disagreeing with the proposition that administrators currently have evidence-based problem-solving and evaluative expertise (100% disagreement), whilst 80% of the panel also disagreed that administrators currently have dedicated, compulsory cross-sector training in urban security management which promotes an understanding of the relationship between policing, healthcare, education, housing and other known influences upon the kinds of problems prioritised by the panel. This is a significant finding given the renowned problem of 'departmentalism' in which civil servants acquire a specialist knowledge and experience of working in particular policy areas and departments of state but struggle to work across these departments and with this broad range of expertise. This is particularly problematic for multi-agency partnership work central to which is precisely this ability to work across policy areas in order to better 'join-up' areas of government intervention to effectively intervene in complex, multi-faceted, problems such as volume personal and property crimes.

There was moderate consensus amongst the panel over the proposition that administrative expertise is driven by a rational bureaucratic authority itself based on compulsory, centralised, state-run training programmes and systems of certification with 73% in agreement but a fifth of the panel in disagreement with one panellist uncertain. There was a lower consensus of



agreement that administrative expertise is informed by generic management consultancy, with two thirds of the panel in agreement but just over a quarter disagreeing and one panellist uncertain. In turn there was a greater spread of opinion about the influence of a training in masters-level criminology training on administrative expertise, with just over a half of the panel agreeing but the remaining panellists disagreeing. A similar split of opinion exists over the impact of masters-level public management and training and an even split of opinion over the impact of a national system of formal certification, principally involving knowledge of public law. The latter type of expertise, it may be recalled, emerged out of responses to Q1 identifying the importance of legal training for the administration of problems of crime and incivility in certain European countries. Another significant finding is the level of disagreement over the scientific analytical capacity of administrators to provide systematic analyses of local and regional statistical trends in the municipal authorities. Whilst 40% of the panel agreed that administrators had this capacity, just over a half disagreed with one panellist uncertain.

Responses to Q2.6b revealed a high consensus about the charismatic basis of elected politicians' authority in urban security management, with 87% of the panel agreeing, whilst 100% of the panel disagreed that politicians premise their authority on evidence-based problem-solving and evaluation. 80% of the panel agreed that elected politicians' expertise in urban security management is premised on their ability to articulate the views and sentiments of the citizenry, although it is worth recalling the qualitative feedback on survey research in the Irish Republic that found citizens to be more compassionate and better informed about security problems than either politicians or the mass media give credit for. 87% of the panel also agreed that politicians' expertise about urban security was premised on party political ideology and strategy, whilst two fifths of the panel disagreed that politicians had knowledge of the multi-dimensionality of urban security issues and their management in both municipal and national elected leadership. However, just over a quarter of the panel thought that politicians did possess this expertise. Even so, the key areas of consensus emerging from the panel were that politicians are primarily driven by party political ideology and strategy, they appeal to charismatic authority and their electoral mandate as a basis for setting policy agendas for urban security and lack knowledge or interest in evidence-based problem-solving and scientific evaluation.

Responses to Q2.6c revealed a perhaps unsurprisingly high consensus amongst this panel of academic experts over the expertise that the research community brings to urban security management. 87% agreed that researchers have knowledge and skills about gathering and analysing data on social trends (interestingly, two panellists dissented), 80% agreed that researchers have a critical awareness of the limitations of current policy and practice and knowledge and skills in understanding wider trends in contemporary society, particularly of urban development, and understanding the policy-making process (interestingly there was no uncertainty amongst these responses, whilst a fifth of the panel disagreed). There was a lower consensus that researchers had knowledge and skills in explaining both the causes and solution of the problems of crime and disorder (with just under three quarters agreeing and just over a quarter of the panel disagreeing). Two thirds of the panel agreed that



researchers have knowledge and skills in evidence-based problem-solving, whilst a fifth disagreed. The same split of opinion was provided in relation to researchers' inter-disciplinary grounding in the social sciences, whilst just over a half of the panel agreed that researchers have knowledge and skills in crime science and experimental methods of evaluation with just under a half of the panel disagreeing. These are significant findings which suggest an important division of intellectual labour within the research community reflecting in part the competing programmes of mainstream and 'critical' social science as epitomised in arguments over the value of experimental criminology as a basis for establishing what works, what doesn't and what's promising about crime prevention (Sherman, 2008; Hope, 2009; Tilley, 2009). These findings also suggest an important variation in capacity across the European Research Area, as epitomised in the two qualitative comments received from panellists to this question:

'Security research in Germany is not established ... is often concentrated on one discipline and not enough interdisciplinary. Especially criminology is underdeveloped in Germany because it is mainly a minor in the law studies and not - like in UK - an established social science. This complicates a proper analysis of urban security matters.'

'The scientific community in the security and criminological is scarce and fragmented in different disciplinary areas (e.g. the only public University in Portugal with three study cycles in criminology is University of Porto).'

III.ii THE EXPERTISE THAT ADMINISTRATORS, ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES AND RESEARCHERS OUGHT TO POSSESS

Responses to Q2.7a revealed a high degree of consensus amongst the panel about the kind of expertise that administrators ought to possess in order to undertake their responsibilities for urban security management. The greatest agreement was over a need for dedicated compulsory cross-sector training in urban security management, an ability to communicate between those with social scientific expertise and with political responsibility for urban security, training in community/neighbourhood consultation, knowledge and awareness of the politics, ethics and human rights consequences of interventions in the field and practical, managerial knowledge and skills regarding organisational cultures and behaviour.

It is also worth noting the 100% agreement amongst the panellists that administrators ought to have a masters-level training in criminology and in evidence-based problem solving and scientific evaluation. According to the IQR score for these responses, they have been categorised as only 'moderate' rather than high consensus but this is an artefact of the extent to which panellists strongly agreed, moderately agreed or simply agreed with these propositions (as can be seen from the raw data in the Q2SOCSI report). The key point remains that a strong consensus exists amongst panellists that administrators ought to have this kind of training and expertise along with scientific analytical capacity in municipal authorities and knowledge of the democratic process and the vocational pressures upon elected politicians. By contrast, two thirds of the panel disagreed that administrators ought to base their expertise of urban security



management on practical occupational cultures and work experience rather than formal qualifications.

There was a broader spread of opinion about the importance of generic management consultancy with just over a half of the panel agreeing with this, a third disagreeing and two respondents uncertain. Just over half of the panel thought administrators ought to have expertise in traditional law enforcement and reactive policing, whilst just under a half of the panel disagreed. This is a significant finding as it reflects a major division of opinion about the importance of law enforcement in urban security as contrasted with the other approaches prioritised in responses to Q2.1b. Opinion was also divided about the compulsory state-run training programmes and the certification of expertise in urban security management, with a third of the panel agreeing but 60% disagreeing. The panel was divided over whether relevant professional groups for urban security management ought to have their own distinct and separate systems of training, with just over a half of the panel disagreeing but the remainder agreeing. This is a very significant finding given the challenges of respecting the particular expertise and experience that these different professions bring to security management whilst facilitating their capacity for joint working and thinking outside of specialist occupational knowledge.

Respondents to Q2.7b revealed a high consensus that elected politicians ought to have knowledge of the multi-dimensionality of urban security issues and their management and that there ought to be dedicated training for elected mayors, especially where they have constitutional-legal authority for the leadership of urban security management. 93% of the panel also agreed that elected politicians ought to reflect the priorities of the citizenry and ought to have a knowledge of evidence-based problem-solving and scientific evaluation. Of course, this raises the challenging problem of how to arbitrate between the priorities of the electorate and the outcomes of evidence-based problem-solving and scientific evaluation where these two drivers of policy conflict with one another. A classic example of this is over the value of routine police patrolling which has been criticised as ineffective in the research literature but which remains popular with many local electorates.

Opinion was divided over the significance of party political ideology and strategy as a basis for politician's contribution to urban security management, with just over a half disagreeing with this but 40% agreeing that political ideology is a justifiable grounds for setting policy agendas and allocating resources. The panel was equally divided over the importance of charismatic authority for elected politician's contribution to urban security management.

Responses to Q2.7c revealed a high consensus, indeed a negligible disagreement, about the need for those researchers contributing to urban security management to have a critical awareness of the limitations of current policy and practice and knowledge and skills in evidence-based problem-solving, gathering and analysing data on social trends and explaining both the causes of, and solutions to, problems of crime and disorder. This is a significant finding as it reflects a strong commitment to causal analysis and intervention which has been resisted, indeed challenged, as an appropriate contribution of researchers by critical social scientists who have privileged a focus on the normative social construction of 'crime' and 'insecurity'. To this end the strong consensus about the value that experimental criminology ought to have for



urban security management is significant, with 80% of the panel agreeing, given the dispute within criminology over the possibility and desirability of experiments.

Summary and implications for Q3

In summary, there was a high degree of consensus about the need for a more research-driven and evidence-based approach to urban security management, which, as noted above, is an unsurprising response from a panel of academic experts. More interesting is the disagreement over the contribution of party political ideology and strategy to urban security management which corresponds with the ambivalence of the panel over the strategic leadership of elected politicians and administrators considered in section II, above. Q3 will seek the opinion of panellists on the prioritisation of scientific, political and administrative expertise in urban security management where these different kinds of expertise are in conflict.

III.iii THE CONTRIBUTION OF EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING PROGRAMMES FOR DEVELOPING EXPERTISE IN URBAN SECURITY MANAGEMENT

Responses to Q2.8 revealed a high consensus about the need for initiatives and processes encouraging long-term collaboration between practitioners and researchers, with 100% agreement of the panel. There was also near complete agreement with the proposition that expertise for urban security management is dependent both on process skills (e.g. how to find out about patterns of crime and victimisation, how to engage communities and manage partnerships) and content skills (e.g. how to interpret such patterns, explain the criminological factors at work in the causes of crime and disorder). There was also a high consensus about the need for urban security managers to be open to regular evaluation of their work by independent scientific parties and for their skills to be developed through a mixture of higher-degree education as well as shorter, more focussed, training courses. There was also, perhaps unsurprisingly, a high consensus about the need for compulsory postgraduate-level education of urban security managers with 80% of the panel agreeing, two panellists disagreeing and one uncertain.

Again, unsurprisingly, panellists agreed that expertise for urban security management would be most effectively developed via university-based learning and training and that targeted training for elected politicians ought to be a priority.

Opinion was more divided about the compulsion of urban security managers to undertake a postgraduate-level programme of education in comparative European and multi-disciplinary approaches to crime prevention and security, with just under a half of the panel in agreement but a third disagreeing and fifth of the panel uncertain. This is a significant finding which provokes further consideration of the relevance of comparative understanding for expertise in urban security management and what, specifically, Europeans can learn from one another. A greater majority of the panel, 60% disagreed with the relevance of postgraduate training in generic public management and business administration, whilst a quarter agreed and two panellists were uncertain. This is a significant finding as there is a tension between the kind of subject specific expertise that criminology could provide into the kinds of problems that have



been prioritised by the panel and the insights that can be gained from training in the challenges of public administration per se. Opinion was also divided over need for common European-wide standards for education and training in urban security management, with just under a half agreeing but 40% disagreeing and two panellists uncertain.

Summary and implications for Q3

As discussed in the introduction to this commentary, we are particularly interested in seeking panellists' opinions about the value of policy convergence around a standardised concept of urban security management and common standards for educational and training programmes. There is a tension in responses from the panel over support for common standards and for context-specific approaches. Q3 will explore this tension further and the problems of what, and how, Europeans ought to learn from one another about urban security management.



COMMENTARY ON QUESTIONNAIRE 2 (Q2) FROM THE CARDIFF UNIVERSITY TEAM TO THE EUCPN DELPHI PANEL

Introduction

We wish to begin by thanking the members of EUCPN who were able to respond to this second round of our exercise in knowledge exchange. In particular we thank the following government representatives for their participation and completion of Questionnaire 2 (Q2):

Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Malta, The Netherlands, and Romania.

In this report on the second of three questionnaires (Q2), we present the key findings on areas of consensus and disagreement about:

- problems, approaches and contexts of urban security management;
- responsibility for undertaking this work; and
- allied areas of expertise.

It will be recalled from the guidance notes accompanying the first questionnaire (Q1), that the methodological justification for conducting a policy Delphi is not to elicit responses that are representative of an entire population of interest (e.g. national-level policy officers with an interest in urban security in Europe). Rather, it is to facilitate structured dialogue amongst those with informed judgement about a subject matter that is characterised by lack of agreement in order to establish if it is possible to reach a consensus of opinion or else to clarify and corroborate areas of disagreement about subjects that are 'contested'.

The subjective judgements of those recruited to a Delphi Panel are transformed into a more objective account through a particular form of iterative group communication in which Delphi Panel co-ordinators collect and interpret responses from each panellist and communicate them back out to all panellists along with further questions. This iterative communication provides panellists with an opportunity to defend or revise initial judgements in the light of feedback from the whole panel. Subsequent iterations in this group communication act as forms of both respondent and construct validation of the research problem in question and therefore of the objectivity of the informed judgement reached by the panel as a whole.

The following commentary summarises areas of consensus and disagreement revealed by analysis of the responses to Q2. After a brief discussion of the logic of the Urbis policy Delphi and the particular contribution of Q2, this commentary will be limited to providing a summary of what the co-ordinators of the panel at Cardiff University consider to be the main findings on consensus and disagreement about urban security management.

Whereas Q1 posed a series of deliberately open-ended questions as a means of capturing the **scope** of (1) the problems, approaches and contexts of urban security, (2) the responsibility of different actors for undertaking this work, and (3) the expertise these actors ought to possess,



Q2 explored areas of consensus and disagreement by asking respondents to **prioritise** the kinds of problems, responsibilities and expertise that had been identified in Q1. The third and final questionnaire (Q3) seeks to **validate** these areas of consensus and disagreement, offering panellists an opportunity to reflect on the priorities indicated by other respondents to Q2 and to corroborate or revise their own opinions accordingly. Q3 will also provide panellists with open text boxes which they can use to offer any final comments on the Urbis policy Delphi. In addition to clarifying the uncertain and contested qualities of 'urban security management', this validation is important for the core objective of Work Package 3 of the Urbis project, which is to recognise the 'state of the art' in urban security management as a basis for curriculum development in postgraduate level education and training in this area of work.

In validating the priorities of this work and, therefore, any proposed 'core curriculum' of education and training in urban security management we are particularly interested in arguments for and against a standardised educational programme. Is it, for example, possible and desirable to pursue **policy convergence** around a standard set of problems, responsibilities and expertise and to what extent policy responses ought to be tailored to the particular contexts of urban security in different European localities? If not, we are interested in panellists' arguments against policy convergence and what this implies for policy transfer across these contexts. Put provocatively: what, if anything, can Europeans learn from one another about managing urban security?

In support of these aims, the following commentary is organised in terms of the three core themes of Urbis policy Delphi:

I. 'Problematisation'

- The main problems, approaches, contexts and futures of urban security management.

II. 'Responsibilisation'

- The actors responsible for urban security management.

III. 'Expertise'

- The education and training required to meet these responsibilities.

Under each of these headings, areas of high, moderate, low, and questionable consensus are discussed as a precursor to provoking a dialogue amongst panellists in Q3 about any core set of problems, responsibilities and expertise.

I. THE MAIN PROBLEMS, APPROACHES, CONTEXTS AND FUTURES OF URBAN SECURITY MANAGEMENT

I.i. PROBLEMS

High priority problems

Responses to Q2.1a revealed a moderate consensus (50-75%) around the following four problems as the principal priorities for urban security management:

- Incivility and anti-social behaviour
- Social exclusion and youth unemployment
- Property crime (burglary, theft, robbery)
- Violence against the person (including domestic violence)

It is a fair interpretation to regard these four problems as constituting the very core of priorities for urban security management.

A significant minority (25-50%), however, saw the core policy agenda for urban security management would encompass the problems of :

- Criminal gangs and organised crime
- Immigration and social cohesion
- Alcohol and drug misuse

Of course, these are matters of interpretation and not an exact measurement but we would argue that a questionable consensus exists around any problem identified by less than a quarter of panellists as a priority for urban security management. In turn this would exclude, from the policy agenda such issues as drug trafficking, corporate crime, fraud, human trafficking, terrorism and civil unrest, notwithstanding the high profile of these problems in public discourse on security in many European countries, certainly since the bombing of public transport systems in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 and in the impact of the post-2008 financial and sovereign debt crises of urban governance in many European cities.

Low priority problems

A further, significant, finding is the moderate consensus (50-75%) of respondents ranking such problems as health and safety in the workplace and tax evasion amongst the five least important problems for urban security management.

There was also a low consensus (25-50%) of responding ranking the following as the least important problems:

- State police violence
- Climate change and natural disasters (flooding, extreme weather)
- Corruption of public administration
- Environmental degradation (illegal waste disposal, pollution)
- Firearms-related crime



The questionable and negligible priority accorded to problems of tax evasion and corruption, especially of public administration, is a particularly interesting finding given the pressures these problems place on the governing capacity for urban security. In analysing the responses for the EUCPN panel, it is possible to identify three possible types of qualification to the prioritisation offered thus far.

I.i.1. Scope

It is important to recognise that issues such as 'organised crime' and 'corruption' are clearly serious problems but they may be ones that are better regarded as 'supra-local' and that are to be addressed by bodies that operate beyond the urban security domain. This possibility provokes an important discussion about the appropriate scope of urban security management. It also depends upon what one considers to lie within the proper capacity and competence of urban security – it cannot be "all things to all people". As such, the consensus of opinion amongst respondents is that urban security management ought to be restricted to problems which are locally bounded in their origin and context-specific. The implication of this is that an important distinction exists between problems that are locally bounded and context-specific or, to use current public policy terminology, those that are 'downstream' and those which may be expressed in particular localities, such as the Madrid and London bombings, but whose origins and key points of intervention are 'upstream', in other localities, regions and countries requiring, in turn, national or transnational security responses.

I.i.2. Context

Another important qualification and one that reflects an ongoing theme of the Urbis policy Delphi is the need to recognise the diverse contexts of urban security across Europe. To illustrate this point some respondents discussed the problems of 'drug trafficking' and 'human trafficking', which less than a quarter of respondents ranked as top priorities for urban security but which are of significant concern in particular contexts.

I.i.3. Categorisation

Finally, it is possible that certain categories which were distinguished in Q2 might be better considered together. For example, it is possible that 'criminal damage' would be considered as an 'incivility' rather than as a separate problem and so issues of 'vandalism' and 'graffiti' would be included in the category of 'incivilities and anti-social behaviour' which, it will be recalled, the panel rated as amongst the highest priority problems for urban security management. Issues of conceptual translation were also identified as significant such that terms like 'anti-social behaviour' ought to be regarded as an ethnocentric (Anglophone) administrative category rather than a commonly used analytical category such as 'incivility' that is recognisable and meaningful in other European contexts. There is a strong argument for emphasising the interaction between problems of urban security and a need to avoid treating problems as 'self-contained'.

Summary and implications for Questionnaire Three (Q3)

It may be suggested that an important criterion for prioritisation is to identify those problems which are regarded as primary, structural and generative and to distinguish these from problems which are thought to be secondary, surface-level and symptomatic. The implication of this is that, especially in austere conditions that compel greater prioritisation, the identification of generative problems provides some grounds for the definition of policy agendas, the allocation of governing resources, the co-operation of responsible actors and the kinds of expertise required for urban security management. This criterion provokes an important debate over the generative or symptomatic qualities of the four problems prioritised by a clear majority of panellists in Q2 of the Urbis policy Delphi. In addition to 'social exclusion and youth unemployment', are 'incivilities' and 'property crime' to be regarded as generative of urban security or as symptomatic of other causal factors and vulnerabilities? In what sense, might 'violence against the person' be regarded as a consequence of 'structural conditions'?

Sensitivity to questions of the 'frequency' and the 'impact' of the sorts of problems ranked both high and low priorities by panellists implies a consideration of **harm** as a possible criterion for defining the scope, contexts and categories of urban security management. Recent work in the area of organised and serious crime (which is another broad, ambiguous, concept) has used the notion of a 'risk assessment matrix' distinguishing policy priorities in terms of the harms of particular problems, ranked according to their 'severity' (on a scale from negligible to catastrophic) and their 'probability' (from unlikely to frequent). This matrix is, of course, subject to some interpretative flexibility but at least it provides an organising framework for arguments about prioritising certain problems relative to others, from one extreme (frequent and catastrophic) to another (unlikely and negligible) (see Greenfield and Paoli, 2010). This is a very significant insight as it illustrates a strategic dilemma for the management of urban security, which is, in a condition of high uncertainty about the probability of infrequent but potentially catastrophic problems (such as terrorist attacks), what investment ought to go into preventing such problems? What are the opportunity costs of switching investment from more frequent but less severe problems towards infrequent but potentially catastrophic problems?

In addition to validating the priority problems identified by panellists in Q2, a purpose of Q3 will be to seek panellists' informed opinion about the utility of this matrix in assessing the severity and probability of these problems and whether this alters the level of consensus and disagreement about the definition of urban security management.

I.ii. APPROACHES

High priority approaches

Responses to Q2.1b revealed a high consensus about the high priority that should be given to reducing social segregation and promoting social cohesion and with no respondent ranking this as one of the least important approaches. The other priority approach attracting a high consensus from the panel was that of reducing the opportunities for criminal victimisation.

Responses to Q2.1b also revealed a moderate consensus (50-75%) around the following three problems as the priority approaches for urban security management:



- Requiring citizens to take responsibility for their own security and equipping them with the capacity and resources to meet this responsibility
- Restorative justice interventions with perpetrators and victims of criminal offences
- Reducing social inequalities in household income, access to education, employment, healthcare and housing

These responses taken together suggest the consensus of opinion of panellists is that scarce resources ought to be allocated to *both* economic and social policy interventions that target social segregation and social inequality combined with targeted measures aimed at reducing both offending and victimisation. There is thus a strong affinity between these judgements and the 'spirit level thesis' (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009) which uses comparative social research to demonstrate a relationship between social inequality and various social ills, including elevated levels of violent crime and punishment. At the same time, the support for targeted interventions lends support for the international promotion of situational crime prevention measures and allied risk management approaches alongside restorative alternatives to criminal justice approaches. Attempts to shift responsibility for security from the state onto private citizens has been an influential theme in contemporary criminology and one that has been regarded as a defining characteristic of the current 'culture of control' in Britain and the United States (Garland, 2001; O'Malley, 1992) and its transfer across Europe (Wacquant, 2001). The findings from this Urbis policy Delphi suggest there is support for this approach.

Low priority approaches

A very significant finding is the high consensus (75-100%) of respondents ranking the 'traditional', repressive criminal justice approaches of increased use of imprisonment and correctional facilities, and punitive sentencing policies as low priority strategies in urban security management. Tellingly no respondent ranked them as high priority approaches. Perhaps less surprisingly, promoting greater health and safety in the workplace was also viewed very widely as a low priority approach in urban security management. There was also a moderate consensus (25-50%) of responding ranking enhancing the democratic scrutiny and oversight of security strategies as a low priority approach.

Summary and implications for Q3

The clear finding from responses to the prioritisation of urban security management approaches is that law enforcement and imprisonment are viewed as inappropriate as responses to the kinds of problems the panel have prioritised for urban security management and appear to be counter-productive for accomplishing the targeted preventive intervention agendas advocated. In particular, those measures that are aimed at reducing the immediate opportunities for criminal victimization and which switch the focus of policy responses away from offending behaviour and toward the vulnerabilities of victims are prioritised. An equally strong consensus exists over the promotion of social policy responses to problems of urban security, particularly those that can tackle social inequalities and cultivate greater social cohesion.

In addition to validating this weight of opinion, Q3 will seek panellists' views on the arguments between advocates of situational crime prevention and proponents of social crime prevention in addition to the relative weighting that ought to be given to primary forms of prevention (that



target whole populations), secondary prevention (that targets 'at risk' groups) and tertiary prevention (that targets 'prolific and priority' offenders and repeat victims). It will also seek panellists' opinions about the basic relationship between social policy and urban security management given the priority the panel has accorded to social policy responses alongside targeted risk management and preventive interventions.

I.iii CONTEXTS

Responses to Q2.1c revealed an unsurprisingly high consensus about large cities and all cities being a relevant context for urban security management. This was the first Likert Scale question of Q2, which enabled analysis of consensus, disagreement and uncertainty in terms of the 'inter-quartile range' (IQR) of responses. All respondents ranked large cities as a priority context. Only one respondent disagreed that all cities were a relevant context. There was also a high consensus that both the European Union Territory and particular neighbourhoods were each a relevant context for urban security management, with no panellist disagreeing.

There was a moderate level of consensus about the following contexts:

- Cross-regional territories
- All national territories
- Cross-national territories (including cyberspace).

Finally there was low consensus and uncertainty with regard to the importance of rural areas as contexts for urban security management.

Whilst cities being by definition 'urban' may seem the obvious contexts for both the generation of many urban security problems and the contexts for the management of such problems, it could be argued that the most relevant context for managing, for example, the particular problems of violence against the person including domestic violence is arguably the neighbourhood, given the identification of a 'Lorenz curve' distribution of inter-personal violence and its concentration in particular residential neighbourhoods characterised by other indices of multiple deprivation (Hope, 1996) along with those commercial and entertainment districts of cities that generate high levels of alcohol-related violence (Hobbs et al, 2004). The other problems ranked as a priority by a majority of the panel (social exclusion and youth unemployment, property crime and incivilities and anti-social behaviour) are similarly concentrated in particular neighbourhoods. This is corroborated in the consensus amongst the panel about particular neighbourhoods as relevant contexts, with 11 panellists agreeing, one uncertain and no one disagreeing.

The appropriate context for managing the problems identified in responses to Q2.1b will also depend on arguments about the appropriate approach to urban security analysis. For example, those arguing for 'upstream' responses to illicit drug use (law enforcement strategies aimed at reducing the supply of illicit drugs from producers and wholesalers) ought to prioritise cross-national, cross-regional and (in Europe) EU-wide contexts as the most relevant. Those



privileging investment in 'downstream' responses aimed at reducing opportunities for consumption of illicit drugs, the rehabilitation of drug users and preventive work with groups 'at risk' of consuming illicit drugs ought to prioritise those neighbourhoods where consumption is concentrated and the large cities that act as the main distribution points for class-A narcotics.

Summary and implications for Q3

In addition to validating the priority problems identified by panellists in Q2, Q3 will seek panellists' opinions about the retention of 'urban security management' as a concept used to recognise the distinctive and common problems of security associated with cities or its replacement with a concept of 'local' or 'neighbourhood' security that can also accommodate rural places and problems.

I.iv CHALLENGES

The Delphi method has also been used to facilitate forecasting given the predictive limitations of social science. This is a particular challenge for social research into security given that anticipation of problems in order to prevent them is central to the logic of security management, as contrasted with after-the-fact prosecution of events in criminal justice approaches. As noted in section I.ii and in commentary on responses to Q1, the panel has prioritised preventive approaches and this implies some debate over the current and prospective challenges for urban security management. In seeking panellists' informed opinion about these challenges, Q2 drew upon the distinction made between the 'endogenous' and 'exogenous' qualities of urban security management and on the need to adopt a more medium-to-long-term anticipation of these challenges over the coming decade.

Current challenges

Responses to Q2.2a about current *endogenous* challenges, revealed a high consensus of strong agreement amongst panellists about the need for security strategies to be driven by evaluations of 'what works, what doesn't and what's promising' about the prevention of security problems. There was also agreement that security strategies ought to be devolved to local authorities and to be driven by research expertise about the causes of security problems. There was also a moderate level of consensus that security strategies ought to be coordinated by the EU and in turn ought to be led by appointed civil servants.

Beyond clarity on these points, responses revealed an interesting admixture of disagreement. Whilst nearly two thirds of the panel, a clear majority, agreed that security strategies ought to be led by democratically elected politicians, just over a quarter disagreed reflecting some of the responses to Q1 which expressed concern about the tensions between research-driven policy agendas and the authoritarian populism resulting from party political competition over crime prevention and other issues of security. Of course this provokes a further discussion about who ultimately has power to set urban security agendas when there are competing mandates (for example between politicians elected on populist manifestos and executives adopting the kind of research driven and evidence-based approaches that an overwhelming majority of the panel agree with).



The panel was also divided over the leadership of national governments with 7 in agreement, 4 against and 1 uncertain. In turn, this reflects broader disputes over 'localism' or the extent to which the formulation and implementation of security strategies ought to be devolved to local actors. A counter argument is that, for certain problems, once again for example organised criminality and the corruption of public administration, such devolution is too high a risk as local actors are vulnerable to intimidation and 'capture' and may even be implicated in the problem. These are often cited as grounds for national and supra-national security agencies. Again, however, the kinds of problems of volume personal and property crime, incivilities and social exclusion that have been prioritised by a clear majority of the panel suggest devolution of power to local actors.

Responses to Q2.2b, about the current *exogenous* challenges confronting urban security strategies revealed a lesser degree of high consensus than about the endogenous challenges. However there was a moderate consensus of agreement regarding a very large number of exogenous challenges, namely:

- Austerity programmes will result in the abandonment of socially excluded populations to criminal victimisation
- Austerity programmes will result in the greater prioritisation of corporate crime, fraud and tax evasion in urban security strategies
- Austerity programmes will act as a catalyst for a rapid growth in private security for affluent neighbourhoods
- Austerity programmes will fuel the growth of organised criminality and an expansion of illicit labour markets in narcotics, vice and gambling
- Austerity programmes will fuel the growth of mass civil unrest and protest
- Cross-national migratory flows will threaten the cohesion and stability of European cities
- Austerity programmes will degrade the capacity to govern problems of urban security
- Foreign policy programmes of some European countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa will make European cities more vulnerable to terrorism
- Austerity programmes will drive down health and safety standards in the workplace.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, there was uncertainty of opinion and questionable consensus with the propositions that austerity programmes will generate both greater corruption amongst public officials, and produce more effective, efficient and economical security strategies.

Challenges in the next decade

Responses to Q2.3, about the challenges for urban security over the next decade, revealed a high degree of consensus amongst the panellists. All panellists (100%) agreed that

- Ageing populations in European cities will alter the demography of crime such that elderly cohorts of the population will account for a greater proportion of the known population of victims for personal and property offences
- Problems of unemployment will be concentrated upon young cohorts of the urban population in Europe and this will lead to greater criminal predation amongst the young and against the elderly



Meanwhile a high consensus of panellists moderately agreed that

- The impact of austere economic conditions on urban populations will be highly uneven with social exclusion concentrated on the young, low-income, populations in particular neighbourhoods and this will elevate criminal predation and victimisation in these areas
- In the context of degraded governing capacity and limited economic growth in the formal economy, the illicit economy (drugs, vice, gambling) will expand and will become more organised and more harmful in terms of its consequences

These are significant findings which suggest that in the wider social and economic context of the polarisation and uneven marginalisation of urban populations, organised criminality in the illicit economy is liable to become a higher priority for urban security across a broader range of European cities over the next decade. In turn, this provokes further reflection on the kinds of approaches and expertise that urban security managers ought to be learning now in anticipation of these trends.

There was also moderate level of agreement on a wide number of further challenges, ranging from demographic, socio-economic developments and governmental capacity, to further aspects of offending and victimisation. These challenges manifesting both moderate consensus and moderate level of agreement are as follows:

- Urban populations in Europe will be characterised by increasing social inequalities which will result in greater conflict between generations over limited public services
- Urban populations in Europe will be characterised by increasing ethnic and cultural diversity which will result in worsening problems of social segregation and integration
- Notwithstanding the ageing profile of urban populations in Europe, offending and victimisation will remain concentrated on young cohorts of the population for both personal and property crimes
- Urban populations in Europe will expand rapidly provoking greater conflict over access to shrinking public services (housing, education) and employment opportunities
- Governing capacity for public safety in European cities will become increasingly degraded in the context of austere public finances and limited economic growth

There was, however, low to questionable consensus with regard to the following propositions:

- Urban populations in Europe will become unsustainable given the pressures on critical infrastructure (transport and energy systems, water and food supplies)
- Critical infrastructure will become more vulnerable to disruption from climatic change and severe weather conditions as well as to attack by acts of terror
- Public administration in European cities will encounter increasing problems of corruption and tax evasion

The uncertainty of opinion manifested over the vulnerability of European cities to future terrorist attacks and the significance of the critical infrastructure of these cities imply again an important strategic dilemma over the investment in infrequent but catastrophic problems. In addition to



this, however, the issue of critical infrastructure provokes further discussion of the priority to be accorded to 'slow-burning' issues that may not register with urban populations (and electorates) in the here-and-now but which may reach a tipping-point after which their harmful impact becomes very severe, very quickly.

Summary and implications for Q3

In addition to validating consensus about the futures of urban security, Q3 will consider whether a risk assessment matrix of severity and probability can support the anticipation of urban security problems and clarify how those with managerial responsibility for tackling these problems can cultivate anticipatory intelligence.



II. THE ACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR URBAN SECURITY MANAGEMENT

It will be recalled from responses to Q1 that panellists made a distinction between the *strategic* management of urban security problems (establishing the policy agenda and allocating resources for its implementation) and *operational* management (the routine processes and practices of urban security).

A further distinction was made between actors organised in different state, commercial and non-governmental 'spheres' and at different supra-national, national and sub-national 'tiers' of governing. Panellists were asked to respond to a series of Likert scale questions about the actors who are *currently* responsible for the strategic and operational management of urban security problems in the national context they were reporting on and which actors they think *ought* to be responsible.

II.i ACTORS WITH CURRENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT

Strategic management

Responses to Q2.4a revealed a high consensus of agreement about the core responsibility of state actors at both national and sub-national tiers for the strategic management of urban security, as reflected in the levels of agreement in response to the following statements:

- Non-state agencies and actors (e.g. commercial enterprises, community groups and NGOs) have responsibility and work with the state (central and local) in the form of 'partnerships' but the State always has the final say on strategy (100% agreement)
- The prioritisation of urban security problems (e.g. terrorism, organised crime, street crime etc.) is the responsibility of state actors (e.g. police, government Ministries) whether this is at the national, regional or local 'tier' (90% agreement)
- Strategic responsibility is organised across the national, regional and local 'tiers' by state actor (80%)

There was also a high level of consensus in moderate agreement with the statements that strategic responsibility is clear and transparent in the respondent's jurisdiction, resources are primarily allocated by state actors to those actors involved in managing urban security, and that these structures are sufficiently evaluated and regulated. Furthermore, respondents showed a high level of moderate agreement with the claim that agencies that make up formal 'partnerships' and other complex arrangements work effectively together to determine strategy and resource allocation and this is always carried out democratically as no single agency has authority over the others. Finally a high level of consensus based on moderate agreement was evident regarding the key role of elected officials such as Mayors and local councils having responsibility over how urban security is managed and being able to set the agenda and allocate resources as they see fit.



Perhaps unsurprisingly, over half of the panel disagree that non-state actors determine the policy agenda for urban security. There was uncertainty about the ability of appointed civil servants to operate independently of political leadership, with a split between 3 agreeing, 4 disagreeing and 3 uncertain. In turn just under half of the panel disagreed that EU bodies such as Europol and Frontex are able to determine strategies for urban security and that conventions and legal frameworks created by international and intergovernmental organisations such as the UN are key in shaping the urban security agenda in the respondent's country.

Operational management

Responses to Q2.4b revealed a very high consensus about responsibility for the operational management of urban security. 90% panellists agreed that the state police are the primary agents of urban security management and every panellist agreed strongly that operational duties are primarily the responsibility of state actors, particularly the police and local government. This is a significant finding which alerts us to the continued dominance of state actors in some contexts for urban security. This may not remain the case given the pressures on state capacity for urban security over the next decade (identified in Q2.3, above).

The overwhelming majority of the panel, 93%, also agreed that responsibility for operational management is located at the local, municipal, level in order to address the needs of local people. Significantly 90% of the panel agreed that this responsibility is jointly shared between civil servants from different departments of state, including justice, health and housing. There was also a 100% consensus of strong agreement that whilst the police play a significant role, other state actors, such as social workers, housing officers and those in the emergency services are involved in the operational side of urban security management. This is a significant finding as it corroborates informed opinion that across different European contexts urban security is not the sole responsibility of the state police and so urban security managers concerned with operational matters have to work in conjunction with civil servants from a broad range of occupations. In these terms the 'brokerage' skills that operational managers require in order to enrol such a broad range of actors into preventive strategies are a core competence. In turn, this implies an ability to understand and engage with the various occupational concerns of these other actors.

There was a consensus about the role of non-state actors in carrying out key urban security tasks. 80% moderately agreed that commercial enterprises and volunteering groups now have an operational responsibility for carrying out urban security tasks at the 'street' level.

Finally, there was a significant division of opinion about the 'unofficial' role that local criminal networks and organised crime groups play in managing problems of urban security. Here the panel was divided with half disagreeing, nearly a third agreeing and a fifth uncertain. This reflects findings in the research literature which suggest that criminal organisations can adopt state functions (such as arbitrating private disputes and providing forms of welfare and employment) particularly in the context of weak and failing state power. Again, this finding is significant for anticipating the kinds of security management that might evolve in those European contexts where the capacity of legitimate state intervention is eroded by austerity programmes and allied reductions in state governing capacities.



Summary and implications for Q3

There is a very high level of consensus about the core responsibility of state actors for urban security management, both strategically and operationally. This contradicts arguments in the academy over the 'limits of the sovereign state' (Garland, 1997) to command and control problems of urban security including the extent to which national governments are dependent on sub-national, even 'street-level', actors to deliver their policy agendas given the 'implementation gap' between policy formulation and outputs (Rhodes, 1997; Wildavsky, 1973). In addition to validating consensus about strategic and operational responsibility for urban security management, Q3 will seek panellists' views on how the notoriously vague concept of 'partnership' relates to strategic management, particularly in the light of the perceived future challenges for this management in the coming decade (see I.iv). It will explore whether, for the purposes of strategy (as contrasted with operations) partnership might be rejected in favour of a more unambiguous leadership of state actors and, amongst these, elected politicians rather than civil servants or their scientific advisors. In turn, this relates to the priorities that panellists accord to political, administrative and scientific leadership (as discussed in section III below).

II.ii ACTORS WHICH OUGHT TO HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT

Strategic management

Responses to Q2.5a revealed a high level of consensus in favour of matching responsibility for strategic management to the particular kinds of security problem in question and to the particular contexts in which they occur. Accordingly there was a 100% agreement with the following statements:

- The management of urban problems in my country should be prioritised in relation to the harms they cause locally, nationally and transnationally and responsibility should be located at each 'tier' as such problems are organised across these levels
- The uniqueness of each town and city in my jurisdiction results in different urban security problems in different locations meaning strategic responsibility should be at the local level in order to allow a flexible response

There was also a high consensus in favour of granting responsibility for strategic management to both local elected officials and civil servants in order to ensure that the prioritisation of urban problems reflects the concerns of local people. There was thus 80% agreement with the following statements:

- Strategic responsibility should lie with elected Mayors or other elected officials in order to ensure the prioritisation of urban problems reflects the concerns of local people
- State officials should have strategic responsibility but they need to be located at the local, municipal level to ensure strategies reflect local issues

However, there was also a high level of agreement (90%) that actors and agencies from the commercial, NGO, voluntary 'spheres' should be significantly involved in creating strategies.



Finally there was greater uncertainty and questionable consensus over the following claims:

- Strategic responsibility has to remain within the nation state as external organisations such as EU bodies do not have sufficient understanding of the nature of urban problems in my country
- International and intergovernmental organisations such as the UN should be key players in setting the urban security agenda as these organisations have the power to pressure countries to focus on transnational problems such as organised crime which cannot be managed in my country alone
- Power should be shifted away from the public police and criminal justice to local stakeholders (e.g. local councils, commercial enterprises, community groups, etc) who are concerned with wider issues such as public safety and wellbeing rather than just crime
- Each municipality/locality in my jurisdiction faces the same problems of urban security (e.g. organised crime, immigration, environmental hazards) meaning strategic responsibility should be at the central level to ensure a cohesive and consistent approach in all cities and regions
- Only state officials, whether located at the national, regional or local levels, should have responsibility for creating urban security strategies

Operational management

Responses to Q2.5b revealed a very high consensus about which actors ought to have operational responsibility for security management, as reflected in the high levels of strong agreement with the following statements:

- Both local authorities and the central government should be responsible for carrying out urban security management (100% agreement)
- If operational responsibility is with partnerships, contracts and agreements between several stakeholders, these need to be formally binding and transparent to ensure decision-making powers are clearly allocated (100%)

There was also a high consensus of agreement with the claims that

- Local authorities and governments are legitimate representatives of local communities given their democratic election and should therefore be responsible for putting urban security management into practice (100%)
- Appointed civil servants should have powers to put urban security management into practice (100%)

All panellists thus agreed that local and national authorities ought to share responsibility. No panellist disagreed with the proposition that partnerships vested with operational responsibility ought to be constituted through formally binding contracts (as contrasted with the vague and informal qualities of much partnership work) that ensure a clear and transparent allocation of decision-making powers. Significantly, 80% of the panel moderately agreed that urban security managers ought to be given formal powers to negotiate and compel both state and non-state agencies to comply with their operational leadership. This is an important but controversial



finding, certainly in those European contexts where state police guard their right to 'operational independence'.

The panel's collective opinion is that operational responsibility ought to be vested in state actors, with only one panellist agreeing that responsibility ought to lie with non-state actors. Finally, there was moderate agreement with the statement that an elected Mayor (or equivalent position) should be responsible for operationalizing urban security management but should also receive relevant training to carry out this role

Summary and implications for Q3

Given the broad consensus about the appropriate distribution of powers for strategic and operational management, Q3 will seek panellists informed opinion about which actors ought to have powers in relation to the four 'core' and specific problems (identified and prioritised on the current agenda for urban security management in section I above) of property crime, incivilities, violence against the person, and social exclusion. It will also question whether this opinion alters in relation to managerial responsibility for the problem of organised criminality which panellists anticipate will become a greater priority in the coming decade.



III. THE EDUCATION AND TRAINING REQUIRED FOR URBAN SECURITY MANAGEMENT

Q2 sought the informed opinion of panellists about the three basic kinds of expertise for urban security management which they had discussed in Q1: the expertise of administrators, elected representatives, and members of the research community. Following the format of other sections in the questionnaire, respondents were asked their opinion about current expertise and the expertise they thought these kinds of actors ought to have. The questionnaire concluded by asking panellists for their opinions about the appropriate use of educational and training programmes for developing this expertise.

III.i THE CURRENT EXPERTISE OF ADMINISTRATORS, ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES AND RESEARCHERS

Administrators

There were no examples of overall strong agreement regarding the current bases of expertise for administrators and public servants. Responses to Q2.6a revealed a high degree of consensus of moderate agreement that those responsible for administering urban security programmes currently have expertise in traditional law enforcement and reactive policing strategies (80%). There was also moderate levels of consensus with regard to administrators' having expertise based on the following:

- generic 'management consultancy' skills;
- Masters -level public management qualification and training;
- practical occupational cultures and work experience rather than formal qualifications;
- rational bureaucratic authority based on compulsory, centralised, state-run training programme and system of certification;
- evidence-based problem-solving and scientific evaluation;
- distinct professional systems of training.

There was also moderate consensus in disagreeing strongly with the claim that Masters -level crisis management qualification and training underpinned the current expertise of administrators.

There was a greater uncertainty and low to questionable consensus about the influence of Masters-level criminology qualification and training on administrative expertise, and the existence of compulsory, cross-sector training in urban security management or a national system of formal certification principally involving knowledge of public law. The same split of opinion and lack of consensus exists over whether there is a confusing and uncoordinated field of educational and training provision and university-based programmes.



Elected Representatives

Responses to Q2.6b revealed a high consensus of agreement about the ability of elected representatives' reflect and give voice to the views and sentiments of the citizenry (90%). There was also a high consensus of moderate agreement regarding politicians' expertise being based on both party political ideology and strategy (90%), and the charismatic authority in urban security management (80%).

Meanwhile there was a questionable consensus and degree of uncertainty regarding the claim that politicians premise their authority on evidence-based problem-solving and evaluation or that they currently possessed knowledge of the multi-dimensionality of urban security issues and their management in both municipal and national elected leadership. The key areas of consensus emerging from the panel were that politicians are primarily driven by party political ideology and strategy, they appeal to charismatic authority and their electoral mandate as a basis for setting policy agendas for urban security and lack knowledge or interest in evidence-based problem-solving and scientific evaluation and of the multi-dimensionality of urban security issues.

Researchers

Responses to Q2.6c revealed a high consensus amongst this panel over the expertise that the research community brings to urban security management. 90% agreed that researchers have knowledge and skills in explaining both the causes and solution of the problems of crime and disorder, in understanding wider trends in contemporary society alongside an inter-disciplinary grounding in the social sciences. In turn 80% moderately agreed that researchers have knowledge and skills in understanding the policy making process alongside evidence-based problem-solving .

III.ii THE EXPERTISE THAT ADMINISTRATORS, ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES AND RESEARCHERS OUGHT TO POSSESS

Administrators

Responses to Q2.7a revealed a high degree of consensus and level of agreement and moderate agreement amongst the panel about the kind of expertise that administrators ought to possess in order to undertake their responsibilities for urban security management. Indeed there were but limited instances of disagreement across the range of propositions presented. There was a high level of consensus over a need for the following extensive spectrum of skills and qualifications:

- Dedicated, compulsory cross-sector training in urban security management (e.g. understanding the relationship between policing, health care, education, housing etc.) (100%)
- Evidence-based problem-solving and scientific evaluation (100%)
- Knowledge of the democratic process and of the nature of politics as a vocation (100%)



- Knowledge and awareness of the politics, ethics and human rights consequences of interventions in the field (100%)
- Masters -level criminology qualification and training (90%)
- Masters -level public management qualification and training (90%)
- Scientific analytical capacity in the municipal authorities (90%)
- Training in community/neighbourhood consultation (especially with 'hard to reach ' groups) (90%)
- Ability to communicate between those with social scientific expertise and those with political responsibility for urban security (90%)
- Masters -level crisis management qualification and training (80%)
- National system of formal certification principally involving knowledge of public law (80%)
- Traditional law enforcement and reactive policing knowledge and skills (80%)

This represents an extensive *future* 'wish-list' which spans a very broad spectrum of skills, knowledge and competences. When compared to the responses concerning the *current* expertise of administrators presented previously there are several significant differences of viewpoint in this desired spectrum of expertise. In particular, there is only moderate to questionable levels of consensus for expertise based on:

- Skills, knowledge and competence associated with generic 'management consultancy'
- Rational bureaucratic authority based on compulsory, state-run training programme and system of certification
- Distinct and separate professional systems of training
- Compulsory postgraduate-level professional qualification with recognised set of core competencies
- Practical occupational cultures and work experience rather than formal qualifications.

The new bases of expertise which our respondents wish to see promoted in the training of administrators when compared to existing forms of expertise include closer connections to the research and scientific community, both in terms of being equipped with the skills of evidence-based problem-solving and scientific evaluation, as well gaining Masters level qualifications in criminology, public management and crisis management. Equally significant was the emphasis given to knowledge of the democratic process and the ethical and human rights consequences of interventions. It is also significant that the panel saw the role of the administrator as being an 'interlocutor' or key broker between those with scientific expertise and those with political responsibility for urban security. Finally there was universal support for dedicated, compulsory cross-sector training in urban security management (e.g. understanding the relationship between policing, health care, education, housing etc.).

These are significant findings given the challenges of respecting the particular expertise and experience that these different professions bring to security management whilst facilitating their



capacity for joint working and thinking outside of specialist occupational knowledge. They are significant in helping shape how the future training needs of urban security managers are addressed and delivered across the three vocations of science, politics and administration.

Elected Representatives

Respondents to Q2.7b revealed a very high consensus (100%) of agreement that elected politicians ought to have knowledge of the multi-dimensionality of urban security issues and their management. There was also a very high consensus that elected politicians ought to be knowledgeable or have access to about evidence-based problem-solving and scientific evaluation (90%). There was also a high consensus regarding the need for dedicated training for the political office of Mayor (80%). These findings stand in sharp contrast to what was perceived in Q2.6b to be the current state of knowledge and training among elected representatives.

100% of the panel agreed that elected politicians ought to reflect the priorities of the citizenry which is in continuity with the responses to the current expertise of elected politicians discussed in Q2.6 above. However, there was a lack of consensus and significant uncertainty over the role to be played in the future by both party political ideology and the charismatic authority of the elected politician with a half disagreeing or uncertain as the importance and contribution of such skills and knowledge to urban security management. Of course, this raises the challenging problem of how to arbitrate between the priorities of the electorate and the outcomes of evidence-based problem-solving and scientific evaluation where these two drivers of policy conflict with one another. A classic example of this is over the value of routine police patrolling which has been criticised as ineffective in the research literature but which remains popular with many local electorates.

Researchers

There was very little difference between the current and future, desirable expertise of members of the scientific and research community as envisaged by the panellists. The only shift of emphasis was that the consensus regarding the desirable knowledge and skills base of researchers was viewed even more unanimously in response to Q2.7c than Q2.6c. Responses to Q2.7c revealed a high consensus, indeed a negligible disagreement, about the need for those researchers contributing to urban security management to have a critical awareness of the limitations of current policy and practice and knowledge and skills in evidence-based problem-solving, gathering and analysing data on social trends and explaining both the causes of, and solutions to, problems of crime and disorder. This is a significant finding as it reflects a strong commitment to causal analysis and intervention which has been resisted, indeed challenged, as an appropriate contribution of researchers by critical social scientists who have privileged a focus on the normative social construction of 'crime' and 'insecurity'. To this end the strong consensus about the value that experimental criminology ought to have for urban security management is significant, with 100% of the panel agreeing, given the dispute within criminology over the possibility and desirability of experiments.



Summary and implications for Q3

In summary, there was a strikingly high degree of consensus about the need for a more research-driven and evidence-based approach to urban security management alongside disagreement over the contribution of party political ideology and strategy and charismatic authority of elected representatives to urban security management. Q3 will thus seek the opinion of panellists on the prioritisation of scientific, political and administrative expertise in urban security management where these different kinds of expertise are in conflict.

III.iii THE CONTRIBUTION OF EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING PROGRAMMES FOR DEVELOPING EXPERTISE IN URBAN SECURITY MANAGEMENT

Responses to Q2.8 revealed a high consensus about the need for initiatives and processes encouraging long-term collaboration between practitioners and researchers, with 100% agreement of the panel. There was also near complete agreement with the proposition that expertise for urban security management is dependent both on process skills (e.g. how to find out about patterns of crime and victimisation, how to engage communities and manage partnerships) and content skills (e.g. how to interpret such patterns, explain the criminological factors at work in the causes of crime and disorder).

There was also a high consensus about the need for urban security managers to be open to regular evaluation of their work by independent scientific parties and for their skills to be developed through a mixture of higher-degree education as well as shorter, more focussed, training courses. All panellists agreed that expertise for urban security management would be most effectively developed via university-based learning and training in collaboration with state and municipal agencies. It was also agreed that targeted training for elected politicians ought to be a priority

There was also a moderate consensus about the need for compulsory postgraduate-level education of urban security managers and also the relevance of postgraduate training in generic public management and business administration with 60% of the panel agreeing, two panellists disagreeing and two uncertain on each of these questions.

Opinion was more divided about the compulsion of urban security managers to undertake a postgraduate-level programme of education in comparative European and multi-disciplinary approaches to crime prevention and security, with two thirds of the panel in agreement but a third disagreeing and uncertain. This is a significant finding which provokes further consideration of the relevance of comparative understanding for expertise in urban security management and what, specifically, Europeans can learn from one another. This is a significant finding as there is a tension between the kind of subject specific expertise that criminology could provide into the kinds of problems that have been prioritised by the panel and the insights that can be gained from training in the challenges of public administration per se. Opinion was also divided over need for common European-wide standards for education and training in urban security management, with a half agreeing but 40% disagreeing and one panellist uncertain.



Summary and implications for Q3

As discussed in the introduction to this commentary, we are particularly interested in seeking panellists' opinions about the value of policy convergence around a standardised concept of urban security management and common standards for educational and training programmes. There is a tension in responses from the panel over support for common standards and for context-specific approaches. Q3 will explore this tension further and the problems of what, and how, Europeans ought to learn from one another about urban security management.

COMMENTARY ON QUESTIONNAIRE 2 (Q2) FROM THE CARDIFF UNIVERSITY TEAM TO THE EFUS DELPHI PANEL

Introduction

We wish to begin by thanking the members of EFUS who were able to respond to this second round of our exercise in knowledge exchange. In particular we thank the following representatives for their participation and completion of Questionnaire 2 (Q2):

Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Spain

In this report on the second of three questionnaires (Q2), we present the key findings on areas of consensus and disagreement about:

- problems, approaches and contexts of urban security management;
- responsibility for undertaking this work; and
- allied areas of expertise.

It will be recalled from the guidance notes accompanying the first questionnaire (Q1), that the methodological justification for conducting a policy Delphi is not to elicit responses that are representative of an entire population of interest (e.g. national-level policy officers with an interest in urban security in Europe). Rather, it is to facilitate structured dialogue amongst those with informed judgement about a subject matter that is characterised by lack of agreement in order to establish if it is possible to reach a consensus of opinion or else to clarify and corroborate areas of disagreement about subjects that are 'contested'.

The subjective judgements of those recruited to a Delphi Panel are transformed into a more objective account through a particular form of iterative group communication in which Delphi Panel co-ordinators collect and interpret responses from each panellist and communicate them back out to all panellists along with further questions. This iterative communication provides panellists with an opportunity to defend or revise initial judgements in the light of feedback from the whole panel. Subsequent iterations in this group communication act as forms of both respondent and construct validation of the research problem in question and therefore of the objectivity of the informed judgement reached by the panel as a whole.

The following commentary summarises areas of consensus and disagreement revealed by analysis of the responses to Q2. After a brief discussion of the logic of the Urbis policy Delphi and the particular contribution of Q2, this commentary will be limited to providing a summary of what the co-ordinators of the panel at Cardiff University consider to be the main findings on consensus and disagreement about urban security management.

Whereas Q1 posed a series of deliberately open-ended questions as a means of capturing the **scope** of (1) the problems, approaches and contexts of urban security, (2) the responsibility of



different actors for undertaking this work, and (3) the expertise these actors ought to possess, Q2 explored areas of consensus and disagreement by asking respondents to **prioritise** the kinds of problems, responsibilities and expertise that had been identified in Q1. The third and final questionnaire (Q3) seeks to **validate** these areas of consensus and disagreement, offering panellists an opportunity to reflect on the priorities indicated by other respondents to Q2 and to corroborate or revise their own opinions accordingly. Q3 will also provide panellists with open text boxes which they can use to offer any final comments on the Urbis policy Delphi. In addition to clarifying the uncertain and contested qualities of 'urban security management', this validation is important for the core objective of Work Package 3 of the Urbis project, which is to recognise the 'state of the art' in urban security management as a basis for curriculum development in postgraduate level education and training in this area of work.

In validating the priorities of this work and, therefore, any proposed 'core curriculum' of education and training in urban security management we are particularly interested in arguments for and against a standardised educational programme. Is it, for example, possible and desirable to pursue **policy convergence** around a standard set of problems, responsibilities and expertise and to what extent policy responses ought to be tailored to the particular contexts of urban security in different European localities? If not, we are interested in panellists' arguments against policy convergence and what this implies for policy transfer across these contexts. Put provocatively: what, if anything, can Europeans learn from one another about managing urban security?

In support of these aims, the following commentary is organised in terms of the three core themes of Urbis policy Delphi:

I. 'Problematisation'

- The main problems, approaches, contexts and futures of urban security management.

II. 'Responsibilisation'

- The actors responsible for urban security management.

III. 'Expertise'

- The education and training required to meet these responsibilities.

Under each of these headings, areas of high, moderate, low, and questionable consensus are discussed as a precursor to provoking a dialogue amongst panellists in Q3 about any core set of problems, responsibilities and expertise.



I. THE MAIN PROBLEMS, APPROACHES, CONTEXTS AND FUTURES OF URBAN SECURITY MANAGEMENT

I.i. PROBLEMS

High priority problems

Responses to Q2.1a revealed a moderate consensus (50-75%) around the following four problems as the principal priorities for urban security management:

- Violence against the person (including domestic violence)
- Social exclusion and youth unemployment
- Incivility and anti-social behaviour
- Alcohol and drug misuse

It is a fair interpretation to regard these four problems as constituting the very core of priorities for urban security management.

A significant minority (25-50%), however, saw the core policy agenda for urban security management as encompassing the problems of:

- Property crime (burglary, theft, robbery)
- Criminal damage (vandalism, graffiti)
- Degradation of governing capacity through public expenditure

Of course, these are matters of interpretation and not an exact measurement but we would argue that a questionable consensus exists around any problem identified by less than a quarter of panellists as a priority for urban security management. In turn this would exclude, from the policy agenda such issues as drug trafficking, corporate crime, fraud, human trafficking, terrorism and civil unrest, notwithstanding the high profile of these problems in public discourse on security in many European countries, certainly since the bombing of public transport systems in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 and in the impact of the post-2008 financial and sovereign debt crises of urban governance in many European cities.

Low priority problems

A further, significant, finding is the moderate consensus (50-75%) of respondents ranking such problems as state police violence and climate change and natural disasters (flooding, extreme weather) amongst the five least important problems for urban security management.

There was also a low consensus (25-50%) of responding ranking the following as the least important problems:

- Knife-related crime
- Human trafficking
- Health and safety in the workplace
- Firearms-related crime



- Criminal gangs and organised crime
- Corruption of public administration
- Protection of critical infrastructure (water and food security, transport and communications systems, energy grids)
- Degradation of governing capacity through public expenditure

The questionable and negligible priority accorded to problems of tax evasion and corruption, especially of public administration, is a particularly interesting finding given the pressures these problems place on the governing capacity for urban security.

In analysing the responses for the EFUS panel, it is possible to identify three possible types of qualification to the prioritisation offered thus far.

I.i.1. Scope

It is important to recognise that issues such as ‘organised crime’ and ‘corruption’ are clearly serious problems but they may be ones that are better regarded as ‘supra-local’ and that are to be addressed by bodies that operate beyond the urban security domain. This possibility provokes an important discussion about the appropriate scope of urban security management. It also depends upon what one considers to lie within the proper capacity and competence of urban security – it cannot be “all things to all people”. As such, the consensus of opinion amongst respondents is that urban security management ought to be restricted to problems which are locally bounded in their origin and context-specific. The implication of this is that an important distinction exists between problems that are locally bounded and context-specific or, to use current public policy terminology, those that are ‘downstream’ and those which may be expressed in particular localities, such as the Madrid and London bombings, but whose origins and key points of intervention are ‘upstream’, in other localities, regions and countries requiring, in turn, national or transnational security responses.

I.i.2. Context

Another important qualification and one that reflects an ongoing theme of the Urbis policy Delphi is the need to recognise the diverse contexts of urban security across Europe. To illustrate this point some respondents discussed the problems of ‘drug trafficking’ and ‘human trafficking’, which less than a quarter of respondents ranked as top priorities for urban security but which are of significant concern in particular contexts.

I.i.3. Categorisation

Finally, it is possible that certain categories which were distinguished in Q2 might be better considered together. For example, it is possible that ‘criminal damage’ would be considered as an ‘incivility’ rather than as a separate problem and so issues of ‘vandalism’ and ‘graffiti’ would be included in the category of ‘incivilities and anti-social behaviour’ which, it will be recalled, the panel rated as amongst the highest priority problems for urban security management. Issues of conceptual translation were also identified as significant such that terms like ‘anti-social behaviour’ ought to be regarded as an ethnocentric (Anglophone) administrative category rather than a commonly used analytical category such as ‘incivility’ that is recognisable and



meaningful in other European contexts. There is a strong argument for emphasising the interaction between problems of urban security and a need to avoid treating problems as 'self-contained'.

Summary and implications for Questionnaire Three (Q3)

It may be suggested that an important criterion for prioritisation is to identify those problems which are regarded as primary, structural and generative and to distinguish these from problems which are thought to be secondary, surface-level and symptomatic. The implication of this is that, especially in austere conditions that compel greater prioritisation, the identification of generative problems provides some grounds for the definition of policy agendas, the allocation of governing resources, the co-operation of responsible actors and the kinds of expertise required for urban security management. This criterion provokes an important debate over the generative or symptomatic qualities of the four problems prioritised by a clear majority of panellists in Q2 of the Urbis policy Delphi. In addition to 'social exclusion and youth unemployment', are 'incivilities' and 'property crime' to be regarded as generative of urban security or as symptomatic of other causal factors and vulnerabilities? In what sense, might 'violence against the person' be regarded as a consequence of 'structural conditions'?

Sensitivity to questions of the 'frequency' and the 'impact' of the sorts of problems ranked both high and low priorities by panellists implies a consideration of **harm** as a possible criterion for defining the scope, contexts and categories of urban security management. Recent work in the area of organised and serious crime (which is another broad, ambiguous, concept) has used the notion of a 'risk assessment matrix' distinguishing policy priorities in terms of the harms of particular problems, ranked according to their 'severity' (on a scale from negligible to catastrophic) and their 'probability' (from unlikely to frequent). This matrix is, of course, subject to some interpretative flexibility but at least it provides an organising framework for arguments about prioritising certain problems relative to others, from one extreme (frequent and catastrophic) to another (unlikely and negligible) (see Greenfield and Paoli, 2010). This is a very significant insight as it illustrates a strategic dilemma for the management of urban security, which is, in a condition of high uncertainty about the probability of infrequent but potentially catastrophic problems (such as terrorist attacks), what investment ought to go into preventing such problems? What are the opportunity costs of switching investment from more frequent but less severe problems towards infrequent but potentially catastrophic problems?

In addition to validating the priority problems identified by panellists in Q2, a purpose of Q3 will be to seek panellists' informed opinion about the utility of this matrix in assessing the severity and probability of these problems and whether this alters the level of consensus and disagreement about the definition of urban security management.

I.ii. APPROACHES

High priority approaches

Responses to Q2.1b revealed no areas of high consensus. There was, however, moderate consensus (50-75%) around the following four priority approaches for urban security management:



- Preventing the onset of offending behaviour and incivility
- Reassuring citizens about their security and about the fear of crime
- Restorative justice interventions with perpetrators and victims of criminal offences
- Enhancing the democratic scrutiny and oversight of security strategies

Low priority approaches

A very significant finding is the high consensus (75-100%) of respondents ranking the 'traditional', repressive criminal justice approach of increased use of imprisonment and correctional facilities as a low priority strategy in urban security management. Tellingly no respondent ranked this as a high priority approach. There was also high consensus around 'promoting greater health and safety in the workplace' as a low priority approach. There was moderate consensus (25-50%) around 'punitive sentencing policies', 'celebrating social diversity and promoting the rights of minority groups' and 'enforcing the criminal law'. As above, the consensus around traditional repressive criminal justice approaches is significant.

Summary and implications for Q3

The clear finding from responses to the prioritisation of urban security management approaches is that law enforcement and imprisonment are viewed as inappropriate as responses to the kinds of problems the panel have prioritised for urban security management and appear to be counter-productive for accomplishing the targeted preventive intervention agendas advocated. In addition to validating this weight of opinion, Q3 will seek panellists' views on the arguments between advocates of situational crime prevention and proponents of social crime prevention in addition to the relative weighting that ought to be given to primary forms of prevention (that target whole populations), secondary prevention (that targets 'at risk' groups) and tertiary prevention (that targets 'prolific and priority' offenders and repeat victims). It will also seek panellists' opinions about the basic relationship between social policy and urban security management given the priority the panel has accorded to social policy responses alongside targeted risk management and preventive interventions.

I.iii CONTEXTS

Responses to Q2.1c revealed an unsurprisingly high consensus about large cities, all cities and particular neighbourhoods being a relevant context for urban security management. This was the first Likert Scale question of Q2, which enabled analysis of consensus, disagreement and uncertainty in terms of the 'inter-quartile range' (IQR) of responses. All respondents ranked large cities, all cities and particular neighbourhoods as a priority context.

There was no moderate consensus about any of the contexts but there was low consensus in relation to the contexts of the EU territory and cross-regional territories. Interestingly, there was uncertainty with regard to the importance of rural areas as contexts for urban security management.



Whilst cities being by definition 'urban' may seem the obvious contexts for both the generation of many urban security problems and the contexts for the management of such problems, it could be argued that the most relevant context for managing, for example, the particular problems of violence against the person including domestic violence is arguably the neighbourhood, given the identification of a 'Lorenz curve' distribution of inter-personal violence and its concentration in particular residential neighbourhoods characterised by other indices of multiple deprivation (Hope, 1996) along with those commercial and entertainment districts of cities that generate high levels of alcohol-related violence (Hobbs et al, 2004). The other problems ranked as a priority by a majority of the panel are similarly concentrated in particular neighbourhoods. This is corroborated in the high consensus amongst the panel about particular neighbourhoods as a relevant context.

The appropriate context for managing the problems identified in responses to Q2.1b will also depend on arguments about the appropriate approach to urban security analysis. For example, those arguing for 'upstream' responses to illicit drug use (law enforcement strategies aimed at reducing the supply of illicit drugs from producers and wholesalers) ought to prioritise cross-national, cross-regional and (in Europe) EU-wide contexts as the most relevant. Those privileging investment in 'downstream' responses aimed at reducing opportunities for consumption of illicit drugs, the rehabilitation of drug users and preventive work with groups 'at risk' of consuming illicit drugs ought to prioritise those neighbourhoods where consumption is concentrated and the large cities that act as the main distribution points for class-A narcotics.

Summary and implications for Q3

In addition to validating the priority problems identified by panellists in Q2, Q3 will seek panellists' opinions about the retention of 'urban security management' as a concept used to recognise the distinctive and common problems of security associated with cities or its replacement with a concept of 'local' or 'neighbourhood' security that can also accommodate rural places and problems.

I.iv CHALLENGES

The Delphi method has also been used to facilitate forecasting given the predictive limitations of social science. This is a particular challenge for social research into security given that anticipation of problems in order to prevent them is central to the logic of security management, as contrasted with after-the-fact prosecution of events in criminal justice approaches. In seeking panellists' informed opinion about these challenges, Q2 drew upon the distinction made between the 'endogenous' and 'exogenous' qualities of urban security management and on the need to adopt a more medium-to-long-term anticipation of these challenges over the coming decade.

Current challenges

Responses to Q2.2a about current *endogenous* challenges, revealed a high consensus of strong agreement amongst panellists about the need for security strategies to be driven by evaluations of 'what works, what doesn't and what's promising' about the prevention of security



problems. There was also high consensus in agreement that security strategies ought to be led by appointed civil servants. There was also a moderate level of consensus that security strategies ought to be devolved to local authorities and be driven by research expertise about the causes of security problems. Interesting when compared with the above consensus, there was low consensus that security strategies ought to be led by democratically elected politicians which may highlight the concern about the tensions between research-driven policy agendas and the authoritarian populism resulting from party political competition over crime prevention and other issues of security. Of course this provokes a further discussion about who ultimately has power to set urban security agendas when there are competing mandates (for example between politicians elected on populist manifestos and executives adopting the kind of research driven and evidence-based approaches that an overwhelming majority of the panel agree with).

The panel was also divided over the leadership of national governments. In turn, this reflects broader disputes over 'localism' or the extent to which the formulation and implementation of security strategies ought to be devolved to local actors. A counter argument is that, for certain problems, once again for example organised criminality and the corruption of public administration, such devolution is too high a risk as local actors are vulnerable to intimidation and 'capture' and may even be implicated in the problem. These are often cited as grounds for national and supra-national security agencies. Again, however, the kinds of problems of volume, personal and property crime, incivilities and social exclusion that have been prioritised suggest devolution of power to local actors.

Responses to Q2.2b, about the current *exogenous* challenges confronting urban security strategies revealed a lesser degree of high/moderate consensus than about the endogenous challenges. There was only one area of moderate consensus of agreement:

- Austerity programmes will fuel the growth of mass civil unrest and protest

There was uncertainty of opinion and questionable consensus with the majority of propositions and, unsurprisingly perhaps, particularly in relation to the propositions that austerity programmes will generate both greater corruption amongst public officials.

Challenges in the next decade

Responses to Q2.3, about the challenges for urban security over the next decade, again revealed no areas of high consensus. There was, however, moderate consensus that:

- In the context of degraded governing capacity and limited economic growth in the formal economy, the illicit economy (drugs, vice, gambling) will expand and will become more organised and more harmful in terms of its consequences
- Notwithstanding the ageing profile of urban populations in Europe, offending and victimisation will remain concentrated on young cohorts of the population for both personal and property crimes



- Urban populations in Europe will be characterised by increasing ethnic and cultural diversity which will result in worsening problems of social segregation and integration
- The impact of austere economic conditions on urban populations will be highly uneven with social exclusion concentrated on the young, low-income, populations in particular neighbourhoods and this will elevate criminal predation and victimisation in these areas

These are significant findings which suggest that in the wider social and economic context of the polarisation and uneven marginalisation of urban populations, organised criminality in the illicit economy is liable to become a higher priority for urban security across a broader range of European cities over the next decade. In turn, this provokes further reflection on the kinds of approaches and expertise that urban security managers ought to be learning now in anticipation of these trends.

The questionable consensus over the vulnerability of European cities to future terrorist attacks and the significance of the critical infrastructure of these cities imply again an important strategic dilemma over the investment in infrequent but catastrophic problems. In addition to this, however, the issue of critical infrastructure provokes further discussion of the priority to be accorded to 'slow-burning' issues that may not register with urban populations (and electorates) in the here-and-now but which may reach a tipping-point after which their harmful impact becomes very severe, very quickly.

Summary and implications for Q3

In addition to validating consensus about the futures of urban security, Q3 will consider whether a risk assessment matrix of severity and probability can support the anticipation of urban security problems and clarify how those with managerial responsibility for tackling these problems can cultivate anticipatory intelligence.



II. THE ACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR URBAN SECURITY MANAGEMENT

It will be recalled from responses to Q1 that panellists made a distinction between the *strategic* management of urban security problems (establishing the policy agenda and allocating resources for its implementation) and *operational* management (the routine processes and practices of urban security).

A further distinction was made between actors organised in different state, commercial and non-governmental 'spheres' and at different supra-national, national and sub-national 'tiers' of governing. Panellists were asked to respond to a series of Likert scale questions about the actors who are *currently* responsible for the strategic and operational management of urban security problems in the national context they were reporting on and which actors they think *ought* to be responsible.

II.i ACTORS WITH CURRENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT

Strategic management

Responses to Q2.4a revealed a high/moderate consensus of agreement about the core responsibility of state actors at both national and sub-national tiers for the strategic management of urban security, as reflected in the levels of agreement in response to the following statements:

- Elected officials, such as Mayors and local councils, have responsibility over how urban security is managed. They are able to set the agenda and allocate resources as they see fit (100% agreement)
- Resources are primarily allocated by state actors to those actors involved in managing urban security (100% agreement)
- Non-state agencies and actors (e.g. commercial enterprises, community groups and NGOs) have responsibility and work with the state (central and local) in the form of 'partnerships' but the State always has the final say on strategy (100% agreement)
- Strategic responsibility is organised across the national, regional and local 'tiers' by state actor (80% agreement)

There was also moderate consensus in agreement that strategic responsibility is clear and transparent in the respondent's jurisdiction.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, 100% of the panel disagreed that non-state actors determine the policy agenda for urban security. In addition, 80% of the panel disagreed that EU bodies such as Europol and Frontex are able to determine strategies for urban security while there was low consensus that conventions and legal frameworks created by international and intergovernmental organisations such as the UN are key in shaping the urban security agenda in the respondent's country.



Operational management

Responses to Q2.4b revealed a very high consensus about responsibility for the operational management of urban security. 100% of respondents agreed that:

- Appointed civil servants and officials have direct responsibility for carrying out urban security management
- The police play a significant role but local authorities and actors such as social services, social workers, housing, other emergency services etc. are also involved in the operational side of urban security management
- The police are the primary agents of urban security management whether located more centrally or more locally as they are a trusted and capable authority

The primary role of the police is a significant finding which alerts us to the continued dominance of state actors in some contexts for urban security. This may not remain the case given the pressures on state capacity for urban security over the next decade. In addition 80% of the panel agreed that:

- Whether state or non-state actors are responsible, they are located at the local, municipal level in order to be able to address the needs of local people and concerns
- Operational duties, while involving actors and agencies beyond the state sphere, are always primarily the responsibility of state actors such as the police or local authorities

This is a significant finding as it corroborates informed opinion that across different European contexts urban security is not the sole (albeit primary) responsibility of the state police and so urban security managers concerned with operational matters have to work in conjunction with civil servants from a broad range of occupations. In these terms the 'brokerage' skills that operational managers require in order to enrol such a broad range of actors into preventive strategies are a core competence. In turn, this implies an ability to understand and engage with the various occupational concerns of these other actors.

However, there was only questionable consensus about the role of non-state actors in carrying out key urban security tasks and specifically that commercial enterprises and volunteering groups now have an operational responsibility for carrying out urban security tasks at the 'street' level.

Summary and implications for Q3

There is a very high level of consensus about the core responsibility of state actors for urban security management, both strategically and operationally. This contradicts arguments in the academy over the 'limits of the sovereign state' (Garland, 1997) to command and control problems of urban security including the extent to which national governments are dependent on sub-national, even 'street-level', actors to deliver their policy agendas given the 'implementation gap' between policy formulation and outputs (Rhodes, 1997; Wildavsky, 1973). In addition to validating consensus about strategic and operational responsibility for urban security management, Q3 will seek panellists' views on how the notoriously vague concept of 'partnership' relates to strategic management, particularly in the light of the perceived future challenges for this management in the coming decade (see I.iv). It will explore whether, for the



purposes of strategy (as contrasted with operations) partnership might be rejected in favour of a more unambiguous leadership of state actors and, amongst these, elected politicians rather than civil servants or their scientific advisors. In turn, this relates to the priorities that panellists accord to political, administrative and scientific leadership (as discussed in section III below).

II.ii ACTORS WHICH OUGHT TO HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT

Strategic management

Responses to Q2.5a revealed a high level of consensus in favour of matching responsibility for strategic management to the particular kinds of security problem in question and to the particular contexts in which they occur. Accordingly there was a 100% agreement with the following statements:

- Strategic responsibility should lie with appointed civil servants who are able to operate beyond specific electoral terms and therefore develop more long-term strategies that are less influenced by political pressures
- One specific agency or 'sphere' does not need to have authority as responsibility can be with several different state and non-state actors at different levels
- State officials should have strategic responsibility but they need to be located at the local, municipal level to ensure strategies reflect local issues
- Decision-making powers for determining strategies have to be organised hierarchically to ensure that when competing authorities disagree, one authority can make a final decision
- The uniqueness of each town and city in my jurisdiction results in different urban security problems in different locations meaning strategic responsibility should be at the local level in order to allow a flexible response

The most notable area of disagreement was in relation to the role of local stakeholders where 75% of respondents disagreed that 'power should be shifted away from the public police and criminal justice to local stakeholders (e.g. local councils, commercial enterprises, community groups, etc) who are concerned with wider issues such as public safety and wellbeing rather than just crime'. Interestingly, however, there was also moderate consensus in uncertainty over whether 'final decision-making powers have to be with state agencies and actors'.

Operational management

Responses to Q2.5b revealed a very high consensus in agreement and disagreement about which actors ought to have operational responsibility for security management, as reflected in the 100% agreement of the panel with the following statements:

- The police must be the primary agent with operational responsibility for managing urban security
- Appointed civil servants should have powers to put urban security management into practice



- Commercial enterprises and community groups cannot be operationally responsible for urban security management as they have no formal commitment to each other which reduces their legitimacy
- Multi-agency partnerships are the most appropriate approach to practicing urban security management given the diverse array of harms that make up this concept – there is no single agency or actor that could manage the responsibility
- If operational responsibility is with partnerships, contracts and agreements between several stakeholders, these need to be formally binding and transparent to ensure decision-making powers are clearly allocated
- An urban security manager at the local level should be created who is given formal powers to negotiate and compel state and non-state agencies to follow their lead
- Both local authorities and the central government should be responsible for carrying out urban security management
- Local authorities and governments are legitimate representatives of local communities given their democratic election and should therefore be responsible for putting urban security management into practice

Interestingly, there was 100% disagreement with the following three statements:

- State agencies do not have sufficient resources while formal non-state bodies do not have sufficient powers so it is appropriate that informal, illicit organisations (e.g. organised crime groups) ensure order is maintained in certain localities
- Operational responsibility should lie with non-state actors and agencies instead of the police and local government
- The police, other state departments and agencies, and non-state stakeholders such as commercial enterprises and community groups should be equally responsible for putting urban security management into practice

All panellists thus agreed that local and national authorities ought to share responsibility but that the police must be the primary agent and that partnerships vested with operational responsibility ought to be constituted through formally binding contracts (as contrasted with the vague and informal qualities of much partnership work) that ensure a clear and transparent allocation of decision-making powers. Significantly, 100% of the panel agreed that urban security managers ought to be given formal powers to negotiate and compel both state and non-state agencies to comply with their operational leadership. This is an important but controversial finding, certainly in those European contexts where state police guard their right to 'operational independence'.

Summary and implications for Q3

Given the broad consensus about the appropriate distribution of powers for strategic and operational management, Q3 will seek panellists' informed opinion about which actors ought to have powers in relation to the four 'core' and specific problems identified and prioritised on the current agenda for urban security management in section I above. It will also question whether this opinion alters in relation to managerial responsibility for the problem of organised criminality which panellists anticipate will become a greater priority in the coming decade.



III. THE EDUCATION AND TRAINING REQUIRED FOR URBAN SECURITY MANAGEMENT

Q2 sought the informed opinion of panellists about the three basic kinds of expertise for urban security management which they had discussed in Q1: the expertise of administrators, elected representatives, and members of the research community. Following the format of other sections in the questionnaire, respondents were asked their opinion about current expertise and the expertise they thought these kinds of actors ought to have. The questionnaire concluded by asking panellists for their opinions about the appropriate use of educational and training programmes for developing this expertise.

III.i THE CURRENT EXPERTISE OF ADMINISTRATORS, ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES AND RESEARCHERS

Administrators

Four statements regarding the current bases of expertise for administrators and public servants generated 100% agreement:

- Relevant professional groups having their own distinct and separate systems of training
- Practical occupational cultures and work experience rather than formal qualifications
- Masters -level public management qualification and training
- Traditional law enforcement and reactive policing strategies

Most statements generated only questionable consensus. However, there was also moderate consensus in relation to the existence of postgraduate level training and qualification in criminology and crisis management.

Elected Representatives

Responses to Q2.6b revealed a high consensus of agreement about the ability of elected representatives' reflect and give voice to the views and sentiments of the citizenry (100%). There was also a high consensus in agreement that knowledge of the multi-dimensionality of urban security issues and their management in both municipal and national elected leadership (100%) is currently in existence.

Researchers

Responses to Q2.6c revealed a high consensus amongst this panel over the expertise that the research community brings to urban security management. 100% agreed that researchers have knowledge and skills in explaining both the causes and solution of the problems of crime and disorder, in understanding wider trends in contemporary society alongside an interdisciplinary grounding in the social sciences. 100% also agreed that researchers have



knowledge and skills in gathering and analysing data on social trends and in evidence-based problem-solving.

III.ii THE EXPERTISE THAT ADMINISTRATORS, ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES AND RESEARCHERS OUGHT TO POSSESS

Administrators

Responses to Q2.7a revealed a high degree of consensus in agreement with 100% of respondents agreeing with the following statements in relation to what the expertise and training of administrators ought to be:

- Masters-level criminology qualification and training
- Masters-level crisis management qualification and training
- Dedicated, compulsory cross-sector training in urban security management (e.g. understanding the relationship between policing, health care, education, housing etc.)
- Compulsory postgraduate-level professional qualification with recognised set of core competencies
- Training in community/neighbourhood consultation (especially with 'hard to reach' groups)
- Practical, managerial knowledge and skills regarding organisational cultures and behaviour
- Ability to communicate between those with social scientific expertise and those with political responsibility for urban security

This represents an extensive *future* 'wish-list' which spans a very broad spectrum of skills, knowledge and competences. These are significant findings given the challenges of respecting the particular expertise and experience that these different professions bring to security management whilst facilitating their capacity for joint working and thinking outside of specialist occupational knowledge. They are significant in helping shape how the future training needs of urban security managers are addressed and delivered across the three vocations of science, politics and administration.

Elected Representatives

Respondents to Q2.7b revealed a very high consensus (100%) of agreement that elected politicians ought to have evidence-based problem-solving and scientific evaluation, the ability to reflect and give voice to the views and sentiments of the citizenry, and knowledge of the multi-dimensionality of urban security issues and their management in both municipal and national elected leadership. Interestingly, these findings corroborate what was perceived in Q2.6b to be the current state of knowledge and training among elected representatives. However, there was a lack of consensus and significant uncertainty over the role to be played in the future by both party political ideology and the charismatic authority of the elected politician with a half disagreeing or uncertain as the importance and contribution of such skills and knowledge to urban security management. Of course, this raises the challenging problem of how to arbitrate between the priorities of the electorate and the outcomes of evidence-based problem-solving and scientific evaluation where these two drivers of policy conflict with one another. A classic



example of this is over the value of routine police patrolling which has been criticised as ineffective in the research literature but which remains popular with many local electorates.

Researchers

Responses to the desirable expertise of members of the scientific and research community generated 100% agreement with all proposed statements:

- Knowledge and skills in evidence-based problem-solving
- Knowledge and skills in gathering and analysing data on social trends
- Knowledge and skills in explaining both the causes and solution of the problems of crime and disorder
- Knowledge and skills in understanding wider trends in contemporary society and in particular those of urban development
- Inter-disciplinary grounding in the social sciences
- Knowledge and skills in crime science and experimental method
- Knowledge and skills in understanding the policy making process
- Critical awareness of the limitations of current policy and practice
- Knowledge and skills as a practical, collaborative policy adviser to those governing urban security
- Knowledge and skills as the social engineer of progressive change with regard to how urban security is managed
- Ability to provide detached evidence-based research knowledge underpinning the response of authorities

When contrasted with responses to the current expertise of this community, there was little difference in the current and future areas of required expertise albeit the following statements received high agreement:

- Critical awareness of the limitations of current policy and practice
- Knowledge and skills in understanding the policy making process
- Knowledge and skills in crime science and experimental method

These findings are significant as it reflects a strong commitment to causal analysis and intervention which has been resisted, indeed challenged, as an appropriate contribution of researchers by critical social scientists who have privileged a focus on the normative social construction of 'crime' and 'insecurity'. To this end the strong consensus about the value that experimental criminology ought to have for urban security management is significant, with 100% of the panel agreeing, given the dispute within criminology over the possibility and desirability of experiments.

Summary and implications for Q3

In summary, there was a strikingly high degree of consensus about the need for a more research-driven and evidence-based approach to urban security management alongside disagreement over the contribution of party political ideology and strategy and charismatic authority of elected representatives to urban security management. Q3 will thus seek the



opinion of panellists on the prioritisation of scientific, political and administrative expertise in urban security management where these different kinds of expertise are in conflict.

III.iii THE CONTRIBUTION OF EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING PROGRAMMES FOR DEVELOPING EXPERTISE IN URBAN SECURITY MANAGEMENT

Responses to Q2.8 revealed a high consensus that expertise would be most effectively developed via university-based learning and training in collaboration with state and municipal agencies (including an internship/compulsory placement), that initiatives and processes encouraging long-term collaboration between practitioners and researchers are needed (e.g. university-based postgraduate practitioner fellowships) and that a culture of openness to regular evaluation from independent, scientific parties is an urgent priority in the field, with 100% agreement of the panel for all three statements.

There was also near complete agreement with the proposition that expertise for urban security management is dependent both on process skills (e.g. how to find out about patterns of crime and victimisation, how to engage communities and manage partnerships) and content skills (e.g. how to interpret such patterns, explain the criminological factors at work in the causes of crime and disorder).

There was noticeable disagreement, albeit with moderate and low consensus, that a compulsory Masters programme in generic public management/business administration is required and that there is a need for the establishment of an international (European) system of commonly shared basic standards with built-in sanctions for those failing to meet these standards. Opinion was also divided about the compulsion of urban security managers to undertake a postgraduate-level programme of education in comparative European and multi-disciplinary approaches to crime prevention and security. This is a significant finding which provokes further consideration of the relevance of comparative understanding for expertise in urban security management and what, specifically, Europeans can learn from one another. This is a significant finding as there is a tension between the kind of subject specific expertise that criminology could provide into the kinds of problems that have been prioritised by the panel and the insights that can be gained from training in the challenges of public administration per se.

Summary and implications for Q3

As discussed in the introduction to this commentary, we are particularly interested in seeking panellists' opinions about the value of policy convergence around a standardised concept of urban security management and common standards for educational and training programmes. There is a tension in responses from the panel over support for common standards and for context-specific approaches. Q3 will explore this tension further and the problems of what, and how, Europeans ought to learn from one another about urban security management.