

**URBIS - 518620-LLP-1-2011-1-IT-LEONARDO-LMP  
COUNTRY REPORTS ON EMERGING NEEDS,  
EXISTING PROFILES AND TRAINING COURSES  
FOR URBAN SECURITY MANAGEMENT**



**Programme Name:** Leonardo Da Vinci

**Project Number:** 518620-LLP-1-2011-1-IT-LEONARDO-LMP

**Grant Agreement Number:** 2011-3905/001-001

**Project Title:** URBIS - Urban Manager for Security, Safety and Crisis Management

**WP N°3  
Deliverable N°3.2  
Title: COUNTRY REPORTS ON EMERGING NEEDS,  
EXISTING PROFILES AND TRAINING COURSES FOR  
URBAN SECURITY MANAGEMENT**

**Delivery date:** 30<sup>th</sup> April 2013  
**Deliverable level:** PU

**Document Name:** URBIS\_D3.2\_V1.0\_30042013\_P2\_GH/AE

**Version.Revision:** 1.0

**WP Leader:** Cardiff University



Education and Culture DG

Lifelong Learning Programme



This project has been funded with support from the European Commission.  
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**REVISION AND APPROVAL**

Date	Author	Reviewer	Revision	Version Status	Approved by	Description of Change
30 <sup>th</sup> April 2013	Gordon Hughes Adam Edwards	/	/	1.0	Amanda Zuffi	/



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## **1. Introduction**

1.1. The URBIS project is funded by the European Union's Leonardo da Vinci Lifelong Learning Programme. Its aims and objectives are to:

- Recognise the 'state of the art' in managing urban security;
- Identify any need for the further professionalization of this role, specifically through higher educational qualifications;
- Design a higher educational programme of teaching and learning about managing urban security; and
- Test out this programme amongst current and prospective urban security managers.

1.2. Work package 3 (WP3), which Cardiff University (Partner Two of the project, 'P2') are leading, is specifically concerned with the first objective, to recognise the state of the art. In turn, this recognition exercise has three objectives or 'deliverables', which are to:

- Describe the current national and EU legislative frameworks empowering municipal authorities to manage urban security and other relevant aspects of the institutional context for this role (D3.1);
- Report on the emerging needs, existing profiles and training courses for urban security management across Europe (D3.2); and
- Provide a checklist comparing these statutory powers, needs, profiles and training courses (D3.3).

1.3. This section of the report for WP3 summarises findings for D3.2. It became apparent through initial consultation of the literature and through discussions at conferences attended by members of P2 that the very concept of 'urban security management' was unfamiliar in some parts of Europe, particularly in Northern Europe. As a consequence, and rather than presuming the existence of established profiles and training courses specifically in 'urban security management', it was argued that the state of the art needed to begin with a more rudimentary question about whether the concept is meaningful in different European regions and, where it is used, what it is taken to mean, who is thought to be responsible for it and what kinds of expertise is relevant for meeting this responsibility. As such, P2 re-framed the initial, presumptuous, focus on emerging needs, existing profiles and training courses in D3.2 in terms of the following questions:

- What can 'urban security management' mean? (PROBLEMS)
- Which authorities are, or ought to be, empowered and legally obliged to manage urban security? (RESPONSIBLE ACTORS)
- What skills and competencies do they have, or could they have, to undertake this responsibility? (EXPERTISE)
- What educational and training provision currently exists, or should exist, in support of their work? (EXPERTISE)

## 2. Research Methodology

As summarised in Table 1., these three themes, the ‘problems’, ‘responsible actors’ and ‘expertise’ that are, or could be, associated with ‘urban security management’ (USM) in Europe, were investigated using a multiplicity of methods for seeking responses from three *European-wide* networks:

- sub-national policy officers who were members of the European Forum for Urban Security (EFUS);
- national policy officers representing member states of the European Union on its European Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN); and
- social scientists from the European Society of Criminology (ESC) with a track record of writing about crime prevention policies.

This initial focus on crime prevention was informed by a desktop review of research and policy literature, most obviously the ‘manifestos’ and policy literature disseminated by EFUS which, since the establishment of this network in 1987, has associated urban security with problems of social crime prevention (<http://efus.eu/en/our-network/>). Other key documentary sources of evidence were the national crime prevention strategies published by member states on the EUCPN website (<http://www.eucpn.org/strategies/index.asp>) and a review of the academic research literature contained in the European-wide peer-reviewed criminology journals and reported in the European Union’s own ‘CRIMPREV’ programme (Levy, 2010). This desktop research was complemented by attendance at conferences and meetings of these organisations, including the annual conference of the European Society of Criminology, the American Society of Criminology, the UK National Community Safety Network and a meeting of the EUCPN in Dublin on 25-26<sup>th</sup> March 2013 at which feedback on the findings of WP3 was sought. Finally, a policy Delphi was used as a method of primary data collection about key areas of consensus and disagreement over the problems, responsibilities and expertise entailed in urban security management amongst and between these European-wide networks.

**Table 1. Methodology for recognising the ‘state of the art’ in urban security management**

Themes	Research Respondents		
	Social Scientists (ESC)	National Policy Officers (EUCPN)	Sub-National Policy Officers (EFUS)
Problems of USM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Urbis policy Delphi</li> <li>• Desktop review of research literature</li> <li>• Conferencing (ESC, ASC)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Urbis policy Delphi</li> <li>• Desktop review of national policy documents</li> <li>• Conferencing</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Urbis policy Delphi</li> <li>• Desktop review of EFUS documents</li> <li>• Conferencing (NCSN, EFUS)</li> </ul>
Responsible actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Urbis policy Delphi</li> <li>• Desktop review of research literature</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Urbis policy Delphi</li> <li>• Desktop review of national policy documents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Urbis policy Delphi</li> <li>• Desktop review of EFUS documents</li> <li>• Conferencing</li> </ul>



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conferencing (ESC, ASC)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conferencing</li> </ul>	(NCSN, EFUS)
Expertise	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Urbis policy Delphi</li> <li>• Desktop review of research literature</li> <li>• Conferencing (ESC, ASC)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Urbis policy Delphi</li> <li>• Desktop review of national policy documents</li> <li>• Conferencing</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Urbis policy Delphi</li> <li>• Desktop review of EFUS documents</li> <li>• Conferencing (NCSN, EFUS)</li> </ul>

As a means of justifying this methodology and, particularly, the decision to use a policy Delphi as the principal means of primary data collection, it is helpful to place this research in the broader context of the increasing interest of European-wide policy networks in problems of sub-national crime prevention. The following account should also be read in conjunction with the WP3 report for deliverable 3.1., on current national and EU legislative frameworks empowering municipal authorities to manage urban security and other relevant aspects of the institutional context for this role.

**2.1. The Research Context: ‘Thinking Globally, Acting Locally’**

It is clear from the original application to the Leonardo da Vinci programme for funding the Urbis project and discussions at the inaugural meeting of project partners in December 2011 that the concept of ‘urban security management’ is meant to signify certain problems of street crime and disorder, for example, prostitution, the operation of illicit drug markets and related problems of public health and safety. These are, of course, conventional problems of the ‘home affairs’ of sovereign nation states but they have become of increasing interest to the European Union for a number of reasons. It is suggested that such ‘internal security’ issues cannot be divorced from the transnational organisation of serious crimes, such as human trafficking and the inter-continental trade in narcotics. It has been the EU Commission’s view that neither can such issues be divorced from the increased migration of European populations across national borders, both within the EU as a consequence of the single European market, and from without, as a consequence of major geo-strategic events on the Southern and Eastern borders of the Union, such as the collapse of the former Soviet Union, civil war in the Balkans and the Horn of Africa and conflict in the Middle East. Along with such threats to public safety as the terrorist attacks on transport systems in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 and the increasingly pervasive problem of victimisation on the World Wide Web, these security issues have a local expression, especially in the urban centres of Europe, but their origins are often beyond these centres.

It is in relation to concern over these transnational qualities of public safety that the Maastricht Treaty, constituting the European Union, defined the creation of an ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (AFSJ) as a principle objective of the Union and established multi-annual programmes for policing and judicial co-operation across member states and with applicant states. Hitherto there have been three AFSJ programmes: Tampere, 1999- 2004; Hague, 2005-2009; and Stockholm, 2010-2014. The Tampere and Hague Programmes emphasised ‘upstream’ policy responses, for example interdiction of drug trafficking operations in an attempt to reduce the supply of narcotics into European localities, and to this end encouraged inter-national policing and judicial co-operation. The current Stockholm Programme, however, has also emphasised the importance of ‘downstream’ policy responses, for example those reducing opportunities for the commission of criminal offences in particular situations, such as the trade in narcotics in particular neighbourhood



settings like street corners, parks and transport termini and also the specific social, political and economic contexts of public safety in European localities. The broader significance of this policy shift is the growing importance of action at the municipal level and by a wider range of health and social policy actors than just police and judicial agencies. To this end, the Stockholm Programme emphasises a need to think globally and act locally.

The shift marked by the Stockholm Programme reflects a longer-standing policy debate about the prevention or 'reduction' of crime and disorder by partnerships of municipal authorities, including local government directorates and police, probation and health authorities as well as non-governmental organisations, commercial enterprises and the direct involvement of citizens. In this 'preventive turn', the limitations of law enforcement and criminal justice have been recognised as greater emphasis has been placed on the anticipation and pre-emptive management of risks, the use of restorative justice to repair the harms caused by offenders to their victims and 'social justice' measures addressing the perceived relationship between increasing social inequalities and civil unrest. Existing research into this preventive turn suggests, however, that it has been both uneven and contested in its development across European municipalities as advocates of criminal justice, risk management, restorative and social justice have competed to define the policy agenda for public safety (Crawford, 2002, 2009; Edwards and Hughes, 2005, 2012; Hebberecht and Duprez, 2002; Sessar, Stangl and van Swaaningen, 2007).

## **2.2. The Research Problem: the Contested Quality of Urban Security Management**

In this research and policy context, a number of challenges for researching the 'state of the art' in 'urban security management' were anticipated:

2.2.1. As with many policy issues, it was thought there might not be a consensus about what 'urban security management' is about or what it ought to be about and, therefore, how 'it' can be professionalised or indeed whether it ought to be professionalised.

2.2.2. As with much comparative cross-national research, it was thought there might not be a common translation of 'urban security management' and that other terms might be used to signify the kind of 'downstream' responses to internal security threats discussed above (see 2.1.). For example, in the Anglophone world there has been a preference for the communitarian language of 'community safety' over the territorial language of the 'urban'. Elsewhere the state-centred language of 'public security' or the cultural concept of *veiligheidsbeleid* ('live-ability' or quality of life) have been preferred (Edwards and Hughes, 2005).

2.2.3. These alternative terms may signify conceptual not just linguistic differences. We are likely to find differences as to whether, for example, policy responses ought to be state-centred, whether they ought to shift the onus of responsibility for internal security issues onto private citizens and commercial enterprises, and how possible and desirable it is to foster the direct involvement of citizens in responses to crime and disorder. Within the cultural contexts in which these concepts are used there are likely to be differences of opinion over the importance of criminal justice responses relative to risk management strategies and to both restorative and social justice programmes and so on. As a consequence, there are likely to be differences of opinion about the sorts of knowledge, skills and competencies that are involved in 'managing urban security' and how managers can be best equipped with these and what, therefore, the particular contribution of lifelong learning can be to the accomplishment of urban security management in different European contexts.

In summary, the problem for researching the 'state of the art' (or, indeed, the 'science') of urban security management across Europe is that it cannot be presumed that this 'art/science' already



exists and, if it does, whether it signifies the same kinds of knowledge, skills and competencies. Rather, this research problem epitomises the situation, identified by Delbecq et al (1975: 5), in their justification of the need for deliberative methods, such as the 'policy Delphi', for researching informed opinion, in which there is a:

*... lack of agreement or incomplete state of knowledge concerning either the nature of the problem or the components which must be included in a successful solution. As a result, heterogeneous group members must pool their judgements to invent or discover a satisfactory course of action.*

### **2.3. Research Strategy: Recognition, Deliberation and Anticipation**

Given this research problem, a particular challenge for WP3 has been to develop a research strategy that is both extensive, in recognising the state of the art in urban security management across Europe, and intensive in recognising how context-specific this art or science is. In addition, the presumption of project Urbis is that it is possible to establish a sufficient consensus about the problems, responsibilities and allied expertise for urban security management that could, in turn, justify a European-wide professionalisation of this role or, at a minimum, a conceptual framework in which expertise about common problems and responsibilities could be debated and exchanged. In short, a research strategy that enables policy actors and social scientists from around Europe to talk to, rather than at or past, one another about common interests. If there is no common referent, there can be no argument or dialogue. In this regard there is a danger of depending on documentary sources alone, particularly the tendentious manifestos and mission statements of policy discourse. Textual analysis can promote a false universality, where it is presumed that concepts such as 'crime prevention' signify the same things in different social groups and in different cultures of control. Conversely, this method can also promote a false particularity insofar as actual variegated cultures of control, such as the predilection of some Central and Southern European policy actors for 'urban security', are imputed from textual sources (see Stenson, 1998). In both these instances of mistranslation, the opportunity for debate, dialogue and learning *across* diverse social contexts can be lost and otherwise delimited. To this end, a review of the existing literature on crime prevention in Europe was undertaken to identify any additional methods that could support the dialogical research strategy of WP3 (Edwards, Hughes and Lord, 2013a). This review identified various methods that have been employed within four distinct traditions of researching crime prevention in Europe:

- The science of experiments, surveys and impact evaluations;
- Grand sociological narratives;
- National case studies;
- Local case studies.

Whilst each of these traditions has generated rich insights that could inform a strategy of dialogue about crime prevention in Europe, it was felt that none of them cultivated *cross-cultural* dialogue as such. Experiments, surveys and impact evaluations seek generalisable, even universal, knowledge about the drivers of crime and preventive interventions. This constrains dialogue to discussions of the general applicability or irrelevance of this knowledge, the corroboration or falsification of whether this knowledge 'works' in context. This research doesn't, of itself, cultivate dialogue across different contexts of crime and control. Conversely, national and local case studies are by definition concerned with the exceptionality of particular contexts and their implications for qualifying grand narratives about crime trends and control tendencies (such as the rise of 'punitive populist' cultures of control, the emergence of the 'security state' or the tendency to 'govern through crime'). As such, these traditions constrain dialogue to the exchange of 'immanent critiques' and the reportage

of local or nationally-specific experiences rather than engagement in a deliberative argument in which the participants are open to persuasion.

As a consequence, the broader literature on social research methodology was consulted for research designs that could support cross-cultural dialogue. In this regard, deliberative research designs offered a potential way forward. Of these, the Delphi method was selected as one of the most mature, tried and tested, deliberative methods available for supporting dialogical research. The policy Delphi also had its origins in attempts at forecasting social change in conditions of major uncertainty and as such it is particularly appropriate for informing research on the (future-oriented) prevention of crime and, more broadly, the anticipatory logic of 'security'.

#### **2.4. Research Design: The Policy Delphi**

The Policy Delphi has evolved over the past four decades as a means of more reliably recognising and acting upon uncertain problems characterised by a lack of agreement amongst those specialising in the study of a problem in question (Delbecq et al, 1975; Linstone and Turoff, 1975; Adler and Ziglio, 1996; Franklin and Hart, 2007). As a distinctive research design it has its origins in work undertaken by the RAND Corporation in the 1950s and 1960s in attempts to improve forecasting about developments in science and technology and their possible impact on social relations, most notably the nuclear arms race (and the related exploration of space through ballistic rocket technologies) that characterised the Cold War (Gordon and Helmer, 1964; Dalkey, 1968). In this potentially catastrophic context there was neither certainty about how the Cold War would unfold nor the luxury of experimenting with nuclear arms exchanges to corroborate hypotheses about how preventable or winnable this war could be. A method of investigation was therefore needed which could steer a path between the impossibility of achieving certain knowledge through experimentation and, on the other hand, recourse to 'mere speculation', ideological doctrine, bigotry and other subjective, potentially catastrophic, approaches to this problem. The Delphi method, named after the oracle of Greek legend, was formulated for this task and its basic propositions are summarised by Ziglio (1996):

- Between the extreme poles of certain scientific knowledge and subjective speculation there exists a 'grey area' of **informed judgement**;
- If effectively sampled and revised through a **structured dialogue** between a panel of informants with experience of, and expertise about, a problem in question, this informed judgement acquires an objectivity that cannot be dismissed as mere speculation nor as just the sum of the various contributions from panellists;
- The specific contributions of the Delphi panellists are transformed into a more objective account through a particular form of **iterative group communication**;
- Typically, this communication takes the form of panellists responding to a common, initial, questionnaire ('Q1') which poses open-ended questions about the problem in ways that are broad enough to avoid leading questions but focussed enough to provide a **common referent for debate and dialogue**;
- Responses to Q1 are then collated by the Delphi Panel co-ordinators and used to construct a subsequent questionnaire ('Q2') which provides panellists with the opportunity to engage with the ideas of others on the panel and **defend or revise initial judgements in the light of comprehensive feedback from the whole panel**;
- Subsequent iterations in the group communication amongst panellists ('Q3', 'Q4' ... 'Qn') act as forms of both **respondent and construct validation of the research problem** and therefore of the objectivity of the informed judgement reached by the panel;



- Initially, the Delphi Method was used to foster a consensus of informed opinion amongst panellists but subsequently the idea of the ‘policy Delphi’ (Turoff, 1975) identified the value of using structured and iterative group communication to **provoke constructive criticism and debate around issues of public policy** for which there are unlikely to be clear-cut resolutions;
- In these terms the objectivity of a ‘policy Delphi’ resides in its ability to **ensure the representation of competing policy agendas and to organise dialogue between their advocates, which may or may not produce consensus**;
- To ensure such representation and dialogue it is important to maintain the **anonymity of panellists, certainly until a panel has concluded**. Lack of anonymity can, as in face-to-face research methods such as interviews and focus groups, inhibit the freedom of expression upon which the objectivity of Delphi panels depend.

Advocates of the Policy Delphi also note its advantages for enabling communication amongst geographically dispersed informants, particularly where there are major restraints on the time and cost of bringing them together in face-to-face meetings (Ziglio, *ibid.*).

## **2.5. Research Methods: The Urbis Policy Delphi**

The attributes of the Delphi Method, particularly the ‘policy Delphi’ version of this method, are especially relevant for the conceptual and logistical challenges of recognising the state of the art in urban security management in Europe. In addition to recognising and acting on the conceptual issues discussed above (see 2.2.), a policy Delphi is also better placed to collect data on the breadth of comparative insight into urban security management in European localities that WP3 is required to deliver and in the relatively short period of time in which this insight needs to be delivered. Although ethnographic methods may yield greater depth of insight into the particular social contexts of security (Nelken, 2007; Young, 2011), such immersion cannot capture the heterogeneity of experiences across Europe. Idiographic accounts are produced in which breadth of insight is sacrificed to narrow but deep understanding of particular contexts. Alternatively, large-scale surveys and secondary analyses of data sets about security issues (including crime victim surveys, police recorded statistics and public opinion polls such as the Eurobarometer survey) can have a wider scope of applicability but, again, insight into the heterogeneity of experience is obscured by the description of statistical patterns and trends. Alternatively, the Delphi method provides a more satisfactory means of reconciling a breadth and depth of insight into the comparative experience of urban security management across Europe. Clearly, the quality of this comparative insight in practice depends on the sampling of particular panellists and the ability to reduce attrition (the loss of panellists) across different iterations or ‘rounds’ of a policy Delphi.

### **2.5.1 Sampling Panels and Panellists for the Urbis Policy Delphi**

Panels can be more or less elaborate depending on the time and cost constraints placed on a research project. Given the resources available for WP3, its relationship to other WPs in the project and consequently, its timetable for completion, panellists were purposefully sampled from the social scientific and policy communities and particularly amongst those with expertise in the development of crime prevention policies and practices in different European countries. To this end, as noted above (see 2., above) panellists were sampled from the European Society of Criminology (ESC), national representatives in the European Union’s Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN) and representatives of sub-national, municipal, authorities in the European Forum for Urban Security (EFUS).

Within these European-wide networks, panellists for the ESC panel were sampled using a 'snowball' method on advice from initial contacts in the ESC and from initial contacts in the secretariats for the EUCPN and EFUS. As such, it cannot be claimed that any of the panels were 'representative' of the entire population of social scientists or of national and sub-national policy officers with expertise about European crime prevention. Rather, the sampling was purposive in recruiting respondents with reputed expertise about crime prevention in relevant and established European-wide networks, in order to establish any common referents for arguments about the prevention of crime across Europe and the particular significance of urban security within these arguments. A particular advantage of the Delphi method, however, is that it enables collective respondent validation of concepts through the iterative rounds of questionnaire–report–questionnaire (see 2.5.2., below). In this way it demonstrates whether it is possible for a group of expert informants to reach a consensus about the significance of concepts and the related construction of social problems. Insofar as any consensus is identified with and between panels of different kinds of expert, it is plausible to argue that common referents exist and that, for the particular purposes of WP3, these provide a means of translating concepts across cultures of control amongst panellists from the social scientific and policy communities with expertise about crime prevention in different European countries.

### **2.5.2 Urbis Policy Delphi Design**

A defining characteristic of the Delphi method is the iterative group communication amongst panellists in which panel co-ordinators (P2 for WP3 of Urbis) design an initial questionnaire ('Q1') collate all panellists responses into a report which is circulated back out to all members of the panel and which is used to design a questionnaire ('Q2') for the second round and so on, in iterations of questionnaire – report – questionnaire. This iterative communication has particular benefits for the translation of concepts across different literal as well as conceptual language communities because having invited respondents to validate or challenge the terms of debate, subsequent iterations provide further opportunities for corroborating any consensus of opinion and areas of genuine disagreement. This is particularly important in the context of comparative European criminology, in which it is often argued that literal translations between different European languages, and especially into English as a principal language of communication across cultures, results in the mistranslation of concepts. In this way, the iterative communication transforms the subjective constructions of panellists into the objective opinion of the panel. Confidence in this objective rendering of the subjective constructions of individual panellists is improved where the anonymity of panellists is maintained. Unlike other deliberative group-based research methods where respondents know who each other are, as in face-to-face or on-line focus groups, the anonymity of panellists in policy Delphi's liberates them from various constraints on freedom of expression. This is especially important where the informed opinion of civil servants is sought and where this may diverge from the beliefs and priorities of the elected representatives they serve. The prevention of drug-related crime is an exemplar of this problem, in which civil servants sceptical of the 'war on drugs' have nonetheless felt constrained in their criticism of this political priority.

A decision was taken to conduct three iterations or 'rounds' for the Urbis policy Delphi in accordance with the following logic:

#### **Round One: Conceptualisation**

The first round entailed a questionnaire ('Q1') inviting open-ended, discursive, responses from panellists to eight questions designed to elicit respondents' conceptualisation of the problems, responsibilities and expertise associated with urban security management.

1. What can 'managing urban security' mean?



2. What are the current challenges for managing urban security in your region?
3. What are the potential challenges for managing urban security in your region in the coming decade?
4. Who is currently responsible for managing urban security?
5. Who ought to be responsible for managing urban security?
6. What expertise and training currently equips these authorities to respond to these problems?
7. What expertise ought to be entailed in this response?
8. How might this expertise be best developed in educational and training programmes?

### **Round Two: Prioritisation**

The policy Delphi co-ordinators, from P2 of project Urbis, then produced a report on responses from panellists from each of the three panels and used these to devise a second questionnaire ('Q2') which was designed to establish areas of consensus and disagreement about the problems, responsibilities and expertise implied by urban security management. Consequently a more structured questionnaire was used in which panellists were asked to rank the five most important and five least important problems and preventive approaches. Q2 also used Likert scale questions to establish consensus and disagreement about the kind of actors responsible for urban security management and the kinds of expertise these actors have, and ought to have, in order to undertake these responsibilities. This structured questionnaire was designed using an on-line survey instrument, 'Qualtrics' (see [www.qualtrics.com](http://www.qualtrics.com)), which also enables the use of open-text boxes for more qualitative responses. This instrument consequently supported mixed quantitative and qualitative methods that structured panellists' responses but also provided them with an opportunity to qualify these responses.

### **Round Three: Corroboration**

The final round of the Urbis policy Delphi also used Qualtrics to design a questionnaire ('Q3') to corroborate areas of consensus and disagreement revealed by responses to Q2 and to seek respondent validation of the interpretation that the co-ordinators had placed on the quantitative and qualitative findings from Q2 in their report on the second round. Panellists were asked to indicate how harmful (how frequent and severe) they thought the problems they had prioritised in Q2 were and which preventive approaches (criminal justice, risk management, restorative justice and social justice) they would prioritise investment in as a response to these problems.

## **2.6. Responses and attrition**

As detailed in Table 2, data about crime prevention in 26 European countries was received from respondents to Q1 providing an extensive coverage of Northern, Southern, Central and Eastern European regions as well as the Balkans and the Baltic states. Achievement of the intensive research goals of WP3 was more equivocal given the level of attrition, particularly of panellists on the EFUS panel after the first round. There was also a limited match between respondents discussing the same country context for crime prevention across the three different panels. Even so, the co-ordinators felt that sufficient respondents from the ESC and EUCPN panels had completed all three rounds of the Urbis policy Delphi to enable a comparison of areas of consensus and disagreement between these two panels and to substantiate common referents about urban security amongst social scientists and national policy-makers in these networks.

**TABLE 2: Urbis Policy Delphi Respondents by Country, Panel and Questionnaire Round Completed**

Country	ESC Panel			EUCPN Panel			EFUS Panel		
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q1	Q2	Q3
Austria				Yes					
Belgium	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Bulgaria				Yes	Yes	Yes			
Cyprus				Yes	Yes	Yes			
Czech Republic				Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Denmark				Yes	Yes	Yes			
EIRE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes				
Estonia				Yes					
England and Wales	Yes	Yes	Yes						
Finland	Yes	Yes	Yes						
France	Yes	Yes	Yes				Yes	Yes	
Germany	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Greece	Yes	Yes	Yes				Yes		
Hungary				Yes					
Italy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Latvia				Yes					
Lithuania					Yes				
Luxembourg				Yes	Yes		Yes		
Netherlands	Yes (with Belgium)	Yes (with Belgium)	Yes (with Belgium)	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
Northern Ireland							Yes		
Malta					Yes				
Norway	Yes	Yes	Yes						
Portugal	Yes	Yes	Yes				Yes		
Romania				Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Scotland	Yes	Yes	Yes						
Slovenia	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes				
Spain	Yes	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes	Yes	
Sweden	Yes	Yes	Yes						
Turkey	Yes	Yes	Yes						
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>



### 3. Research Findings

The full reports for each of the rounds of each of the panels are provided in appendix one. Here a summary is provided of key findings about the problems, responsibilities and expertise entailed in urban security management that emerged from each of the three rounds of the Urbis policy Delphi, focussing on notable areas of consensus and disagreement.

#### 3.1. Problems

##### 3.1.1. Findings from Round One of the Delphi (Q1)

3.1.1.1. In the narrative responses to Q1 panellists distinguished between the problems for urban security management and problems of urban security management. To clarify this distinction the panel co-ordinators made a distinction between problems for urban security and approaches to urban security management. It was possible to identify a total of 25 problems and 15 approaches from the responses to Q1 from panellists on the ESC, EUCPN and EFUS panels and these are summarised in Table 3.

**Table 3: Cross-panel Problems and Approaches Identified in Q1**

Problems	Approaches
1. Incivility and anti-social behaviour	1. Enforcing the criminal law
2. Drug trafficking	2. Reducing social segregation and promoting social cohesion
3. Property crime (burglary, theft, robbery)	3. Repressing incivility
4. Criminal damage (vandalism, graffiti)	4. Increased use of imprisonment and correctional facilities
5. Fraud	5. Use of CCTV surveillance
6. Violence against the person (including domestic violence)	6. Reassuring citizens about their security and about their fear of crime
7. Alcohol and drug misuse	7. Reducing the opportunities for criminal victimization
8. Firearms-related crime	8. Reducing social inequalities in household income, access to education, employment, healthcare and housing
9. Environmental degradation (illegal waste disposal, pollution)	9. Preventing the onset of offending behaviour and incivility
10. Knife-related crime	10. Punitive sentencing policies
11. Criminal gangs and organised crime	11. Requiring citizens to take responsibility for their own security and equipping them with the capacity and resources to meet this responsibility
12. Human trafficking	12. Restorative justice interventions with perpetrators and victims of criminal offences
13. Prostitution, illicit sexual services	13. Celebrating social diversity and promoting the rights of minority groups
14. Corporate crime, including corruption	14. Enhancing the democratic scrutiny and oversight of security strategies
15. Health and safety in the workplace	
16. Corruption of public administration	
17. State police violence	
18. Terrorism	
19. Tax evasion	
20. Climate change and natural disasters (extreme weather)	
21. Protection of critical infrastructure (water and food security, transport and communications systems, energy grids)	
22. Immigration and social cohesion	
23. Mass demonstrations and civil unrest associated with austerity	

24. Social exclusion and youth unemployment  
25. Degradation of governing capacity

15. Promoting greater health and safety in the workplace

3.1.1.2. As anticipated in the research problem (see 2.2., above), a number of panellists, particularly from Northern Europe and from the UK and Republic of Ireland noted the negligible use of the concept of urban security in this region and the preference for alternative concepts such as 'community safety', 'integral security' and 'public safety'. Even so, these alternative concepts share a concern to replace the relatively narrow concept of 'crime prevention' with other terms that all define the prevention of crime as a problem for social and economic policy as well as a problem for criminal justice and risk management. This is indicated in references to approaches that 'reduce social segregation and promote social cohesion' or 'reduce social inequalities in household income, access to education, employment, healthcare and housing'.

3.1.1.3. To this end, a number of panellists differentiated symptomatic problems, such as property crime, from generative problems, such as 'social exclusion and youth unemployment' and the 'degradation of governing capacity'.

3.1.1.4. Responses to Q1 also questioned the relevance of the concept of urban security management in largely agrarian countries, such as Norway and the Republic of Ireland, where rural contexts, problems and approaches were a greater priority, both for crime prevention and for broader concepts of security, for example in relation to flooding and other consequences of climate change, threats to critical infrastructure and the food chain. The latter problems indicate how elastic and all encompassing the concept of security can become. This is positive insofar as the concept of security is better placed to accommodate the variegated problems and preventive approaches found in contexts as diverse as rural Ireland and Norway and highly urbanised regions such as metropolitan England, Northern Italy or the Rhur in Germany. It is problematic, however, in establishing common referents for a European-wide dialogue about the symptoms and generative causes of crime and appropriate preventive approaches. To this end, the second round of the Urbis policy Delphi asked panellists to prioritise the problems and approaches they felt were most important in the particular contexts they had expertise about. In turn this would help clarify the existence of any common referents and therefore the appropriate scope of a European-wide dialogue about the prevention of crime and other problems of insecurity.

### **3.1.2. Findings from Round Two of the Delphi (Q2)**

3.1.2.1. Mindful of some of the criticisms of the particular focus on urban security that had emerged out of some of the discursive responses to Q1, Q2 sought to establish whether problems of crime and insecurity in Europe were so context-dependent and whether these contexts were so variegated that there would be negligible consensus about any core problems and approaches. If this were found to be the case it would challenge the basic presumption of project Urbis, that there are common referents and that these enable a European-wide dialogue including a programme of higher educational training and knowledge exchange. As such, panellists were asked to select the five most important and five least important problems from the list of 25 identified in Q1 and the five most important and least important approaches from the list of 15 identified in Q1. Tables 4 and 5 summarise the collective judgements of the ESC and EUCPN panels about these priorities. As discussed above, the level of attrition of respondents from the EFUS panel limited the comparability of data from these respondents and so the following discussion reports key findings from a contrast of responses from the ESC and EUCPN panels.

**Table 4: Problems prioritised in Q2 of the Urbis policy Delphi by panel.**

Q2	ESC	EUCPN
<b>High consensus</b> ≥75-100%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Violence against the person (including Domestic Violence)</li> </ul>	
<b>Moderate consensus</b> ≥50 – <75%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Social exclusion and youth unemployment</li> <li>• Incivilities and anti-social behaviour</li> <li>• Property crime</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Violence against the person (including DV)</li> <li>• Social exclusion and youth unemployment</li> <li>• Incivilities and anti-social behaviour</li> <li>• Property crime</li> </ul>
<b>Low consensus</b> ≥25 – <50%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Alcohol and drug misuse</li> <li>• Immigration and social cohesion</li> <li>• Criminal gangs and organised crime</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Alcohol and drug misuse</li> <li>• Immigration and social cohesion</li> <li>• Criminal gangs and organised crime</li> </ul>

3.1.2.2. Table 4 reveals a major finding of WP3 and that is a remarkably high degree of consensus amongst and between the ESC and EUCPN panels over a core set of shared problems. Over three quarters of the ESC panel prioritised violence against the person (including domestic violence) as one of the five most important problems for urban security and over a half of the EUCPN panel agreed with the prioritisation of this problem. Over half of both panels also prioritised social exclusion and youth unemployment, incivilities and anti-social behaviour and property crime as priorities. Over a quarter of both panels agreed on the prioritisation of problems of alcohol and drug misuse, immigration and social cohesion and criminal gangs and organised crime. Taken together these seven problem areas indicate the core agenda for any European-wide dialogue about urban security and help to set manageable parameters on the kinds of expertise that any curriculum of higher educational programme could support (see 3.3., below).

3.1.2.3. These seven priorities were revealed through the agreement of panellists about current priority problems. An additional strength of the policy Delphi is its support of forecasting and, in this regard, the ESC and EUCPN panels also identified the 'degradation of governing capacity' (through public expenditure cuts) as problem likely to generate further problems of crime and insecurity over the next decade, particularly in those European countries experiencing major

sovereign debt crises and allied pressures to reduce public expenditure. The EUCPN panel also identified the growth of urban populations as a problem set to become more important over the next decade given the pressures such projected population growth is likely to place on access to basic resources such as housing, healthcare and education and consequently on social cohesion and civil unrest. A number of respondents linked this concern to a growing populist and party political reaction against immigration into and around the European Union. The ESC panel also identified urban population growth as a prospective problem but panellists explicitly linked this to the broader issue of protecting the critical infrastructure of cities (such as water and food security, transport and communications systems and energy grids).

**Table 5: Approaches Prioritised in Q2 of the Urbis Policy Delphi by the ESC and EUCPN Panels**

Q2	ESC	EUCPN
<b>High consensus ≥75-100%</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reducing social segregation and promoting social cohesion</li> <li>• Reducing social inequalities in household income, access to education, employment, healthcare and housing</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reducing social segregation and promoting social cohesion</li> <li>• Reducing the opportunities for criminal victimisation</li> </ul>
<b>Moderate consensus ≥50 – &lt;75%</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reassuring citizens about their security and about their fear of crime</li> <li>• Preventing the onset of offending behaviour and incivility</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Requiring citizens to take responsibility for their own security and equipping them with the capacity and resources to meet this responsibility</li> <li>• Restorative justice interventions with perpetrators and victims of criminal offences</li> <li>• Reducing social inequalities in household income, access to education, employment, healthcare and housing</li> </ul>
<b>Low consensus ≥25 – &lt;50%</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enhancing the democratic scrutiny and oversight of security strategies</li> <li>• Reducing the opportunities for criminal victimization</li> <li>• Restorative justice interventions with perpetrators and victims of criminal offences</li> <li>• Requiring citizens to take responsibility for their own</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Preventing the onset of offending behaviour and incivility</li> <li>• Use of CCTV surveillance</li> <li>• Reassuring citizens about their security and about their fear of crime</li> <li>• Enforcing the criminal law</li> </ul>

	security and equipping them with the capacity and resources to meet this responsibility	
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3.1.2.4. The ranking of approaches to problems of urban security in Q2 revealed some interesting areas of inter-panel consensus and disagreement (see Table 5). There was a high consensus across the two panels about the need to reduce social segregation and promote social cohesion. Thereafter, however, the ESC panel placed a greater emphasis on reducing social inequalities whereas the EUCPN panel privileged the reduction of opportunities for criminal victimization, reflecting a key argument in contemporary criminology about the place of ‘dispositional’ and ‘situational’ approaches to crime prevention in public policy (Clarke, 2004). Another key finding was the prioritization of CCTV surveillance and criminal law enforcement by the EUCPN panel and the absence of these approaches in the priorities identified by the ESC panel, reflecting the scepticism of much academic criminology about the benefits of surveillance and enforcement. The EUCPN panel also accorded a greater priority to the responsibility of citizens for their own security and to the role of restorative interventions with perpetrators and victims of criminal offences (Edwards, Hughes and Lord, 2013: 11-12). Over a quarter of ESC panellists also prioritised ‘enhancing the democratic scrutiny and oversight of security strategies’ as a means of ensuring accountable, evidence-driven and reflective approaches to problems rather than approaches driven by ideological and/or institutional self-interest.

### **3.1.3 Findings from Round Three of the Delphi (Q3)**

3.1.3.1. To further explore and corroborate the priorities identified in Q2, Q3 conflated these approaches to prevention into four categories that are familiar to both academic and policy-oriented criminology in Europe and that are often counterpoised to one another in public discourse on crime and insecurity: criminal justice; restorative justice; social justice; and risk management. A problem with this discourse, however, is a tendency to over-generalize the applicability of one or other of these approaches for preventing ‘crime’ per se (for example, Clarke, 2004; EFUS, 2012) or to infer the eclipse of one approach (for example, social justice) by others (for example, criminal justice and risk management) in grand narratives about social control (for example, Garland, 2001; Wacquant, 2009).

3.1.3.2. Consequently, Q3 asked panellists to prioritize these approaches *in relation to* the specific problems they had prioritized in Q2. This decision also reflects an interest in the call for a more ‘problem-oriented’ approach to prevention in which deliberation proceeds from concrete problems to institutional responses rather than the more familiar reversal of this chain of reasoning, which takes the institution (for example, the police, the prison, the courts) as the starting point for appropriate policy responses (see Goldstein, 1990). In turn, Q3 was used to investigate how this re-orientation of public discourse about crime and insecurity around problems rather than institutions affects the dialogue between social science and other policy-makers; specifically,

whether it is possible to reach a consensus both about priority problems and about the most appropriate approaches to their prevention.

3.1.3.3. Q3 asked panellists to identify how severe and frequent they perceived the problems they had prioritized in Q2 to be. This follows recent work on the concept of the 'seriousness' of crime that differentiates crime problems in terms of their harmful effects, defined, in turn, in terms of their perceived severity and frequency (Greenfield and Paoli, 2012). Panellists were asked to consider each of the problems they had identified as current priorities, along with problems they had forecast as emerging problems over the next decade, according to a seven-point Likert scale (very severe/frequent; severe/frequent; moderately severe/frequent; uncertain; moderately innocuous/infrequent; innocuous/infrequent; very innocuous/infrequent). Consensus among panellists about the severity and frequency of these problems was ascertained through the use of two scales: 'mean panel response' and 'consensus of panel'. The key findings are visualized in Figures 1 and 2 (see Appendix Two), where the further out from the centre of the 'radar diagram' a marker is for a particular problem, the more severe and frequent the panel thought this problem to be, and the larger the size of the marker, the greater the consensus among panellists about the severity and frequency of a problem.

3.1.3.4. These metrics and this visualization reveal some interesting patterns of judgements about the harms of priority problems for urban security, both within and between the ESC and EUCPN panels. Most striking is the similarity in the overall pattern of judgements between both panels, signalling the possibilities for reaching agreement between academic criminologists and policy-makers. Both panels corroborated violence against the person, property crime and social exclusion and youth unemployment as policy priorities. We suggest this pattern of inter-panel agreement after three iterative rounds of deliberation provides strong evidence in support of the existence of common referents among academics and policy-makers sampled from around Europe about the problems for crime prevention and their connection to issues of social and economic policy.

3.1.3.5. These visualizations were also used to compare and contrast inter-panel consensus and disagreement about the appropriateness of criminal justice, risk management, restorative justice and social justice policy approaches to these problems (see Appendix Two). Space prohibits a full exposition of the revealing commonalities and divergences in the judgements of ESC and EUCPN panellists in this regard and so discussion is restricted to some of the more striking patterns of consensus and agreement and what, in conclusion, these tell us about the possibilities for a European-wide dialogue.

3.1.3.6. Figures 3 and 4 visualize the pattern of judgements about criminal justice as an appropriate response to the problems prioritized by the ESC and EUCPN panels. Again, most striking is the common pattern of judgements, with both panels identifying a strong consensus in favour of criminal justice responses to problems of violence against the person, property crime and organized crime but not for problems of social exclusion. A clear divergence of opinion between the two panels, however, is the greater strength of consensus among the EUCPN panellists for these responses than among ESC panellists, arguably reflecting a greater scepticism among academic criminology about the efficacy of criminal justice policy responses for reducing the harms associated with these problems. Two further striking differences between the panels are over the use of criminal justice responses to incivilities or 'anti-social behaviour' (ASB) and alcohol and drug misuse, with EUCPN panellists expressing a strong agreement in favour and the ESC panel expressing uncertainty. Again, we take this pattern of judgements as evidence of common referents around which a constructive dialogue between academic criminologists and policy-makers in Europe can be organized.

3.1.3.7. Figures 5 and 6 visualize the pattern of judgements about the appropriateness of risk management responses to these problems, in particular measures to reduce the situational opportunities for their commission. Here there is an interesting divergence in the pattern between the two panels, with ESC panellists expressing a mostly high consensus of opinion in favour of using this approach, particularly in relation to property crimes, but less enthusiasm for this approach than their counterparts on the EUCPN panel, where there was again a mostly high consensus but with higher levels of agreement (except for incivilities/ASB, where agreement in the ESC panel was marginally stronger) about the applicability of this approach to all problems including issues of immigration and social cohesion.

3.1.3.8. Figures 7 to 10 indicate the pattern of judgements about the appropriateness of restorative and social justice approaches to the problems prioritised in Q2. The enthusiasm of the EUCPN panellists for alternatives to criminal justice responses was also borne out by the strength of their agreement in favour of social justice responses (those focusing on the reduction of social inequalities as a means of reducing crime and insecurity) to all of the problems other than organized crime and the degradation of governing capacity. These judgements were also shared by ESC panellists, signalling a strong consensus among academic criminologists and policy-makers about the irrelevance of social inequalities for understanding and acting against organized criminality. A remarkable difference of judgement between the panels about the issue of organized criminality, however, was the relevance of restorative justice responses, which ESC panellists were uncertain about but which EUCPN panellists were strongly in favour of.

## **3.2. Responsible Actors**

### **3.2.1. Findings from Round One of the Delphi (Q1)**

3.2.1.1 Following round one of the policy Delphi (Q1), respondents across the three panels advocated dual responsibility or co-responsibility between local authorities/municipalities and the central government.

3.2.1.2 As one response from the ESC panel suggested, giving emphasis to local government and the public police seems an appropriate division of labour as it formally removes the monopoly over security from the police: this complements local strategies of public safety and wellbeing as opposed to crime control that are evident throughout the sampled jurisdictions.

3.2.1.3 For some jurisdictions, the role of the police within this framework should remain pivotal given the high level of trust they receive and their status as the central authority for responding to internal problems.

3.2.1.4 However, even in those jurisdictions advocating a strong police role, myriad state and non-state actors and agencies emanating from different 'spheres' located across different 'tiers' would remain involved in urban security management.

3.2.1.5 Thus, there was consensus across the panels that non-state developments should be managed and regulated by the state but operationalised at the local 'tier' by local authorities within the state 'sphere'.

3.2.1.6 There is stronger support for responsibility to be located primarily at the local 'tier' (municipalities, cities) where the police, Mayors and/or other responsible agents (but primarily

those within the state 'sphere') can be directly accountable to those areas and citizens that they serve

### **3.2.2. Findings from Round Two of the Delphi (Q2)**

3.2.2.1 The distinction between who 'is' and who 'ought' to have responsibility was further developed in Q2, where panellists were required to indicate their level of agreement with statements exploring strategic and operational responsibility. In the ESC panel, there was a high level of consensus in favour of matching responsibility for strategic management to the particular kinds of security problem in question and to the particular local contexts in which they occur. There was also consensus in the panel around restricting urban security management to locally-bound and context-specific problems.

3.2.2.2 Notably, the ESC panellists indicated high consensus in favour of granting responsibility for strategic management to elected officials in order to ensure that the prioritisation of urban problems reflects the concerns of local people. In line with this, the panellists were against granting strategic responsibility to national policy-makers and against a standardised approach to security management in all cities and regions.

3.2.2.3 All ESC panellists were in favour of multi-agency partnerships as the most appropriate way of managing urban security where local and national authorities ought to share responsibility but there was low consensus about the hierarchical organisation of decision-making powers to ensure that disputes between authorities with competing mandates for urban security can be arbitrated.

3.2.2.4 Whilst 80% of the ESC panel thought elected local authorities ought to be responsible, a third also thought the police must be the primary agent for managing urban security, while 40% also felt that an elected mayor ought to be responsible. Finally, 80% of the panel agreed that urban security managers ought to be given formal powers to negotiate and compel both state and non-state agencies to comply with their operational leadership but ambiguity remained over which agencies and actors should retain ultimate decision making powers and operational independence.

3.2.2.5 In the EUCPN panel, there was high consensus in favour of granting responsibility for strategic management to both local elected officials and local civil servants and a high level of agreement that actors and agencies from the commercial, NGO, voluntary 'spheres' should be significantly involved in creating strategies.

3.2.2.6 In terms of operational responsibility, there was high consensus in the EUCPN panel about which actors ought to have operational responsibility for security management, namely: both local authorities and the central government

3.2.2.7 The EUCPN panel indicated that if operational responsibility is with partnerships, contracts and agreements between several stakeholders, these need to be formally binding and transparent to ensure decision-making powers are clearly allocated.

3.2.2.8 There was also high consensus in agreement in the EUCPN panel with the claim that appointed civil servants should have powers to put urban security management into practice. However, 80% of the panel moderately agreed that urban security managers ought to be given formal powers to negotiate and compel both state and non-state agencies to comply with their operational leadership. According to the EUCPN panel, an elected Mayor (or equivalent position) should be responsible for operationalizing urban security management but should also receive relevant training to carry out this role.



3.2.2.9 In the EFUS panel, there was high consensus that strategic responsibility should lie with appointed civil servants where responsibility can be with several different state and non-state actors at different levels. However, while state officials should have strategic responsibility, they need to be located at the local, municipal level.

3.2.2.10 There was also high consensus in the EFUS panel that the police must be the primary agent with operational responsibility and that appointed civil servants should have powers to put urban security management into practice. Within this framework multi-agency partnerships are the most appropriate approach to practicing urban security management but as above, if operational responsibility is with partnerships, contracts and agreements between several stakeholders, these need to be formally binding and transparent.

3.2.2.11 Finally, the EFUS panel also indicated high consensus that an urban security manager at the local level should be created who is given formal powers to negotiate and compel state and non-state agencies to follow their lead

### **3.2.3. Findings from Round Three of the Delphi (Q3)**

3.2.3.1 Analysis of Q3 of the Delphi focused on the ESC and EUCPN panels due to attrition and poor response rate in the EFUS panel.

3.2.3.2 Q3 required panellists to identify which actors and agencies ought to have strategic and operational management for the problems identified in Q2 but also to address the possibility and desirability of strategic management at the 'supra-problem' level.

3.2.3.3 In terms of strategic management, there was high consensus in agreement in the ESC panel that politicians with an electoral mandate ought to have responsibility for all nine problems. There was clear uncertainty over whether advisors with a scientific mandate should have strategic responsibility while there was either little agreement or uncertainty over appointed civil servants.

3.2.3.4 In contrast, there was less clarity in the EUCPN panel as panellists largely agreed in high or moderate consensus that politicians with an electoral mandate, appointed civil servants and advisors with a scientific mandate all ought to have responsibility for strategic management.

3.2.3.5 In terms of operational management in a framework where the police, criminal justice and welfare agencies ought to share responsibility, there was high consensus in agreement within the ESC panel that urban security managers ought to have operational responsibility and thus ultimate decision making powers for violence against the person (including domestic violence), social exclusion and youth unemployment, incivilities and anti-social behaviour, and immigration and the decline in social cohesion (although there was moderate consensus in agreement that welfare agencies ought to have ultimate decision making powers for the latter three problems).

3.2.3.6 There was also moderate consensus in agreement in the ESC panel that urban security managers ought to have ultimate decision making powers for property crime (although the police also had moderate consensus in agreement here), degradation of governing capacity and the protection of critical infrastructure and expansion of urban populations. There was high consensus in agreement that welfare agencies ought to have decision making powers for alcohol and drug misuse.

3.2.3.7 The role of the police for the ESC panel was more uncertain. While the panel indicated moderate consensus in agreement for the police to have decision making powers for criminal gangs and organised crime and also property crime, there was high consensus in disagreement that the police ought to have ultimate decision making powers for social issues such as social exclusion and youth unemployment and immigration and decline in social cohesion. There was also moderate consensus in disagreement over the role of the police in relation to incivilities and anti-social behaviour. For the other identified problems, the role of the police was highly uncertain.

3.2.3.8 A clear difference in judgement was evident in the EUCPN panel in relation to operational management as unlike the ESC panel, there was high consensus in agreement that the police ought to have responsibility and ultimate decision making powers. The police had the greatest support within the EUCPN panel where there was high consensus that the police ought to have operational responsibility for violence against the person (including domestic violence), property crime, criminal gangs and organised crime, alcohol and drug misuse, immigration and the decline in social cohesion, and the expansion of urban populations.

3.2.3.9 In the EUCPN panel, there was much less agreement and more uncertainty over operational responsibility. There was only high consensus in agreement in relation urban security managers having responsibility for property crimes but even here the level of agreement was lower than the level of agreement for the police.

3.2.3.10 There was largely uncertainty within the EUCPN panel over the responsibility of welfare agencies.

3.2.3.11 When asked whether police and criminal justice agencies or welfare agencies ought to have operational independence for the identified problems, the ESC panel indicated uncertainty amongst most problems. However, there was high consensus that the police and criminal justice agencies ought to have operational independence for criminal gangs and organised crime and moderate consensus that they should have operational independence for property crime and violence against the person (including domestic violence). As above, there was high consensus in disagreement that the police and criminal justice agencies ought to have operational independence for social exclusion and youth unemployment and immigration and decline in social cohesion. There was also high consensus in agreement that welfare agencies ought to have operational independence for alcohol and drug misuse.

3.2.3.12 In contrast, the EUCPN panel indicated a high consensus in agreement that the police and criminal justice agencies ought to have operational independence for violence against the person (including domestic violence), the expansion of urban populations, property crimes and criminal gangs and organised crime. However, there was also high consensus with the same level of agreement as the police that welfare agencies ought to have operational independence for violence against the person (including domestic violence) and high consensus in agreement that welfare agencies ought to have operational independence for incivilities and anti-social behaviour.

3.2.3.13 In relation to supra-problem strategic management, there was high consensus in agreement in the ESC panel that it is possible to identify the interrelationship of urban security problems and to plan their reduction over the medium (annual) to long (electoral cycle) term and that urban security managers ought to have primary responsibility for identifying the interrelationship of urban security problems and planning their reduction over the medium (annual) to long (electoral cycle) term. Interestingly, the panel indicated uncertainty over the role of elected politicians at the supra-problem strategic level despite overwhelmingly identifying politicians with



an electoral mandate as the key actors for strategic management at the level of individual problems.

3.2.3.14 The EUCPN panel indicated high consensus in agreement that it is possible to identify the interrelationship of urban security problems and to plan their reduction over the medium (annual) to long (electoral cycle) term, that urban security managers ought to have primary responsibility for identifying the interrelationship of urban security problems and planning their reduction over the medium (annual) to long (electoral cycle) term, and that both elected politicians and scientific advisors also ought to be key actors in identifying the interrelationship of urban security problems and planning their reduction over the medium to long term.

### **3.3. Relevant Expertise**

#### **3.3.1. Findings from Round One of the Delphi (Q1)**

3.3.1.1. In Q1 panellists were asked to discuss the expertise and training that authorities responsible for urban security currently have and that which, ideally, they ought to have in order to meet their responsibilities. As detailed in the commentaries on responses to Q1 from the ESC, EUCPN and EFUS panels (see Appendix One) a distinction was made between three substantively different kinds of current and prospective expertise, namely:

- The expertise of administrators and public office holders ('administration as a vocation')
- The expertise of politicians and elected representatives ('politics as a vocation')
- The expertise of scientists and researchers ('science as a vocation').

3.3.1.2. Another key distinction was made between expertise in strategy (the prioritisation of problems and approaches, setting security policy agendas, allocating resources and co-ordinating interventions made by the various responsible authorities organised at different tiers and in different spheres of governing, see 3.2., above) and expertise in operations (front-line interventions such as law enforcement, restorative work with offenders and victims and rehabilitative work with offenders).

3.3.1.3. The cross-national picture in Europe is decidedly uneven in terms of the expertise and training currently equipping authorities to respond to problems of urban security management (finding which is also borne out by the checklist of available education and training in crime prevention, see Deliverable 3.3.).

3.3.1.4. In terms of the current expertise held by administrators the EFUS panel identified a significant regional variation. At one extreme, two Northern European respondents and one Central European respondent highlighted the breadth and depth of officer expertise in the realm of urban security management. At the other extreme three Southern European respondents noted the current absence of any specific training in urban security management other than that associated with basic traditional police training. Other respondents fell between these extremes and suggested that developments were under way in terms of developing officer expertise through both formal higher educational programmes and 'on the job' training and experience. Amongst panellists from both the ESC and EUCPN panels, there was a broad consensus that the generally limited expertise and training in urban security which did exist across European countries was associated with public servants and often remained specifically located in the traditional branch of law enforcement and crime control, the public police. In turn these actors were located at both the national and municipal levels.



3.3.1.5. A key problem identified by respondents from all panels was the lack of an evidence-base including reliable administrative data and primary data sets (such as local victim surveys and self-report studies of offending behaviour) which could inform managerial responses premised on detailed knowledge of problems and evaluative understanding of what preventive approaches could work. As a consequence, both operational management and strategic management (in so far as this existed) tended to be premised more on occupational sub-cultures and practitioner know-how rather than on any self-conscious, intelligence-led, approach.

3.3.1.6. Given this analytical deficit, panellists from across the three panels identified a need for a programme of training and education in evidence-based approaches. In this regard, reference was made to the Tilley Awards in problem-oriented crime reduction, which are awarded by the Home Office of England and Wales each year to local partnerships that have developed evidence-based approaches. There was less agreement, however, about the appropriate role of postgraduate education in cultivating this kind of administrative expertise with a number of respondents, particularly from the EFUS and EUCPN panels identifying the importance of short courses for professional development as a more appropriate vehicle. Others, however, and predictably amongst the ESC panel, noted the importance of blending this kind of vocational education with educational and training programmes involving the long-term collaboration of universities and researchers and national and local policy officer and practitioner agencies.

3.3.1.7. A strong consensus of opinion across the three panels noted the lack of expertise held by elected representatives and there was negligible discussion from panellists on the EFUS and EUCPN panels about the kind of education or training that politicians ought to have, not least in equipping them with the ability to exercise effective democratic scrutiny and oversight of security strategies. There was more, although not substantial, discussion of the expertise of politicians by respondents from the ESC panel of social scientists. These respondents were uniformly critical of the populist, anti-intellectual, impact of elected politicians on crime prevention, noting that consequently the exercise of authority for urban security management is either premised on the party political and ideological inclinations of elected actors or it is left to unaccountable public administrators. In this regard, some panellists noted the important role of administrators in communicating scientific expertise to elected representatives.

3.3.1.8. There was limited discussion of the contribution of social scientific expertise to urban security management in responses from both the EFUS and EUCPN panels to Q1, suggesting such expertise is somewhat marginal to the current strategic and operational work of public authorities tasked with managing urban security. The marginal influence of social science was also corroborated by respondents from the ESC panel who, perhaps unsurprisingly, suggested that this ought not to be the case and that social science had a significant contribution to make to an evidence-based approach to problems of urban security. All panellists supported the emerging role for university-based undergraduate and, more especially, Masters level courses in, variously, 'urban safety', 'crime prevention' and 'community safety' and to a lesser extent 'crisis management', 'urban policy' and 'public management'. However, at present it would appear that very few, if any, of these university-based and primarily criminology-based and multi-disciplinary social science courses are considered compulsory for candidates for urban security management posts. In turn across European countries there is little evidence of any general, coordinated training although developments associated with the European Forum for Urban Security (EFUS)-based Masters programme in urban security were cited by a number of respondents as a potential starting point for the European-wide development of such training and education.



### **3.3.2. Findings from Round Two of the Delphi (Q2)**

3.3.2.1. In keeping with the logic of the second round of the Urbis policy Delphi, respondents across the three panels were asked to prioritise the kinds of expertise they thought administrators, politicians and social scientists ought to have in support of their responsibilities for taking action on the kinds of problems and approaches that had been identified in Q1. In this regard responses to Q2 helped to further clarify some of the ambiguities over the kind of expertise and training that had been identified in the first round.

3.3.2.2. In terms of administrative expertise, there was a high level of consensus amongst EUCPN panellists over a need for the following extensive spectrum of skills and qualifications:

- Dedicated, compulsory cross-sector training in urban security management (e.g. understanding the relationship between policing, health care, education, housing etc.) (100%)
- Evidence-based problem-solving and scientific evaluation (100%)
- Knowledge of the democratic process and of the nature of politics as a vocation (100%)
- Knowledge and awareness of the politics, ethics and human rights consequences of interventions in the field (100%)
- Masters -level criminology qualification and training (90%)
- Masters -level public management qualification and training (90%)
- Scientific analytical capacity in the municipal authorities (90%)
- Training in community/neighbourhood consultation (especially with 'hard to reach ' groups) (90%)
- Ability to communicate between those with social scientific expertise and those with political responsibility for urban security (90%)
- Masters -level crisis management qualification and training (80%)
- National system of formal certification principally involving knowledge of public law (80%)
- Traditional law enforcement and reactive policing knowledge and skills (80%)

There was even greater consensus amongst EFUS panellists, all of whom agreed with the following statements in relation to kinds of expertise and training that administrators ought to receive in order to effectively fulfil their responsibilities for urban security management:

- Masters-level criminology qualification
- Masters-level crisis management qualification
- Dedicated, compulsory cross-sector training in urban security management (e.g. understanding the relationship between policing, health care, education, housing etc.)
- Compulsory postgraduate-level professional qualification with a recognised set of core competencies
- Training in community/neighbourhood consultation (especially with 'hard to reach' groups)
- Practical, managerial knowledge and skills regarding organisational cultures and behaviour
- Ability to communicate between those with social scientific expertise and those with political responsibility for urban security.

Similarly there was a high degree of consensus amongst the ESC panel about the kind of expertise that administrators ought to possess in order to undertake their responsibilities for urban security management. The greatest agreement was over a need for dedicated compulsory cross-sector training in urban security management, an ability to communicate between those with social scientific expertise and with political responsibility for urban security, training in community/neighbourhood consultation, knowledge and awareness of the politics, ethics and human rights consequences of interventions in the field and practical, managerial knowledge and skills regarding organisational cultures and behaviour. It is also worth noting the 100% agreement



amongst the panellists that administrators ought to have masters-level training in criminology and in evidence-based problem solving and scientific evaluation.

3.3.2.3. Q2 also helped to clarify panellists views on the kind of expertise that elected representatives ought to have. Responses from the EFUS panel revealed a very high consensus (100%) that elected politicians ought to have evidence-based problem-solving and scientific evaluation, the ability to reflect and give voice to the views and sentiments of the citizenry, and knowledge of the multi-dimensionality of urban security issues and their management in both municipal and national elected leadership. Interestingly, these findings corroborate what was perceived in Q2.6b to be the current state of knowledge and training among elected representatives. However, there was a lack of consensus and significant uncertainty over the role to be played in the future by both party political ideology and the charismatic authority of the elected politician with a half disagreeing or uncertain as the importance and contribution of such skills and knowledge to urban security management.

Similarly, responses from the EUCPN panel revealed a very high consensus (100%) of agreement that elected politicians ought to have knowledge of the multi-dimensionality of urban security issues and their management. There was also a very high consensus that elected politicians ought to be knowledgeable or have access to knowledge about evidence-based problem-solving and scientific evaluation (90%). There was also a high consensus regarding the need for dedicated training for the political office of Mayor (80%). These findings stand in sharp contrast to what was perceived to be the current state of knowledge and training among elected representatives.

This consensus of opinion was also found in the responses of the ESC panel which observed that elected politicians ought to have knowledge of the multi-dimensionality of urban security issues and their management and that there ought to be dedicated training for elected mayors, especially where they have constitutional-legal authority for the leadership of urban security management. 93% of the panel also agreed that elected politicians ought to reflect the priorities of the citizenry and ought to have knowledge of evidence-based problem-solving and scientific evaluation.

Of course, this raises the challenging problem of how to arbitrate between the priorities of the electorate and the outcomes of evidence-based problem-solving and scientific evaluation where these two drivers of policy conflict with one another. A classic example of this is over the value of routine police patrolling which has been criticised as ineffective in the research literature but which remains popular with many local electorates.

3.3.2.4. Q2 also helped to clarify expectations that respondents on the EFUS panel had of social scientists' contribution to urban security management. Responses revealed 100% agreement with all proposed statements about the desirable expertise that social scientists ought to have in order to support urban security management:

- Knowledge and skills in evidence-based problem-solving
- Knowledge and skills in gathering and analysing data on social trends
- Knowledge and skills in explaining both the causes and solution of the problems of crime and disorder
- Knowledge and skills in understanding wider trends in contemporary society and in particular those of urban development
- Inter-disciplinary grounding in the social sciences
- Knowledge and skills in crime science and experimental method
- Knowledge and skills in understanding the policy making process
- Critical awareness of the limitations of current policy and practice
- Knowledge and skills as a practical, collaborative policy adviser to those governing urban security



- Knowledge and skills as the social engineer of progressive change with regard to how urban security is managed
- Ability to provide detached evidence-based research knowledge underpinning the response of authorities

When contrasted with responses to the current expertise of this community, there was little difference in the current and future areas of required expertise albeit the following statements received high agreement:

- Critical awareness of the limitations of current policy and practice
- Knowledge and skills in understanding the policy making process
- Knowledge and skills in crime science and experimental method

These findings are significant as it reflects a strong commitment to causal analysis and intervention which has been resisted, indeed challenged, as an appropriate contribution of researchers by critical social scientists who have privileged a focus on the normative social construction of 'crime' and 'insecurity'. To this end the strong consensus about the value that experimental criminology ought to have for urban security management is significant, with 100% of the panel agreeing, given the dispute within criminology over the possibility and desirability of experiments. These expectations were also found in responses from the EUCPN and ESC panels.

### ***3.3.3. Findings from Round Three of the Delphi (Q3)***

3.3.3.1. Responses to Q2 had indicated some ambivalence about the standardisation of education and training programmes or the extent to which they ought to be tailored to specific contexts and, if the latter, whether they ought to be tailored to the particular conditions of different European countries or of particular cities and localities. Q3 sought the opinion of the panels on this and, in doing so, to corroborate the priority these panels had given to education and training in urban security management.

3.3.3.2. As noted above, the attrition of panellists from the EFUS panel precluded any meaningful discussion of consensus and disagreement about these questions from this panel in round three. However, Q3 responses from the ESC and EUCPN panels are summarised in Figures 15 and 16 (see Appendix Two).

3.3.3.3. Both panels were in strong agreement with the possibility and desirability of an education and training programme organised around a common set of problems, responsibilities and types of expertise. This is an important finding as it corroborates the core set of problems and approaches prioritised in Q2 (see 3.1., above) and suggests there is a common conceptual framework for a European-wide dialogue and knowledge exchange about urban security.

3.3.3.4. Both panels were also in strong agreement with need to use this common programme of education and training to tailor urban security management to the particular contexts found in different European countries and, within these, in different cities and localities.



## **4. Summary and Discussion**

4.1. In summary, there is a need for a programme of education and training that shares abstract knowledge about common problems and approaches but which also equips learners with an ability to tailor this abstract knowledge to the specific contexts in which they are applying this knowledge. This can be contrasted with learning programmes which seek to generalise knowledge in the belief it has a universal application.

4.2. Specifically, it has been found from WP3 that common referents for urban security exist (such as problems of violence against the person, property crime, organised crime, incivilities etc., and approaches prioritising criminal justice, risk management, restorative justice and social justice) exist (see 3.1., above) and that these enable a European-wide dialogue and knowledge exchange. However, understanding their particular expression and their interrelationship with other social problems requires local knowledge and contextualised insight that can, for example, appreciate the particular conditions of crime and insecurity in rural Ireland or Norway as contrasted with urban England and Germany and, more forensically still, in the conditions of large metropolitan areas such as London, Paris and Berlin as contrasted with the post-industrial cities of Wallonia, Northern France and the Welsh valleys.

4.3. As such, WP3 has provided a foundation for this kind of curriculum development, which will be pursued in WP5 and in relation to findings from WP4 on the kinds of expectations that employers of urban security managers have about this role or 'profile'.